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 The claim has been made that the nineteenth century’s interest in libertine fiction 
is merely “archival.” This dissertation seeks to contest that claim by examining the reuse 
of certain well-known, if not notorious, characters from European seduction narratives of 
the fifteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries—Valmont, Don Juan, and 
Tannhäuser—in the work of George Gordon, Lord Byron, Charles Baudelaire, Algernon 
Swinburne, and Aubrey Beardsley. It finds that these seducers are not static characters 
deployed for the purpose of allusion or critique, but heroes, reworked and rehabilitated as 
the central figures of literary seductions intended to entice and control the reader and 
address the perceived inequities of nineteenth-century morality or politics. By applying a 
four-phase framework for seduction derived from canonical seduction narratives, the 
argument demonstrates how the reinvented seducers have been stripped down, 
personalized, redressed, and recontextualized in narratives that seek to compel through 
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Ian Kelly prefaces his biography of Giacomo Casanova with a brief anecdote 
retelling Casanova’s reaction to Mozart’s Don Giovanni. “Seen it?” Casanova is thought 
to have responded to the inquiry, “I’ve practically lived it” (1). It is a moment that 
underscores Casanova’s habitual wit and approachability, but it also says a great deal 
about the essential relevance of Don Giovanni. By the time of the opera’s Prague 
premiere in 1787, the tragi-comic antihero Don Juan had been going to his sticky 
supernatural end for more than 150 years,1 his cosmopolitan adventures advancing 
posthumously to occupy stages all across Europe. Yet Don Giovanni is not merely the 
subject of revival, like a Mirabeau perpetually parroting the same witticisms decade after 
decade in the same drawing room. Don Giovanni—or Don Juan, or Don John, as aliases 
vary according to the preferences and prejudices of the audience which consumes him—
gets rewritten. He is tragic; he is comic; he is villain; he is hero; he is a killer, a rapist, a 
lover, a philosopher… He is, in short, an endlessly reconstitutable archetype. 
 But it was not just the eighteenth century that had such a lust for recycling the 
classic heroes of dirty didactic tales; the nineteenth century also revived Don Juan—
among others—with gusto.2 As we will see, the Spanish seducer was taken to the English 
everyman’s bosom along with the dame and the devil of pantomime, before being 
elevated into something uncommon again in Byron’s Don Juan; Valmont was promoted 
from subject of moral outrage to subject of analysis in Baudelaire’s “Notes sur Les 




adopted as a subject by everyone who was anyone, at least in Aesthetic circles, becoming 
a sort of variorum edition of himself. That these characters are both popular and 
persistent is obvious; what is less clear is why the nineteenth century should have turned 
to this kind of morally dubious character in particular, and renovated their stories.   
One of the ways this question has been resolved critically is by discounting the 
immediacy of the nineteenth century’s interest. In Schooling Sex, James Grantham Turner 
traces the lineage of a particular genre of libertine discourse—the erotic-didactic text, in 
particular the predecessors and variants of Chorier’s Satyra Sotadica,—through its 
sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and early-eighteenth-century evolutions. Any nineteenth-century 
engagement with the type is confined to an epilogue subtitled “Afterlife and Retrospect.” 
Though the epilogue nicely balances the prologue, which considers Chorier’s formative 
impact on the adolescent Casanova, by noting the text’s place on the shelves of the 
imaginary aesthetic libraries conceived by Baudelaire and Huysmans and its role as a 
foundation for Forberg’s taxonomy of sex, the epilogue’s treatment of these occurrences 
emphasizes their archival, rather than practical, deployment. The paragraph that briefly 
considers Chorier’s reuse in Baudelaire’s “Femmes damnées: Delphine et Hippolyte” and 
“Les Bijoux” lingers over the moments of direct translation, but appears to consider 
Baudelaire’s reinventions of the source material half measures rather than valid 
evolutions: the first poem becomes “something doom-laden and infernal” (393) because 
of Baudelaire’s inability to sustain true amorality; the second transforms “erotic 
metamorphosis into the detached, voyeuristic mode of the ‘Museum’” (394)—it becomes 
a retrospective allusion rather than a contemporarily reinvention. In Turner’s defense, his 




trope, the feminine point of view, and the early-modern timeframe—so it is reasonable 
that, as the fashion for the trope peters out, so does his interest. He also positions himself 
openly and aggressively in reaction to previous collections of libertine scholarship, those 
of Lynn Hunt and Catherine Cusset in particular, that seek to connect libertine literature 
with modernity. In spite of their “modern moments,” Turner contends “my hard-core 
texts…have been weakened by anachronistic assimilation into genres like ‘pornography’ 
and ‘the novel’” (395). This, I believe, underestimates the tenacity of such texts.  Mere 
allusion may be chalked up to only a fashion for decadence or subtle intellectual 
aggrandizement, an erudite wink on the part of an author to a coterie of readers in the 
know; reinvention, however, in the manner of Baudelaire’s poems, speaks to the kind of 
ongoing relevance to the nineteenth century also seen in the lineage of Don Juan—
immediate, contemporary, and practical.            
The intention of this argument is to demonstrate that nineteenth-century revivals 
of certain seduction narratives are more than just “archival” manifestations; they are 
eroto-didactic texts themselves, true to the tradition that Turner explores, but elevating 
the didactic effect outside the narrative itself, replacing the libertine instructor and the 
novice instructee of the seventeenth-century tradition with libertine text and novice 
reader of the nineteenth-century transformation. These texts are less about seduction than 
they are seductions themselves, and my intention is to treat them as rhetoric, to analyze 
their methods and, wherever possible, divine their aims. The seduction narratives in 
question are those concerning the characters mentioned earlier—Don Juan, Valmont, and 
Tannhäuser—and the focus of inquiry is into the manner in which they are redeployed in 




Beardsley. These authors would have known libertine literature intimately—it occupied 
their bookshelves, is mentioned in their diaries, and headlined their theater programs and 
their opera nights. They would have been readers, just as cognizant of the means and 
methods of seduction as any of the previous century’s consumers of Molière, Mozart, 
Choderlos de Laclos, or John Cleland. Initially, their reimaginings of libertine tales 
document their reader responses: how they negotiated the seductive inconsistencies in the 
source texts, and what imaginary realities—fantasy, philosophy, analysis, commentary, 
personal bias, wish fulfillment—they constructed within the gaps. These reimaginings 
stand, second and perhaps more importantly, as rhetoric, careful redeployments of those 
narrative strategies of seduction and control that libertine literature does so well, in hopes 
of promulgating carefully, pleasantly, perhaps even invisibly, some larger point about the 
world, turning titillating stories into eroto-didactic adventures, to address and rebalance 
the perceived inequities of morality and politics in a nineteenth century gone painfully 
conservative and powerfully dictatorial in reaction to the excesses of the French 
Revolution. 
 This argument presumes that some larger point must exist, even if its 
transmission in these often-incomplete projects was truncated or flawed; else why risk 
writing the book? The publication history of libertine literature is so fraught with 
prosecution and censorship, there seems to be no other reason to bother. In France, 
extensive censorship of libertine texts was already a feature of the years leading up to the 
Terror, in part because so many dirty books and illustrations also took pot shots at king 
and church.3 In England, however, the comparatively lax common-law approach of the 




Person Act of 1828 consolidated a miscellany of pre-existing laws and clarified their 
punishments, lumping sodomy, bestiality, abortion, and bigamy in with piracy, 
kidnapping, assault, and murder as felonies. The anti-obscenity mandate of the Society 
for the Suppression of Vice (1802) was partly formalized in the Vagrancy Acts of 1824 
and 1838, making obscene display (including illustrations) prosecutable as vagrancy, and 
completed in the Obscene Publications Act of 1857, which extended the ban to all print 
forms.  Offending materials could be seized and incinerated, and offending purveyors 
brought up on charges. It was dangerous to sit down and write a dirty book, and the 
stringency of such legislation may account for the comparative tameness of Byron and 
Swinburne’s work as compared to, say, the explicitness of Cleland’s Fanny Hill.  
In spite of the hazards, however, an eroto-didactic text based on a familiar 
libertine character has its advantages—in this case, popularity and promise. The libertine 
characters chosen for analysis and reconfiguration in these stories all have both a literary 
history and a degree of cultural currency: as we see later, Don Juan occupied stages 
almost continually from the early seventeenth century through the end of the nineteenth, 
in drama, comedy, and pantomime; Valmont’s story, first published in 1782, was adapted 
for the stage as comedy in 1783 and as drama in 1834; once resurrected from his 
fifteenth-century mythology, Tannhäuser’s experiences are committed to the page on 
various dates including 1799, 1827, 1836, and 1861, and to the German stage in 1845 and 
the French stage in 1861. To go to press with “the next” Don Juan or Tannhäuser story is 
to leverage an existing audience, with a predefined set of expectations that may be toyed 
with, built upon, or demolished, for rhetorical and didactic effect. To wrap the next Don 




countercultural appearances for one of a group of writers whose reputation are built, to 
one degree or another, on shock, and to entice audiences who may not necessarily 
willingly consume a more melodramatically moral novel—an Elizabeth Gaskell, say, or a 
Charles Dickens—on the grounds that it is too tame, too preachy, or too bourgeois, but 
would attend a pantomime romp, read a dirty book, or delight in having experienced the 
newest and most talked-about entertainments. The simple fact is that, at least until the end 
of the story when the messy retribution happens, most libertine novels feel good to read; 
closely related to pornography in their methods and effects, they rely heavily on reader 
identification to create feelings of titillation. Because readers seek these stories out for 
precisely that mimetic capability, many libertine authors recognized it as a powerful 
rhetorical and didactic tool—a kind of whore’s dialogue between author and reader, 
where ideas may be passed along as salacious gossip. Narratives about sex can simulate 
sexual experience, as Ros Ballaster notes; narratives about seduction can themselves 
seduce. As readers of libertine stories, Byron, Baudelaire, Swinburne, and Beardsley 
would have been subjects of that seduction; as creators of fresh-conceived libertine 
adventures that challenge the political and religious dogma of the nineteenth century, 
they are in a position to co-opt and refine its methods. This is why, in the first chapter of 
this argument, I attempt to synthesize a coherent process for seduction from some of the 
diverse critical definitions and fictional depictions of seduction out there. Analysis of a 
selection of literary and philosophical arguments suggests that seduction has four distinct 
strategies: disarmament, personalization, enticement, and control; the remainder of the 





The second chapter, for instance, shows how Byron works to disarm the reader 
and personalize the libertine by taking a well-exercised tale about the middle-aged 
adventures of a thoroughly dissipated Spanish seducer, the kind of character who is at 
best the butt of jokes and at worst dragged off to Hell by demons, and turning it into a 
peripatetic bildungsroman about a thoroughly nice, if feckless, adolescent everyman to 
whom sexual adventures occur inadvertently. He positions the reader between the too-
worldly, too-sarcastic, evidently once oversexed but now superannuated narrator and the 
young, attractive, generally sweet-tempered Juan, undoubtedly aware that the narrator’s 
biting tone and factual inconsistencies will pale, and perhaps irritate, in comparison to the 
boy’s straightforwardness. Born of the confluence of the passions and the intellect, 
Byron’s Don Juan knows nothing, is nothing, until a variety of unexpected and exotic 
sexual experiences shape him—and the reader who has identified with him—into a 
person with sufficient empathy to conquer the xenophobia and misogyny typical of his 
class, and sufficient intelligence to see through grandiose supernatural manifestations to 
the all-too-human self-service beneath.             
         The third chapter examines how Baudelaire redesigns the libertine to entice a 
democratic audience by reading between the lines, and the letters, of Valmont just as he 
was written by Laclos, but building into the gaps a personality with the potential for 
moral and philosophical growth. Through stringent application of those same tools that a 
successful homme dangereuse has already mastered—awareness of the mechanics of evil 
and the impulses of human nature—a libertine’s sins may themselves become the path to 
virtue. In Baudelaire’s notes, Valmont is decontextualized, isolated from the elaborate 




reactionary Republican, and recontextualized as a superlative combination of 
Baudelairean ideals—dandyesque self-awareness plus Satanic knowledge. What Laclos 
writes as emotional and procedural failings in seduction (failings that point up Valmont’s 
second-tier libertine capabilities, especially in comparison to the Marquise de Merteuil’s 
peerless single-minded destructiveness) Baudelaire interprets as the first quaking 
undercurrents of catalysis, of transition to something better—the redeemable man. 
“Voyez mon ouvrage,” Valmont says, and Baudelaire would have the reader do just that: 
to look at his work as an exercise in free will, evaluate it with a clear eye, unpolluted by 
nineteenth-century romanticism, or worse yet, ignorance, and take note of its value, take 
note of it as a way forward and a philosophy to emulate both socially and politically.     
 The fourth chapter examines Swinburne’s reduction of the Tannhäuser 
abduction—a story which usually travels back and forth between the real world and the 
Venusberg—into a long moment of reflection and a short moment of rejection, as a 
platform for the deployment of techniques for control. With “Laus Veneris,” Swinburne 
reaches sideways, rather than backwards, taking up a popular tale of fairy seduction with 
medieval roots, which had momentarily entranced the aesthetic world. Its attraction is due 
in part to the seven-year gap in the tale that begs to be filled with the wildest debauchery 
that can be expected of a fallen pagan goddess, the kind of deviancy that Swinburne, with 
his literary predilections for lesbianism and masochism in classical draperies, seems just 
the poet to write, the kind of deviancy hinted at in the poem’s Latin title…and delivered 
nowhere else. The poet fills the poem instead with inescapable reverie. Trapped in an 
eerily necrophilic lovers’ clinch, the knight of “Laus Veneris” casts his thoughts back and 




discover that his memories of a faith that once supported him are themselves a lie.  
Swinburne locks the reader into the knight’s perspective as if gripping the back of the 
reader’s head; with nothing to look at except Tannhäuser’s current and past perceptions, 
the reader is treated to an elaborate and systematic application of doubt that dissolves the 
moral binaries of a Christian past in the crucible of a pagan sexual present. The resulting 
psychological apocalypse—the ultimate discovery that divinity is accessible only through 
the form of the beloved—is as much a relief (and release) for the reader, as it is for the 
knight.   
 Finally, Beardsley works through all four phases in turn in the least complete 
seduction effort explored in this argument; so incomplete a narrative, in fact, that his 
ultimate aim is never entirely clear. He retreads the territory explored by both Swinburne 
and Richard Wagner—though it is Wagner’s deficiencies, evidently, he means most 
directly to redress—but he exploits his unique position as both author and illustrator to 
create text and illustrations that challenge each other, creating a world of excess and 
inconsistency that systematically challenge the reader’s beliefs about what they know of 
sex, what they believe about society, and the journey of experience itself. Beardsley’s 
Tannhäuser is a thoroughly modern hero, the questing aesthete and voluntary student 
whose focus on form, rather than substance, undermines the seriousness of the varied and 
frenetic sexual activity in which he lustily participates. The illustrations show a boy—
perhaps even an effeminatus—entrapped yet unaware of his bonds, poised on the brink of 
changes for which, with his lace cuffs and his walking stick, he seems ill-equipped. The 
text describes a society whose primary entertainment is sex, in the endless forms and 




Psychopathia Sexualis (or similar medico-sexual texts), as though the acts themselves 
were words allowed free play so long as they remain confined in the syntax that is the 
Venusberg. The illustrations are tame, even static, as though the sex has already become 
irrelevant even at the moment of its conception, a means rather than an end. In the space 
between the word and the drawing, the reader is supposed to negotiate the real story, the 
one which mimics Swinburne’s story, only with the religious and sexual politics stripped 
away, the one in which the hero, broken over the rack of his experiences, sees beyond the 
primacy of form to the substance beneath, and the goddess, uncharacteristically 
submissive, passive, and sympathetic, becomes the haven in which he loses himself and 
finds redemption.   
Though the minutiae of the conversions differ in their particulars, in broad terms 
Byron, Baudelaire, Swinburne and Beardsley apply the same methodologies in 
refashioning their libertine tales. They strip their heroes of those qualities which would 
devalue them or make them objectionable—age, agency, seriousness, or competition. 
They remove them from familiar contexts, destabilizing them, stripping them of their 
social milieu, sending them across the world, across the country, or across their own 
histories. They play down the mechanics of sex and play up its impact, emphasizing the 
myriad ways that sexual experience can break and remake a man. (Not that a female 
audience was uncommon, at this time or for these writers. However, given that women 
were already considered to be the primary consumers of novels, particularly gothic and 
sentimental ones; that the didactic aspects of libertine literature designed to warn 
women—the depiction of male aggression against weaker female victims—is missing in 




political or martial flavor, a male target audience would be both more challenging to 
appeal to and more valuable to coerce.) Though most of these works are unfinished, they 
still suggest, at least briefly, that the remade man is better—more sympathetic, more 
aware, more intelligent, more redeemable—than a virtuous man without such experience 
would be. The moral of all four reinventions is that vice, when experienced in its 
diversity, objectively, with the intellect engaged, can serve as a crucible, integrating the 
intellect and the passions so that they may act in accord rather than contention, 
effectively reintegrating the demon in man with the angel, to the benefit of both. 
A digression may be necessary to defend the less-than-conventional choice to 
include Tannhäuser with the more traditionally libertine Don Juan and Valmont. The 
stories of all three characters may be classified as “seduction narratives,” because each 
plot hinges on at least one seduction, although the term is unsatisfyingly vague, as it can 
also include sentimental, victim-focused narratives that exacerbate feelings of pity, 
empathy, or schadenfreude as well as more traditionally arousing accounts of seduction. 
“Libertine” and “libertinism,” on the other hand, are too narrowly, yet still variously, 
defined in the critical literature by projects that encompass a variety of periods and a 
variety of nations; the only locus of temporal-spatial agreement appears to be eighteenth-
century France, or what Feher calls “the licentious ways of the declining French 
aristocracy” (12). Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Connell carry the definition across the channel 
to include eighteenth-century Britain; Bradford Mudge and Richard Darnton extend the 
period backwards to the Renaissance progenitors of the English and French texts in 
which they are interested. Turner considers classical texts alongside Chorier. Hunt 




twentieth-century connections, though Hunt is tracing pornography rather than libertine 
literature, a distinction which is also fraught with problems. Cusset further complicates 
matters by distinguishing “libertinism” and “libertinage,” and arguing for two sub-
classifications of libertinage. The whole matter would risk devolution into an arcane and 
unusable taxonomy of distinction, save for Cusset’s attempt to create common ground 
among the disparate positions of the arguments in her own collection: “…libertinage is 
text, not sex…libertine eroticism implies an esthetic relation among words, the 
imagination, and the reader” (12). Later she coins the suggestive phrase “strategies of 
seduction” (12). In an effort to avoid arbitrary exclusion of potentially enlightening texts 
based on year or place of composition, I wish to follow her example and widen the 
definition of libertinism (or narrow the definition of seduction narrative) to privilege 
structure over place—European stories which happen to be derived since the Middle 
Ages that take seduction as their primary focus and a moral, potentially admonitory 
universe as their context. Valmont, as an Ancien Régime aristocrat in Catholic France 
whose seductive projects ultimately kill him, is undeniably a libertine, and the position of 
Dangerous Liaisons in the canon of libertine texts is unassailable. Don Juan, as a Spanish 
aristocrat whose story is predicated on seduction and escape, also counts, although one 
may argue he is condemned to Hell for his hubris rather than his immorality. Tirso de 
Molina’s original play gave birth to so many variants which have themselves entered the 
canon—Molière leading the charge—that El Burlador de Sevilla y convidado de piedra is 
frequently included under a sort of grandfather clause. As a thirteenth-century German 
minnesinger whose name became linked with a cluster of grail-paradise myths in the 




myth had little currency outside of Germany before the nineteenth century. Much of the 
“Tannhäuser tradition” is, frankly, down to Wagner. However, even in its fifteenth-
century folk-song incarnation the myth is still a two-fold story of seduction: first, as a 
minnesinger, Tannhäuser’s particular expertise is crafting love poetry, not out of personal 
interest, but to please an audience, making him a master of love as a system or a craft 
rather than an emotion; second, he is abducted, not by a fairy, whose charms might 
encompass a variety of magical experiences, but by Venus, a goddess with three defining 
features: paganism, power, and sexuality. Even in its early incarnations, the Tannhäuser 
myth is in effect the story of the forced seduction of an expert in love as a rhetorical art 
by an even greater expert in love as a manipulative art—a libertine contest structurally 
identical to that between “traditional” libertines Valmont and Merteuil. The weapons with 















In her analysis of the Valmont/Merteuil libertine contest, “‘Les Liaisons 
Dangereuses’: A Practical Lesson in the Art of Seduction,” Valerie Minogue accounts for 
what she calls the novel’s “powerful emotional fascination” with the contention that, in 
the novel, the act of seduction occurs on two levels simultaneously—the manipulation of 
character by character within the plot, and the manipulation of reader (who is “flattered, 
intrigued, baffled, and blandished”) by text during the act of reading (775). She charts the 
seduction of the reader in two phases—courtship, in which the libertine philosophy is 
made to look heroic, and disappointment, when these putative heroes are shown to have 
feet of clay. For the purposes of my argument, the proposition that an analogy exists 
between the dynamic of libertine and victim and libertine text and reader is an intriguing 
one, as it permits me to borrow a language with which to describe the narrative changes 
made to the stories of Don Juan, Valmont, and Tannhäuser and to categorize their effects. 
The binary system of overture and movement she outlines, however, seems too 
simplistic. The intention of this chapter, then, is to build upon and complicate Minogue’s 
taxonomy of seduction in order to generate a lexicon for seductive strategy, derived from 
both seduction theory and seduction narrative, that may be applied to the libertine 






The process of seduction is more often nodded to in the literature than explained 
with any kind of comprehensiveness. Critical approaches, for instance, prefer rather to 
define the concept, usually ambivalently, than lay out the steps for its deployment. 
Fictional seducers, so voluble on the mechanics of sex, say very little indeed about the 
mechanics of seduction. On those rare occasions when a seduction narrative includes a 
précis of seductive technique, as we will see later in the work of Laclos and Crébillon 
fils, it is often quite obviously incomplete; like a writer writing about bomb-making, 
there seems to be a concern about the dangers of too much verisimilitude. (Indeed, more 
is usually gleaned from watching what these libertine figures do than from listening to 
whatever little bit they say, especially as so much of seduction depends on verbal irony 
and dissimulation.) Nonetheless, if taken together, twentieth-century theory and 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century self-revelation do appear to provide a coherent and 
surprisingly simple four-step methodology for seduction, a phased strategy of four 
steps—disarm, personalize, entice, control. Because seduction is, at its heart, a rhetorical 
practice, the deployment of discourse to manipulate the perceptions and attitudes of its 
victim, its strategies lend themselves nearly as well to a narrative environment and the 
relationship between writer and reader as to a physical environment and the relations 
between seducer and victim. Seduction becomes an excellent metanarrative technique 
with which to manipulate the reader, as Byron, Baudelaire, Swinburne, and Beardsley do, 
into entertaining and perhaps adopting novel, if not scandalously subversive, social and 
political perspectives.  
Among critics, most definitions of seduction characterize it as a unilateral 




of the many methods of implementation; only a few, Roland Barthes and Jean Baudrillard 
among them, treat it as a projection of power primarily through discourse; its physical 
outcomes are less important than the triumph of manipulation.5 In Barthes, for example, 
perhaps because he is critiquing de Sade, the definition of seduction preserves an air of 
violence in the presupposition of an unwilling victim and a completely dominant master, 
but the control of the body is secondary to the control of language. In some of de Sade’s 
more elaborate sexual scenarios, where victims have submitted, or been converted, to the 
practices of the master, or everyone seems to be buggering everyone else, it is sometimes 
difficult to tell who is the libertine in charge; for Barthes, that distinction is predicated on 
the possession of a will to discourse: “The master is he who speaks, who disposes of the 
entirety of language; the object is he who is silent, who remains separate… from any 
access to discourse” (31). The master of language is the master of people.6  The Sadean 
libertine is he who controls and disposes of individuals the way a writer arranges words, 
in an infinitely mutable syntax of participants, orifices, and acts. The artistry in seduction 
is found in the imaginativeness of the arrangement, debauchery as story, and thus it is 
analogous to both the creation of fiction and to surrealist art. In seduction narratives, 
usually fictionalized accounts of seductions, it is the reader (who has the most omniscient 
perspective), rather than the libertine’s victim (whose perspective is limited, likely 
preoccupied with the sexual realities of the moment, and in any case disempowered by 
the lack of access to discourse), who is the object of the seduction.7 Seduction’s ultimate 
effect is rhetorical rather than physical, arising not from the acts performed, but from the 
aggregation of inventive arrangements—in Barthes’ words, from being the figure that 




pretends a realism it does not possess, a condition that can only be maintained so long as 
the seducer can exclude reality and prevent comparison; for this reason, as Barthes points 
out, Sadean seductions are only ever set in a closed world—a locked cellar, a closed 
courtroom, a sequestered manor—where “social autarchy” can be maintained (17). 
Barthes’ observations about the Sadean setting can be applied to other pornographic and 
seductive narratives; they are echoed in Stephen Marcus’ construction of the 
“pornotopia,” a narrative setting for pornography that treats the world it creates as a 
bubble or a body utterly without external context. This imperative for enclosure noted by 
Barthes and Marcus serves to manufacture the illusion of intimacy and interdependence 
between the seducer and the victim, an illusion that is leveraged psychologically in the 
conversion of the victim to complicit novice seducer. 
Where Barthes’ observations about seduction suggest only the possibility of a 
transfer of power from libertine to victim, Baudrillard’s analysis in Seduction 
presupposes the continual transfer of power between seduction participants. In the course 
of a seduction, power is projected, undermined, and reversed; the line between seducer 
and victim muddies as the seduction continues. Seducer and victim arrive at a state of 
complicity because both become, in the end, aware of the existence of the secret of the 
seduction (although the goal of some seductions is the revelation of this “secret” and the 
public shaming of the victim). For Baudrillard, seduction is uncertainty, power 
undermined by knowledge, and as such, is a feminine principle in that it defies the formal 
(masculine) order represented by sex. Like Barthes, Baudrillard finds seduction 
inextricably bound up with imaginative discourse; taking a shot at Foucault, for whom 




over the symbolic universe, while power represents only the mastery of the real universe” 
(8). The symbolic universe is fundamentally frangible; the immutable qualities upon 
which the formal order is based (class, power, nation, heritage, perhaps even gender, 
intellect, and tastes) are shown to be mutable and may be manipulated and overturned at 
will. (This is why, in the libertine reinventions discussed in the remainder of this 
argument, the author’s first move is usually to strip the hero of all of his identifiers early 
in the text. These identifiers create a semblance of difference between the reader and the 
hero, impeding identification; the perception of otherness intrinsic to social, economic, or 
national stratification can too easily be misinterpreted as threat, undermining the 
seduction before it has even begun.) The problem with realism in a symbolic universe is 
that it cannot be real; the uncertainties of seduction are so fundamental to the world that 
things that present themselves as real—Baudrillard notes both pornography and overt 
sexual invitation as examples—are too apparently truthful to be actually true. They must, 
instead, refer to something other than themselves. Order, certainty, sexuality, and the real 
are thus illusions of the symbolic; the pretense that motivates seduction is instead an 
operation that is what it aspires to be—perversely, the operation with truth value.9  
In theory, then, seduction is shown to be a process based upon pretense (the 
illusion of weakness, usually, or at least safety), requiring enclosure (either physical 
sequestration or the perception of an exclusive relationship), and intending control 
(although those intentions may not be consistently fulfilled.) It is an expression of the 
agility of the mind, rather than the gonads, a bringing of the intellect to bear in service of 
the imagination to undermine the targeted order and fulfill the self-interest. In practice, 




factual account—bear this out. As noted previously, fictionalized seduction narratives are 
routinely incomplete in their explanations of the mechanisms of seduction. The libertine 
pedagogue Versac’s lecture on the topic in The Wayward Head and Heart, for instance, 
postpones proceedings as soon as the conversation turns to women—“If you are as eager 
to learn as I am to instruct, we shall easily find an opportunity”—but that opportunity 
never comes. The meat of the matter is never discussed, the object of interest (889). 
Consequently, fictions tend to emphasize techniques of pretense, enticement, and 
personalization rather than control and follow-through. Versac lays out a long-winded 
schema of affectation by which the would-be seducer can move through, and take 
advantage of French society at will. For Versac, this very long-windedness is a virtue, as 
discourse is one of the ways society negotiates and transfers power. He provides an 
example in which a man’s military conversation is superseded by a woman’s amatory 
philosophy, which is in turn overtaken by another woman’s licentious ditty, resulting in a 
moral lecture that is cut short in turn by gossip, political agitation, gambling stories, and 
finally personal remarks (888-9). Though Versac’s explanation gives lip service only to 
society’s empty-headedness, his example lays out a much more fundamental 
understanding of the workings of the society in which he moves and the way society 
preserves itself. The threat of consequential ideas is mitigated, individuals with 
inconsequential minds are flattered and included, virtue is nodded at, and stability in a 
system of divergent capabilities and motivations is maintained. The trick for the would-
be seducer is to learn how to insert himself into the discourse at the right moment and 
with the right content to achieve his aims without appearing to disrupt or preempt the 




Dangerous Liaisons, seduction is best conducted via conversation rather than in print; 
speech presumably permits the seducer to react more immediately to the changing 
circumstances of the discourse.10 Leo Weinstein boils down Versac’s advice on managing 
society into six precepts: “eagerly embrace all fads of the moment,” “be different at any 
price,” “study other people without revealing yourself,” “be overbearing and overly self-
confident,” “assume the bon ton of good society,” and “make a noisy display” (41-4). 
Versac’s seducer masquerades, like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, not just as a peer to his 
prey, but a peerless example—a little more sophisticated, a little more innovative, a little 
more au courant, a little more attractive. The seducer is the bait in his own trap; the mark 
of a good male seducer is that the prey does all the apparent pursuing. As Søren 
Kierkegaard’s unnamed seducer in “Diary of the Seducer” remarks, “…when one can 
arrange it that a girl’s only desire is to give herself freely, when she feels that her whole 
happiness depends on this, when she almost begs to make this free submission, then there 
is the first true enjoyment…” (51). The mark of a good female seducer is, as the 
Marquise de Merteuil lays out in the much-discussed Letter 81 in Dangerous Liaisons, 
the ability to feign insusceptibility to pursuit while secretly picking and choosing the 
overtures to which one succumbs. The aim of seduction, in these fictional accounts, is 
thus the appropriation of power; mastery requires the sophisticated, practically invisible, 
deployment of the twin arts of dissimulation and enticement. 
A seducer’s first priority must be to ensure admittance to his target’s world 
without arousing the suspicions of either the object of seduction or her caretakers. A 
variety of pretenses may be used—the appearance of irreproachable social or moral 




pity, or even a well-timed personal recommendation. Some even rely on well-placed 
honesty. Versac, for instance, recommends the talking of piffle because it gives him the 
appearance of good breeding—what he calls “negligence of demeanor” (887)—and 
allows him to move among those he hunts unremarked. Valmont is introduced to Cécile, 
whom he will seduce at Merteuil’s behest, in the company of the child’s mother at a 
dinner party given by a woman who is perceived to be of impeccable morality and 
breeding, even though the scheme for the child’s corruption is secretly hers. At the home 
of his doting aunt, Valmont approaches Tourvel, to whom he openly confesses certain 
aspects of his profligacy, offering himself flatteringly as an object of pity, ripe for her 
moral guidance. In Letter 4, he flatters Merteuil with terms of submission, even though 
his intent is to replace her plan of seduction with an even more enterprising scheme of his 
own. Kierkegaard’s seducer spends visit after visit in the sitting room with his target’s 
aunt, precisely so that the girl does not come to think of him as a suitor. Seductive 
narratives disarm using similar tactics. Dangerous Liaisons is framed with not one but 
two critical prefaces decrying the text’s value, the publisher criticizing the verisimilitude 
of the setting, ironically asserting that no such events could occur in the present, and the 
editor condemning it for the apparent defects of style and substance, which, but for its 
usefulness as a moral example, would ordinarily have resulted in the text’s suppression. 
The framing would have the reader assume the text he or she has not yet read is “safe,” 
because of its deficiencies, but fails to consistently argue the nature of those deficiencies: 
its pitiable failures at realism and relevance—not about current conditions, not about 
truth, satisfying to very few, with very little to recommend it save the lessons taught by 




help but be deficient literarily—or its lack of appeal to any readership other than that 
swathe of individuals flatteringly described as neither “libertine” nor “puritan,” neither 
“freethinker” nor “devout,” and not excessively “fastidious” (941-2). In a word, 
reasonable. Crébillon fils’ The Wayward Head and Heart, on the other hand, is framed 
with a preface that trumpets the text’s moral value, purporting to offer an example of 
redemption, a story where a man who is first a victim of inexperience and then of 
corruption is ultimately to be saved, “restored to himself, owing all his virtues to a good 
woman” (770). In truth, the novel never reaches that third and desirable stage; like a lover 
who promises marriage but never gets around to buying the ring, its interests are revealed 
to be solely that of defloration and corruption. Casanova’s autobiography, History of my 
Life, perhaps the world’s longest sustained seduction in print, augments the natural 
intimacy of the first-person perspective with a charmingly direct declaration of its own 
motives in the preface:  “I want you to know me before you read me” (17). Casanova 
would rather be judged on his manner than his actions—he wants to be liked. Yet it drops 
the honesty almost immediately in favor of unctuous flattery, building a case for the 
reader’s unassailability:  
I have not written these memoirs for those young people who can only save 
themselves from falling by spending their youth in ignorance, but for those whom 
experience of life has rendered proof against being seduced, whom living in the 
fire has transformed into salamanders. Since true virtues are only habits, I can say 
that the truly virtuous are those happy people who practice them without any 
effort. Such people have no notion of intolerance. It is for them I have written. 
(23)  
 
Like that of Crébillon fils, Casanova’s readership is defined by who it is not, in this case 
the intentionally uninformed. Instead, like Madame de Tourvel, Casanova’s reader is to 




exposure to the unexpurgated details of the libertine life; more experienced, perhaps, than 
the libertine himself.11 The seducer is powerless in the face of such practiced virtues; the 
reader can thus afford to be tolerant, to be sympathetic, to engage fully and completely in 
a text that is rife with contradictions, omissions, and space for reader participation.12 This 
preface frames a narrative that frames its own events by the pretense of a mature 
narrative voice recounting the adventures of youth, a configuration of perspective that 
assists the reader in forgiving any perceived defects in the character by implying that the 
character has grown beyond these deficiencies.13 
 Voluntary participation in the seduction by the seduced is what makes seduction, 
in the view of the libertine, an art. Without voluntary participation, it is merely rape. 
Voluntary participation is invited by the twin practices of personalization and enticement; 
personalization creates the appearance of an individual, unique, and intimate relationship 
between the seducer and the seduced, and enticement creates a reason for the seduced to 
seek out and pursue the seducer and thus, ultimately, be at fault for the seduction. Versac 
accuses Meilcoeur of inadvertently personalizing a relationship with a woman of his 
acquaintance: “When a man of your age visits a woman like Mme de Senanges, appears 
in public with her, and permits a correspondence to be established, he must have his 
reasons…She must think that you adore her” (878). He has mistakenly given her the 
illusion of “intimate connection” and “warm friendship that resembles love in its 
pleasures,” and so she pursues him. (What Versac realizes, although Meilcoeur does not, 
is that Senanges is ideal as a means of entree into better society, and the seduction should 
continue for precisely that reason.) Once the appearance of an intimate relationship has 




a man of our rank and your age,” Versac opines, “is to make his name celebrated,” 
ideally in the arenas or society most likely to attract the notice of the seduced (881). In 
the early days of his seduction of Tourvel, Valmont takes advantage of the duty of 
houseguests to amuse themselves in order to speak extensively and intimately with the 
pious lady, confiding his faults and accepting her lectures (and her surveillance) with 
good grace. Thus, when he is seen to pay off the debts of a family hounded by bailiffs, 
she interprets as virtue an act that he claims to Merteuil is machination, and allows 
herself to entertain an attraction that makes it that much harder to accept the warnings of 
her friends and divorce herself from Valmont’s company and communication. In his 
seduction of Merteuil, the pretense of an intimate relationship is already well-established 
at the beginning of the story; the flatteringly informal tone of the letters between them 
provides proof. The challenge, then, is to force Merteuil to drop her pretense of libertine 
collegiality and reveal her desire for him, an event that can only be precipitated by 
demonstrating his unquestioned dominance in a pursuit that will garner her respect—
libertinage. Ironically, it is for the purpose of attracting Merteuil that Valmont first 
alienates her by refusing the seduction of Cécile in favor of the seduction of Tourvel. The 
corruption of Cécile, an inexperienced schoolgirl, is no particular accomplishment in 
libertine terms; the corruption of Tourvel, a retiring and pious wife, is. If the 
accomplishment is sufficient, the direction of attention should change; Merteuil is meant 
to value Valmont precisely for denying the lesser project that she proposed. She should, 
in effect, adopt his way of thinking, a necessary precursor for the final step in seduction, 
control. Unfortunately, Valmont underestimates his quarry, perhaps because her 




relationship accurately; her burning resentment of his defiance ultimately preempts the 
appeal of his conquests, and his seductive efforts fail. 
In order to seduce the reader, a seduction narrative—either the original libertine 
work or the nineteenth-century reinvention under discussion in this argument—faces the 
same sort of challenges in creating a complicit object that Valmont faces with Merteuil. 
A narrative can never be quite certain of its reader, so it cannot tailor its interaction as 
closely to the reader’s proclivities and appetites as one might like. It may cope either by 
depicting material to appeal to a variety of different proclivities in order to personalize 
for a variety of possible readers, or else by leaving space in the narrative for the reader to 
create his or her own intimate experience. Libertine literature, as at least a close cousin of 
pornography, already assumes a degree of reader complicity; otherwise a reader would 
have put the book back down rather than read it through. Though it is often freighted with 
any amount of extraneous characteristics, Rousseau’s “one-handed read” is only made 
possible through the reader’s intense identification with the circumstances and one or 
more of the characters in the sexual situation.14 Such narratives are frequently constructed 
to maximize the possibility of this identification by providing multiple character types 
and various and diverse acts, in order to satisfy individual preferences and individual 
desires as much as possible. For instance, de Sade’s Philosophy in the Bedroom, an 
explicit orgy in seven acts with a politico-philosophical interval, offers the reader choices 
for identification that allow him or her the opportunity to satisfy a variety of personal 
criteria—males and females, heterosexuals and homosexuals, virgins and whores, 
dominants and submissives, seducers and rapists, aristocrats and servants, as well as a 




lesbianism, masturbation, voyeurism, medical sadism, coprophagy… If these laundry 
lists of sexual proclivities fail to provoke the required level of reader involvement, a 
viable alternate strategy is the deployment of the gap, a narrative uncertainty used to 
good effect in eighteenth-century novels, and to excellent effect, as we shall see later, in 
the nineteenth-century reinventions under discussion, which filled the gaps found in their 
progenitor narratives with new stories—the multiple seductions of the adolescent Don 
Juan, the emotional development of Valmont between the letters, the transformative 
influence of Venus and the Venusberg upon Tannhäuser—better designed to disarm, 
entice, and personalize the seductive experience. In The Act of Reading, Wolfgang Iser 
posits gaps, intentional or accidental, as a novelistic tool that prompts the reader to 
actively and continually reconstitute meaning in order to maintain a coherent 
visualization of the story. Such “papering over” of inconsistencies can be seen, for 
instance, in the whore’s dialogues of the late seventeenth century, which often utilize a 
phased approach, deploying multiple interchanges between the instructor and the 
instructee with periods of absence in between. The gaps permit the sexual instruction to 
be organized logically, frequently by topic and according to skill level; it also allows for 
significant changes to occur in the personality or motivations of a character without 
significantly disrupting the logic of the story. The School of Venus, or Ladies’ Delight, 
for instance, is separated into two dialogues.  The first dialogue is the basic premarital 
lesson, where Frances (the wife) trains Katherine (the virgin) in the theory of sex.  The 
second dialogue comprises the practicum and the advanced course.  Katherine is back, no 
longer a virgin, to retell her sexual experiences with Mr. Roger, and Frances puts her 




introducing advanced postmarital topics including what to do if pregnant and the merits 
of a well-conducted adultery. The warning at the end of the first dialogue that “I hear Mr. 
Roger a-coming,” together with Frances’ stated intention to “prepare and give him his 
lesson” (24-5), foreshadow the narrative interruption; the reader is permitted, if he or she 
so chooses, to pause and imagine what comes next. Here the text sketches in broad 
strokes what is to come, but leaves the details up to the imagination, and the proclivities, 
of the reader. The gap also allows the reader to be privy to multiple encounters and 
multiple perspectives in ways that he or she is not in a continuous narrative like Daniel 
Defoe’s Roxana, which is limited to serial presentation of sex acts and the single point of 
view.15 Because of the gap, and the transition to a second plot with a new protagonist, 
Katherine can change from the dubious and ingenuous virgin of the first dialogue to the 
experienced, enthusiastic, and functionally perfect lover of the second believably (or as 
believably as dialogues like this need to be), without requiring a Damascene conversion 
to get her there. 
The gap may also be used as a tool for enticement, an intentional silence deployed 
in order to insinuate a better construction of a person’s identity, motives, or actions than 
events themselves provide, sometimes in defiance of all expectations. Casanova, for 
instance, uses a strategic silence to distract the reader from a perhaps less-than-salubrious 
background and to put him or her, instead, in the mood for approval. After a long and, 
biographers contend, largely specious genealogy16 and a romantic paragraph about his 
parent’s elopement, little is seen of young Giacomo Casanova or his family between birth 
and the age of eight, that pivotal moment when Casanova is taken to Murano, is cured of 




being. Casanova converts what would be a narrative of self-definition—the who, what, 
where, and when of family relationships—into an epistemological problem that 
undertakes to foster belief in a rational consciousness called into existence by magical 
practice. He is sympathetic to the reader’s doubt:  “After the journey to Murano and my 
nocturnal visit from the fairy I still bled, but less and less; my memory developed, and in 
less than a month I learned to read. It would be ridiculous to attribute my cure to these 
two absurdities, but…” (30). The vast shadow over his childhood that precedes this event 
allows the reader to construe one of two possible explanations of Casanova’s 
development, a medical one or a supernatural one.17 A reader who is Casanova’s 
contemporary and peer—there is no indication in his tone or language that he envisions 
himself speaking to posterity—is no more likely to plump for the rational explanation 
than the supernatural one; Casanova’s was the age that glorified Rousseau, Voltaire, 
Cagliostro, and Saint-Germain in equal measure. Casanova magnanimously 
accommodates either preference.  But he then ever-so-neatly reconciles the paradox: 
As for the appearance of the beautiful queen, I have always believed that it was a 
dream, unless it was a masquerade deliberately contrived; but the remedies for the 
worst diseases are not always found in pharmacy. One phenomenon or another 
demonstrates our ignorance to us every day. I believe it is for this reason that 
nothing is harder to find than a learned man whose mind is entirely free from 
superstition. There have never been wizards on this earth, but their power has 
always existed for those whom they have been able to cajole into believing them 
such. (30)  
 
If the reader believes, even for a moment, in Casanova’s “magic,” then the reader 
believes in Casanova as wizard. Casanova resolves the contradiction regardless of 
preference by first presenting the pill of belief coated in the glaze of logic, then the pill of 
reason in the glaze of faith, and also, for any as yet unconvinced, adding an appeal to 




habitual salt-over-the-shoulder believer, he or she has been manipulated, through careful 
management of the possibilities of the gap and a little astute argumentation, into 
acceptance of the coexistence of the logical and the metaphysical—an acceptance which 
will be awfully useful later in the narrative when the reader is asked to look upon 
Casanova’s alchemical dabbling (or the chicanery so presented) with an approving eye. 
Likewise, in Laclos, gaps give the reader the opportunity to explore his or her 
preconceptions and, perhaps, acknowledge more “wizardry” from Valmont than events 
might themselves account for.  An experienced reader of libertine literature, for instance, 
interprets Letter 21, Valmont’s account of his stratagem to pay the debts of an evicted 
family as ingratiation, as truth, and Letter 22, Madame de Tourvel’s recapitulation of the 
same event as evidence of his virtue, as misguided naïveté (969-72). The reader 
reconciles this initial inconsistency between described motivations by accessing his or 
her store of accrued knowledge about the character and his or her understanding of how 
libertine texts work—there are seducers and there are victims and the victims never, ever 
see the seducers coming. It is not until the reader is faced with Letter 138 that the 
discrepancies between accounts might begin to destabilize the reader's conviction. When 
Valmont writes the marquise, “I insist, my love: I am not in love…” (1197), the reader 
likely begins to wonder if the writer protests too much, merely because it is so out of 
character for Valmont to insist on anything. Compel, certainly; but verbal insistence is 
the refuge of one who cannot do anything constructive to achieve his ends, and Valmont 
had previously been full of constructive stratagems. The duel, the forgiveness of 
Danceny, and release of secret correspondence pre-mortem are even less in character. Is 




Valmont concede to his victimization, all but throwing himself on Danceny’s sword, 
when the boy had previously been so open to manipulation? Is this Valmont’s final 
stratagem to destroy the marquise? Is the duel, instead, merely a method of suicide by 
another’s hand, a means of getting his message out in a way that would ensure it gets 
retold? The inconsistencies here, the things the reader does not know for certain, have 
been skillfully managed to force the reader, whatever his or her initial opinion of 
Valmont, to reconsider both the character and the reader’s own ability to read character 
effectively. Valmont the rationalist may be seen to succumb fatally to emotion, or to have 
perpetrated a skillful seduction; Valmont the strategist may be seen to fail and sacrifice 
himself unnecessarily, or to put across the ultimate revenge; Valmont the manipulator 
may be seen to have manipulated the circumstances of his suicide, or been manipulated to 
his death. As we will see in a later chapter, Baudelaire’s “Notes sur Les Liaisons 
dangereuses” tackles these inconsistencies explicitly, exploiting them to suggest a more 
exalted vision of Valmont’s heroism than Laclos likely intended—an informed and 
practical bravery, both satanic and dandyesque, to use Baudelaire’s terms, and thus a 
model for the kind of fully cognizant moral and political thinker missing and much 
needed in nineteenth-century France. 
 Once an apparently intimate relationship has been forged and the quarry enticed 
into the seducer’s grasp, the seducer is free to exert control over the victim’s thoughts, 
aspirations, and perspective in order to fulfill whatever ends are desired. Kierkegaard’s 
seducer makes control the mark of a competent libertine:  “He who does not know how to 
compass a girl about so that she loses sight of everything which he does not wish her to 




everything issues as he wishes it, he is and remains a bungler…” (59). He becomes his 
victim’s world. Versac’s lecture on seduction is deferred before it can broach the subject 
of control, but given that the novel ends with Meilcoeur giving lip service to his love of 
Hortense while sleeping (repeatedly) with an older woman who can assist his passage 
through society, it may be that Versac is not himself a bungler, at least as it pertains to his 
seduction of Meilcoeur. Valmont achieves total control of Cécile, deflowering her, 
dictating her love letters for her, and instructing her in a variety of deviant practices under 
the guise of usual marital relations, the better to offend her future husband with. His 
control of Tourvel is only partial; she submits willingly to his sexual advances, but then 
retreats from him to places he cannot pursue her or control—first into herself, then into a 
convent, and finally into death. He bungles his seduction of Merteuil; in spite of his 
success in both the seduction which she directed and the one he undertook to impress her, 
she refuses his attentions, offended that she is third after the “heavenly” Tourvel and the 
“attractive” Cécile. She snaps the thread of intimacy in Letter 127 by intimating that, as 
his invitation is only the latest of many invitations to join a “seraglio,” he is, himself, 
merely the latest in a series of forgettable suitors—less young, less devoted, less valuable 
to her (1179). It may be that this seduction fails because Valmont has been gone too long 
and is too far away; he simply lacks the primacy and the proximity to Merteuil to 
effectively exclude any other considerations than his own will and his own viewpoint. 
 If narratives have handled the personalization stage of the seduction properly, 
control of the reader should be very easy indeed. After all, any story automatically 
defines the world in which the reader participates and the reader has already agreed to 




story of seduction, libertinage, or pornography has, in a sense, arranged to meet the Devil 
at the crossroads, already made him or herself complicit in the production, not just of 
meaning, but a particular kind of meaning, with particular and very personal 
physiological effects. The only necessary consideration is to avoid pushing the reader too 
far too soon in pursuit of the seducer’s intentions. Ideally, material that will deviate from 
the reader’s experience and cause uncertainty should be introduced gradually, and 
without too much declarative intent—a gap should be left to provide room to doubt. This 
gives the reader time to renegotiate the reality of the narrative continually, often without 
noticing; the reader’s experience one hundred pages in to the story should not the same as 
the experience he or she had on page one because negotiating each uncertainty requires a 
redesign, however slight, of the previous imagined reality. Each redesign is inflected by a 
subjective experience that has been altered by participating in all the previous negotiated 
realities. The gap becomes a didactic technique.  
Casanova handles this beautifully on those occasions in his autobiography when 
he begins to deviate from traditional consensual heterosexual relations. When Casanova 
depicts his potentially less popular adventures—those involving homosexuality, 
pederasty, or violence—he coerces the reader into that position of acceptance or rejection 
typical of all libertine texts, but permits the tiniest bit of doubt to undermine the 
completeness of any dismissal. Ted Emery’s study of three potentially homosexual 
interludes in the autobiography (the relationship with Bellino, the “castrati” who turns out 
to be a girl in drag; the importunities of Ismail, his Turkish host; and the encounter with 
Lunin, the effeminate Russian soldier) points to the author’s subversive deployment of 




essential heterosexual identity, as it “disempowers the male reader and threatens to 
constitute him as the subject of a homosexual experience” (40). It has, in essence, 
allowed the reader to toy with the idea of homosexual experience without having to 
commit unequivocally to it.18 In the story of Bellino, it is Casanova’s reaction to the state 
of the castrato’s sexual organs. The reader is teased by an ongoing use of the male 
pronoun when referring to the girl, as well as the provocative caveat that, “In this 
conviction [that Bellino was female], I made no resistance to the desires which he 
aroused in me” (192). Convictions are, after all, so often wrong. When Casanova 
discovers what he believes to be the singer’s maimed penis, he reacts violently, but it is 
not clear to what:  “I saw that Bellino was in truth a man; but a man to be scorned for 
both his degradation and for the shameful calm I observed in him at a moment when I 
ought not to have seen the most patent evidence of his insensibility” (201). Even in 
translation this is a difficult sentence to construe: is Casanova scornful because Bellino is 
a man, because Bellino is maimed, or because Bellino is unresponsive? The first provides 
a position for identification for a heterosexual male reader, the second for a heterosexual 
female reader, and the third for any type of reader at all. Though Bellino is ultimately 
revealed to be female and responsive, and Casanova’s heterosexuality and prowess 
confirmed, the narrative has nonetheless introduced the possibility of homosexual 
experience. His later relationship with the young Russian Lunin is similarly freighted 
with doubt. Much like Casanova in his efforts to ingratiate—“like an intelligent youth he 
not only defied prejudice, he deliberately set about winning the affection and esteem of 
all men of position, in whose company he was always to be found, by his caresses” 




Russian’s beauty convinces Casanova that he must be female, a misapprehension that the 
boy is at pains to dispel. The declaration and subsequent genital display occur in front of 
a female audience, a Parisienne that Casanova clearly does not like, and in spite of the 
subsequent exchange of “tokens of the fondest friendship” (991), which may equally well 
be taken as an exchange of rings or of ejaculations, the entire incident reads very much 
like a schoolboy prank devised to thwart unwanted female attention. Thus the reader is 
free to dally with the hint of homosexual exchange, while ostensibly having the 
homosexual subtext explained away.19 The matter of pederasty is likewise explained 
away as an aesthetic, rather than a purely sexual, choice; his own desires for, as well as 
his efforts to obtain, juvenile bedmates tend to remain undescribed. The crime of 
procuring children is never his; it is the parents who sell their children, or sometimes the 
girls who sell themselves, in exchanges of more or less explicitness.20 The girls are 
inevitably dutiful, and frequently enthusiastic, participants. On the rare occasion 
Casanova himself initiates a bargain, it is to sell the child up the social ladder, as in the 
case of “O-Morphi,” or Maria Louise Murphy, whose three-year liaison with King Louis 
XV, which ended in a gift of 400,000 francs, Casanova claims to have orchestrated.  (He 
even appears to have been instrumental in getting Boucher to do the famous painting of 
her naked behind, though that itself creates a gap.)21 Casanova presents himself as having 
clearly done the girl a favor, and had even paid the mercenary adolescent 300 francs for 
the pleasure of not deflowering her little sister. The elision of physical desire as a 
motivation allows the reader to play, as Casanova does, with the fantasy of nubile virgins 
while skating comfortably past the grubby realities of child molestation—youth is 




well, retires to the country with a fortune. In this manner, Casanova retains control of the 
reader’s experience regardless of the reader’s reactions to the behavior being described. If 
the reader is enticed by the prospect of homosexuality or pederasty or any other behavior 
hinted at, there is room in the narrative to redesign the experience to make it fit, to enjoy 
the moment; if the reader is repulsed, the narrative itself provides excuses, explanations, 
alternative readings that allow the reader to back away from the idea without 
withdrawing from the text. 
This brief examination of both the practices of fictional seducers and the methods 
of seduction narratives suggests that, contrary to Merteuil’s claim, seduction works just 
as well in writing as in conversation; it is, in fact, practiced over and over again in print 
by writers looking to overcome objection to salacious material, generate identification 
with difficult characters, manufacture appeal for corrupt societies, and keep the reader 
engaged in the libertine world the narrative builds. Byron, Baudelaire, Swinburne, and 
Beardsley, all students of these kinds of narratives, recognize and employ the power of 
these strategies for a subtly different purpose—to challenge the perceived insufficiencies 
of nineteenth-century political and social strategies for the inculcation and legislation of 
morality. Though some authors favor one stage of seduction over the others when 
rewriting their seducers for nineteenth-century audiences—Byron, for instance, makes 
extensive effort to disarm the reader, while Swinburne privileges control—as we shall 
see, all four construct seduction narratives that themselves perform the seductions they 












A PRACTICAL EDUCATION: BYRON’S DON JUAN 
 
 AND THE INGENUE’S JOURNEY 
 
 
Although the strategies of seduction are, in theory, four discrete stages to be 
progressed through systematically, in practice they are often intermixed and repeated, 
tailored to suit the characteristics of the victim and the ultimate aims of the seducer. 
Though Byron’s changes to Don Juan include moments that work on the reader to entice 
and control, they function primarily to disarm the reader, turning what is traditionally a 
profoundly arrogant and openly manipulative character into one that is affable, appealing, 
and perhaps even a trifle ineffectual, and to personalize the seduction, updating what is a 
fundamentally antique and foreign morality tale with sufficient contemporary allusion to 
function as a comment on, and challenge to, nineteenth-century political and religious 
dogma. Byron’s target, the reader of Don Juan, would approach the poem for the first 
time presuming her or she already knew the nature of the character and the outlines of the 
plot. As Moyra Haslett notes, early marketing of the poem leveraged familiarity with the 
story and the expectation of licentiousness by publicizing only the hero’s name, and 
many contemporary reviews were preemptory in their consideration and tainted by 
preconceptions about the piece built on previous versions: “The periodical reviewers 
were duly alarmed—‘merely’ by the title…” (78). Once the identity of the “anonymous” 





were further sharpened by the knowledge that this poem was written by that notorious 
rake, Lord Byron, from his Italian seat of exile, after the lurid affair with Caroline Lamb 
and the much-discussed dissolution of Byron’s marriage. Many readers may have 
expected Juan’s libertine adventures to veil a tell-all biography, or at least a defense of 
the poet’s behavior, and there are several moments in description of Donna Inez in Canto 
I where Byron appears to be complaining about his ex-wife, so that may have been one of 
the motives behind the choice of subject matter. Indeed, the re-creation of the libertine 
Juan as a comparatively guiltless juvenile adventurer may have been intended, in part, to 
tar the poet with the brush of innocence, because the literary tradition Byron drew from, 
which includes works by Tirso de Molina, Molière, Pierre Corneille, Thomas Shadwell, 
Carlo Goldoni, and of course Mozart’s Don Giovanni, as well as contemporary 
pantomime versions, all depict the eponymous antihero as a man of indeterminate 
(middle) age, but of well-honed libertine skills.22 Byron undercuts these expectations 
seductively, disarming the expectant reader by presenting Don Juan as a youth—so 
young as to be as yet intellectually and sexually unformed, so young that a reader might 
indulge as mistakes those actions that would be seen as sins in an older character. Byron 
also makes Don Juan likeable, bleeding the seducer of all lascivious intent, while framing 
the narrative within a commentary penned by an untrustworthy and salacious speaker-
poet. Byron personalizes the narrative experience for the reader, first creating a sense of 
intimacy through a change in literary form and then familiarity through contemporary 
literary references and increasingly realistic modern settings. Stripped by his picaresque 
wanderings of all his determinist identifiers—class, nation, language, even gender—Juan 




rational man. Only the appearance of control is missing; while the reader is forewarned of 
the time and place of Juan’s eventual reckoning, no such judgment occurs; Juan (and the 
reader who has coexisted with him on his journeys) finds himself a free agent in a 
rational world, unrestricted by divine control—an existence Byron himself must have 
craved.23  
 
The Birth of Don Juan 
 
The opening of the poem promises the reader, in fine Versacian tradition, both 
frivolity and novelty. Frivolity, in that the main character is a familiar literary construct, 
only just released from pantomime, still with the whiff of burlesque transvestitism and 
violent harlequinade; novelty, in that the speaker-poet plans to provide a hero whose 
heroic exploits are bound to transcend those of the real army, navy, and revolutionary 
heroes of all the recent wars, a long list of whom fails to be “fit for my poem (that is, for 
my new one)” (I, v), perhaps because they are not, themselves, new. By 1819, the 
publication date of Canto I, these men are well-known and their histories are recorded. 
They are also, for the most part, dead and thus static personalities, susceptible to no 
further development. Such inertia recalls the historical treatment of Don Juan himself, a 
seducer whose inability to change—to repent, specifically—condemns him to an ugly 
eternity in hell. In El Burlador, for instance, the playgoer meets Don Juan for the first 
time in the act of leaving Isabela’s bedroom, where he has slept with her in the guise of 
Duke Octavio. His true identity is revealed to Isabella and the audience simultaneously, 
so the first experience for the viewer is not the progressive sequence of seduction, 
conquest, and fulfillment, but the reductive act of dropping the pretense. His history, 




biography than a rap sheet:  “Your father sent you from Castile to Naples for committing 
the same crime against a noblewoman there. Italy gave you asylum, but still you continue 
with your scandalous life, sparing neither single nor married women. And now, with a 
duchess, in the palace itself!” (I, i). De Molina provides no justification, genetic or 
psychological, for Juan’s lothario habits, save that he is young (though not so young that 
this is a first offense), a charge which, taken in conjunction with his premature end at the 
hands of the stone statue, suggests that womanizing is a symptom of arrested 
development and Juan is a kind of Peter Pan. Molière’s play also introduces Don Juan in 
the act of departure, but here the story is related second-hand. The playgoer is introduced 
to the absent character, not through a litany of crimes, but a litany of synonyms to rival 
any thesaurus entry, as Sganarelle speculates on the libertine’s abandonment of Donna 
Elvira.  “…[Y]ou behold in my master, Don John, , the greatest Libertine that the Earth 
ever bore, a Madman, a Dog, a Devil, a Turk, an Heretick…who lives like a downright 
Brute-Beast, one of Epicurus’ Swine, a true Sardanapalus…a Marryer at all 
Adventures…”(I, i). Don John is not so much a character as a concept, a signifier that 
connotes a specific collection of vices, impieties, and betrayals for use in a larger, stage-
based syntax of relationships and results, and he is a busy one at that. Befitting just such 
an anti-ideal, this version of Juan is not even credited with a proper family. Where de 
Molina is generous enough to create an uncle and a father against whom the libertine 
might be seen as a wayward youth rebelling, Molière writes Don John as the product of 
the Earth’s parturition using a throwaway phrase which is nonetheless fraught with 
implicit fixity of nature. A man who is said to have feet of clay has a propensity for vice; 




born of Earth is to suggest being called up out of the ground like a stone or an artifact, a 
thing devoid of a human context. It should not be surprising, in fact, that Don John fails 
to atone when given the opportunity; in his own way, he is built to be just as monolithic 
and immutable in his shamelessness as the statue that invites him to dinner and 
repentance. 
Unlike these other static heroes, however, Byron’s Don Juan is a novel thing, a 
seducer who begins the story fundamentally undefined. By naming the poem, and the 
character, traditionally, Byron takes advantage of reader experience as a mechanism of 
appeal—if the reader saw Don Juan in one of the (mostly humorous) previous 
appearances, and liked him, or heard about the play or the pantomime from a friend, well, 
here the scalawag is again. Expect hijinks and schadenfreude. By introducing the 
character through a list of all the heroes he is not using, however, Byron’s speaker-poet 
apes the tropes of the tradition by creating a kind of genealogy that establishes, not who 
Don Juan is, but who he is not. By identifying all the roads not taken, Canto I busies itself 
in both undermining reader expectation, saying, in effect, “I may have gotten you here 
under false pretenses, but the next part is going to be really interesting,” and creating in 
the story a new gap, one in which the character exists only as undefined potential. The 
canto, like the reimagined tale of Don Juan himself, apes the libertine tradition and sex 
itself by beginning with a need that is assuaged by the arrival (in the sense of both literary 
creation and actual birth) of the infant seducer, at which point the speaker-narrator drops 
this pretense of poetic creation in favor of the semblance of biography, crediting Juan 
with a proper birthplace and a detailed parentage. In previous incarnations, the reader was 




substance and background by the act of reading itself, suggesting a valorization of change 
in this poem that is not present in any of its forebears.   
Juan’s early biography continues to tease, appearing to be always on the verge of 
reiterating or reinforcing the Don Juan tradition, but ultimately undermining it with a 
barrage of new experience. As a setting, Seville is a traditional choice drawn from El 
Burlador, but the dalliance with his home city is temporary, and Juan will tour a new land 
(Persia, Russia, England) in nearly every subsequent canto. The incomplete family hinted 
at by de Molina is here completed, and stripped of its patriarcha, by the addition of a 
mother-in-fact, though not necessarily a mother figure. This aggregate of progenitors also 
turns out to be conveniently allegorical. The mother, Donna Inez, is initially defined as a 
figure of intellect: “His mother was a learned lady, famed/ For every branch of science 
ever known…” (I, x), but that assertion is qualified by an explanation of the limitations of 
her knowledge: her facility with Latin extends only to a single prayer, her Greek to the 
alphabet, and her contemporary literature to a couple of Spanish playwrights and some 
French novels. Outside of her preference for math, her capabilities seem sufficient for 
little more than bible-reading, a convenience given that she was both “a walking 
calculation” and “morality’s prim personification” (I, xvi), a cognate reinforced by the 
shared rhyme. Read allegorically, this characterization of Donna Inez implies a narrative 
bias that believes that traditional Christian morality—the kind that knows its Lord’s 
Prayer in Latin and its Greek letters from the altar cloth—is evidence of an artificially 
limited reason. Yoked to such a figure by holy sacrament is José, a character about whom 
comparatively little is said, except that “He was a mortal of the careless kind…/Who 




mistresses. Indiscretion, impulsiveness, and a disregard for learning and thus reason are 
all qualities attributable to a personification of the passions, particularly when placed in 
opposition to a character like Inez, who is all about the intellect. Even José’s final illness 
seems significant, as “the tertian” is a kind of fever with intermittent and thus inconstant 
symptoms, suggesting perhaps that the father had died in the same manner that he lived. 
While much is made in the text of the pair’s desire for separation—Donna Inez attempts 
to have her husband declared insane, presumably in order to have him committed, and 
Don José’s choices are said to be limited to “death or Doctor’s Commons,” where 
divorce cases would have been heard—the way they achieve it is through death, 
suggesting a subtextual commentary on the impossibility of a truly passionless reason.   
 This new Don Juan, then, is not just a product of new class rules, the union of a 
bluestocking and a Hidalgo, he is also the product of two philosophical allegories, human 
motives usually thought divergent, if not combative. Although the speaker-poet has 
dropped the pretext of literary construction in favor of this-boy-I-knew storytelling, Juan 
himself continues to exist in a literal and theoretical mode simultaneously. In the Don 
Juan tradition, the narrative is driven by the practical and repeated application of the 
passions, assisted in varying degrees by the schemes of the intellect. Yet this Juan’s 
education is effected in such a manner that neither passion nor intellect may be cultivated 
effectively. Though Donna Inez has sole charge of her son’s education and might be 
expected to mold him in her own intellectual image, the moral project informing her 
curricular choices promotes an almost antirationalist agenda. Don Juan is taught nothing 
at all about the world as it presently exists; instead, his languages are “dead,” his science 




nature, which means he has no preconceived ideas about how the events that one 
normally addresses using practical knowledge are meant to occur. He has no 
preconceived notions about anything, in fact, because his training in belles lettres is 
positively bountiful by comparison with his education in the natural sciences—he is 
given no natural history instruction and tutored in classics from bowdlerized texts. 
Though the speaker is quick to convey that all the expurgated content is conveniently 
accessible in a single salacious appendix, that addendum is there for the benefit of “the 
ingenuous youth of future ages” rather than Juan, the ingenuous youth of the present age 
(I, xlv). Juan’s devotional is devoid of decoration, his mother retaining control of the one 
ornamented with the “grotesques” that “kiss all”; even his awareness of the saints is 
flawed by the omission of St. Augustine and his confessions. So while Juan might be 
considered a child of grace, he is clearly also a child devoid of the material with which to 
manufacture any kind of practical immorality. Sheila J. McDonald attributes this impulse 
to authorial motivations, saying, “The poet would have us believe that his passive, 
bungling protagonist is the only ‘true’ libertine, for the experienced seducer whom the 
world sees is really an innocent seducee at heart… Juan, therefore, seems to represent 
that private part of the poet, and by extension the interior life of the libertine, which the 
world refuses to acknowledge. In ridiculing tradition, Byron is, in a sense, coming to 
grips with it” (296). It is difficult to say whether the ridicule that McDonald sees is truly a 
result of Byron’s authorial critique, or rather a practical means of disarming the reader. 
Juan may share the name of the great Spanish seducer, but he certainly lacks the 
culpability. Byron designs such an imperfect childhood for Don Juan in order to make 




for Juan’s immorality than the libertine himself. Byron continually emphasizes Juan as 
the victim of someone else’s inadequacy: an incomplete practical and religious education, 
a contentious family life with incompatible parents, and a lineage tainted by class 
betrayal. Conveniently, this means he lacks any real allegiance to those attributes of order 
discussed in the first chapter (class, race, even sex) that Baudrillard claims are fantasy, 
attributes outside of which seduction operates. De Molina’s Don Juan is a threat to his 
world and may be blamed by his audience for his hubristic impiety, his intentional 
immorality, his lack of fidelity to his family and open defiance of his father, and his 
leveraging of aristocratic privilege at the expense of duty and honor; Byron’s Don Juan is 
a threat to no one and may be blamed by his reader for none of these sins because he lays 
no claim to the qualities they sin against. Molière’s Don Juan might be a signifier of vice, 
impiety, and betrayal; Byron’s Don Juan is a signifier of nothing at all, except perhaps 
adolescence:  not class, not family, not intellectual pretension, not even sexual 
competence. 
Juan’s inoffensiveness is in direct contrast to the louche and knowing 
lasciviousness of the speaker-poet. McDonald is, after all, one of those youth of future 
ages who would, in the narrator’s prediction, have access to the unexpurgated classical 
texts, much like the speaker himself, and may see Byron writing schism where he intends 
complete differentiation. The speaker-poet is not Juan at a later date, but instead a distinct 
and separate character, as revealed through his extensive editorializing and propensity for 
discursus. Many, many critics praise the narrator persona—Anthony England finds him 
Fieldingesque because of the primacy of his commentary (Byron’s Don Juan and 




critic of all he surveys” (136), and Elizabeth French Boyd celebrates the discursive, 
allusive, “not to say confidential and even chatty” tone as a distillation of Byron’s own 
engaging improvisational manner (46-7). In the introduction to Don Juan, Leslie 
Marchand argues that Byron felt his reputation as a poet too much tainted by the moody 
emotionalism of Childe Harolde (Marchand terms it weltschmerz), the poem that made 
his career, and at the time of his Italian exile was looking for a mode of self-expression 
more appropriate to his own persona; the Augustan sarcasm of the speaker balanced 
against the innocent sentimentalism of the hero gives him the greatest possible latitude 
for personalization. The speaker’s inconsistencies are consistently seen by these critics as 
fundamental to the promulgation of Byron’s satire, evidence that, in spite of expectations 
to the contrary, there is no truth to be found in the world. It is true that the extensive and 
sometimes heavy-handed intrusion of commentary into the story allows the narrative to 
operate simultaneously in two modes, narrative and critical. It is also true, as M. K. 
Joseph contends, that the separation of hero and speaker allows for the coexistence of 
emotional engagement and rational (if not omniscient) objectivity (32). The speaker-poet 
may even be seen, in simplest terms, as an intellectual foil and counterpoint to Juan’s 
unmoderated and unanalyzed needs. Yet for readers who are not in the business of 
reconciling inconsistency in the quest for innovative argumentation, the speaker must 
seem troublingly unreliable, if not outwardly deceptive. After negotiating the transition 
from the meta-poetic consideration of Don-Juan-as-literary-construct to Don-Juan-as-
character-with-pretense-to-heritage-and-position in the first canto, the speaker then 
awkwardly—and briefly—inserts himself into the story, on the very stairs of the family 




speaker-poet has authority. If the speaker-poet writes, and thus can be expected to 
control, the narrative, he can also be expected to understand it; if the speaker is not in 
truth the poet, and only occupies the narrative reality, then his authoritative claims are 
only as reliable as those of any other character; he has no more insight—and is thus no 
less fallible—than his ingénue hero. Frederick Beaty sees this fallibility as a selling point, 
a humanizing quality in the speaker that should appeal to the reader (128). I contend 
instead that, in a setting like Don Juan’s, a fairytale past brought up to date and 
personalized for its readership by nearly continual allusion to recent events, such 
unreliability would be alienating; together with the arrogant tone, the contentious 
cynicism, and the louche interests, the speaker’s persona seems purpose-built to drive all 
but the most practiced libertine reader searching for an object of identification into the 
arms of the much more personable young hero.    
Unlike the engagingly fallible Juan, the speaker must seem troublingly antisocial 
to many readers, and this may be key to the speaker-poet’s function in the narrative—he 
is there to present the reader with an artificial choice with a predictable outcome. As 
already noted, when describing the paucity of Juan’s education, the speaker-poet goes out 
of his way to demonstrate his familiarity with all the dirty bits in classical literature—
even in bowdlerized editions, which suggests he went to the trouble to seek them out; he 
is cosmopolitan enough to attempt to encapsulate the difference in sexual habits between 
northern and southern climes24; he is also, apparently, an atheist:  
But whether Glory, Power, or Love, or Treasure 
The path is through perplexing ways, and when 
The goal is gained, we die, you know—and then— 





Most damningly, perhaps, he is openly self-aggrandizing and rude to the reader, in one 
breath placing himself in the company of Dante, Solomon, Rousseau, and the like by 
pointing out the similarity of their messages—“this life is not worth a potato” (VII, iv)—
and in the next breath placing the reader in the company of dogs, who apparently fare 
better by the comparison (VII, vii). Though his delivery becomes more critical and less 
louche over the course of the narrative, his function in the early cantos seems to be to 
express himself so odiously and at such length in criticism of those articles of faith that a 
reader might be expected to hold dear, including morality, religion, existential human 
value, and the supremacy of mankind over the animals, that the reader recoils… into the 
sphere of the kinder, gentler, more innocent, and above all uncritical Don Juan. The 
speaker-poet is not a character who has been stripped of his preconceptions and then 
remade by experience; he is, if anything, a character so confirmed in his beliefs that he no 
longer notices the inconsistencies of his position or the inadequacies of his rhetoric. 
Louche, vain, and dissimulating, this speaker-poet seems at times an adequate 
representation of the libertine villain as was, the dirty-minded, self-important 
manipulator-turned-rapist as found in de Sade or even de Molina, so confirmed in his 
strategies of discourse, however inappropriate, that the mark of his excellence, the willing 
capitulation of his victim (in this case the reader) is no longer relevant. His unreliable, 
lascivious, critical commentary is exactly the bitter pill that makes the picaresque sexual 
misadventures of the comparatively innocent Don Juan, accidental Lothario, far easier to 
swallow. He serves as another method of seductive disarmament; he becomes the danger 
in the room, such an obviously immoral influence in the narrative he draws attention 




otherwise pose. By comparison, Byron’s hero appears more feckless, more adolescent, 
more unassuming, and less of a threat.25  
This appearance of ingenuousness, which is so attractive in contrast to the suspect 
observations of the speaker-poet to any reader who is looking to identify with a “nice 
guy,” is, of course, the thing that ultimately fits Juan for vice; fortunately, by the time 
Juan is first exposed to the sins of the flesh, the reader is well-primed by extensive 
disarmament to forgive him most indiscretions. Juan is, after all, apparently a victim in 
his initial sexual encounters. Granted, it can be said of seduction that, before the seducer 
seduces the victim, the victim must first seduce—or at least draw the attention of—the 
seducer. As shown in Valmont’s seduction of Madame de la Tourvel in Dangerous 
Liaisons, it is simultaneously the unassailability and the desirability of the victim which 
makes the seduction a triumph. Though Byron assigns all seductive culpability in Juan’s 
first sexual encounter unequivocally to Julia, Juan is primed by the circumstances of his 
development so far to receive her attentions, much in the same way continuous contact 
with the abrasive speaker fits the reader to look kindly on the hero. The seduction itself is 
a stock scene from romantic theater—there is a dark night, a river, a book of Renaissance 
poetry, a pretty girl—but Juan’s attentions are firmly fixed, not on physicality, but on 
physics: 
He thought about himself, and the whole earth 
Of man the wonderful, and of the stars, 
And how the deuce they ever could have birth; 
And then he thought of earthquakes, and of wars, 
How many miles the moon might have in girth, 
Of air-balloons, and of the many bars 
To perfect knowledge of the boundless skies; — 





Clearly in this passage Juan is not planning romantic activities; he does not seem to have 
the nominative vocabulary to frame the thought. He is, however, aware of what might be 
called the algebra of sex—the terms are unknown, but the interaction between them is 
rendered familiar by some kind of physical law, perhaps passed down from that 
allegorically passionate father figure. He has the space in his head where the intercourse 
would fit. Juan thinks of the physical world in seductive terms: the planet is possessed by 
man; the stars are born, not created; images of roundness are everywhere, so it is air 
balloons rather than ships at sea and astronomical statistics reckoned in terms of distance 
around rather than distance between. This innate comprehension of the interaction of 
bodies—which the speaker coyly refers to as “the action of the sky” and ascribes as the 
equal product of both sexual and mental development—further underscores the inability 
of the intellect to police the totality of human existence. In spite of the limitations of his 
education, in spite of the absence of the father and thus passion’s exemplar, in spite of the 
tyranny of the mother and thus intellect’s model, Juan still has the capability, the tools, 
and the spaces in which vicious inclination can fit. Here Byron seems to be anticipating 
Baudelaire’s condemnation of moral literature—the problem with modernity is not moral 
education, it is the underlying assumption that ignoring immoral education will somehow 
make immorality disappear.   
It is a particularly trenchant irony, then, that Juan’s first practical encounter with 
the immoral should turn out to be the result of Julia’s attempt to validate her own virtue. 
In response to a desire born of Juan’s adolescent comeliness, Julia first vows avoidance, 
but then opts instead for a self-test: 
She now determined that a virtuous woman 




That flight was base and dastardly, and no man 
Should ever give her heart the least sensation, 
That is to say, a thought beyond the common 
Preference…(I, lxxvii) 
 
In order to prove virtue, in Julia’s view, a woman must first confront the substance of her 
temptation; avoidance is itself an immoral act. Ideally, confrontation results in 
diminution, the trivialization of the impulse, but even if the circumstances are not ideal, 
“…there are such things as Love divine,/ bright and immaculate, unmixed and pure…” (I, 
lxxix). The flaw in Julia’s logic that leads to Juan’s eventual seduction is not one of 
premise—confrontation is necessary if temptation is to be truly overcome, rather than 
merely put off—but of warrant and a too-limited pool of conclusions. Divine love is, by 
definition, the province of divinities, and man is neither divine, nor immaculate, nor 
unmixed, as Juan’s parentage and Julia’s heritage demonstrate, so the conclusion that a 
confrontation between this woman, however virtuous, and any man, however common, 
would result in such celestial sentiment is illogical. Likewise, Julia’s assessment of 
outcomes is inadequate by a full third; her thinking accounts for both the best case 
intellectual outcome—virtue and relationship obsolescence—and the best case emotional 
outcome—virtue and a deepening of feeling—but avoids the best case physical outcome, 
which is the fulfillment of her bodily desires. Her test is thus constructed to beg the 
question of her own purity, so while the impulse to examine temptation is laudable, the 
results of that examination are marred by personal bias. In spite of the speaker’s 
willingness to blame external factors including love, summer, moonlight, Julia’s 
husband’s age, and Plato, the reason Julia succumbs to temptation is that she fails to 
understand it. Even at the last, she lies: “whispering ‘I will ne’er consent—[she] 




point:  “[Byron] sets himself the great satiric task of demonstrating, both in jest and in 
earnest, the reality that lies behind the self-deceptions, the pretenses, the illusions, which 
we normally accept so readily as the whole truth” (146). Byron stages a test of the powers 
of intellect to cope with morality so that the reader can find those powers wanting. Unlike 
Juan, whose metaphysical musings denote only receptivity and thus the potential for 
eventual clarity, Julia is shown to be perennially intellectually self-deluding and 
ultimately self-serving, as her speculation about Juan’s prospects at the time of a future 
and hypothetical widowhood indicates. Clearly the history of personal experience and 
moral instruction that permits Julia to frame the problem of temptation does nothing to 
help her avoid it, because she continues to fail to avoid it for months, until, in a scene 
drawn directly from de Molina, her husband discovers Juan in her bed. Unlike de 
Molina’s version, however, the husband is not then killed in a duel, so Juan’s subsequent 
flight from Spain, when it comes, looks less like exile than rebirth. Juan is first expelled 
from Julia’s room as the infant is from the womb, naked, in a hurry, and in the dark. He is 
then expelled from his mother country, by his mother, to “mend his former morals, and 
get new” (I, cxci), a curious choice of phrase since it was indicated clearly during the 
early stanzas that his inculcated morals were strictly doctrinal, and his experiential morals 
derived from a brief and passive relationship with Julia. While old morals might be 
repaired anywhere by renewed religious instruction, what new morals could he acquire in 
a tour of European, and thus largely Christian, countries? After all, this solution is in 
direct contrast to the speaker’s enthusiastic endorsement of punitive measures at the 
beginning of the second canto, which enjoins those “who teach the ingenuous youth of all 




Inez’s capricious intentions are the first direct indication that Juan’s story is intended to 
be more than just a picaresque adventure; to leave a Christian country to tour other 
Christian countries with an intention of acquiring some new kind of moral experience 
suggests that, even in an environment governed by doctrine, alternative moral 
perspectives exist and familiarity with them is somehow desirable, even to a bounded 
intellect like Donna Inez’s. Juan’s exile will be the making of him, quite literally; Juan’s 
reader, by this time thoroughly disarmed by the alterations to his character, sympathetic 
by virtue of his continuing bonhomie, and indulgent of his indiscretions because of his 
clear lack of culpability, is engaged by the prospect of novelty, ready to pack a suitcase 
and accompany the libertine on the Grand Tour that will, unexpectedly, strip him of his 
remaining signifiers and remake him as a man who can understand the truth of the world. 
 Byron does so much work disarming and enticing the reader by infantilizing the 
libertine’s character, designing the speaker as an antithetical frame, and recasting the 
seductions to create alternative culpability, it is easy to overlook the efforts invested to 
personalize the narrative seduction for the reader, especially as those changes are buried 
deep in the structure of the narrative, at the level of form and plot. These changes are 
worth considering, however, because they help to preserve the sense that the narrative is 
an intimate interaction, in spite of the breadth of Juan’s travels and the length of the 
poem, and a relevant one, in spite of the apparent exoticism of Spanish aristocrats, 
Turkish harems, and Persian cities to the average English reader. The first, and most 
obvious, change Byron makes is to turn a plot that was previously a play—drama, 
comedy, or pantomime—into a poem. A reader’s previous experience of Don Juan would 




experiences. For the playgoer, the story would be, at best, a voyeuristic experience, 
conducted in company and thus fundamentally public. The viewer’s reactions are thus 
tempered by the constraints of public behavior. The character would, by necessity, be 
predefined by the choice of actor, the costume, the staging, and the direction. The 
audience sees the body rather than imagines the form, deducing the motivations rather 
than intuiting the thoughts. The performance realizes the director’s and actors’ visions; 
the viewer is left to accept or reject the dramatization.   
 By contrast, a published poem has the potential to be vastly more intimate, more 
flattering, and more involving. It is individual intercourse. Unless experienced through a 
public reading, poetry is consumed in the private space behind the reader’s eyes. The 
work of visualization is left to the reader, as is the speed of consumption; the reader can 
pick up, put down, re-experience, or reimagine at will. The poem has infinite scope for 
setting, character, or action, without regard for the practical limitations of theatrical 
staging. A poem can expand the possibilities of perspective to third-person omniscient or 
even first person; it can also appear to speak directly to the reader, as Byron’s poem does, 
capitalizing on the conversational rhythms of ottava rima and a nearly endless and 
rambling progression of cantos to simulate an long, intimate chat with a voice who is 
advisor, lover, or seducer.      
 The second alteration Byron makes to personalize the poem, to heighten the 
perception of both intimacy and immediacy, is to update the setting of the narrative 
gradually as the plot progresses from the distant Spanish past to the turn-of-the-
nineteenth-century English present. In the opening cantos, although the speaker-poet is 




from battles recently in the headlines, there is little to disturb the presumption that this 
new Don Juan is any less a seventeenth- or eighteenth-century aristocrat than his 
predecessors in the tradition. (Juan’s brief consideration of hot-air ballooning in the 
initial stages of his affair with Julia suggests eighteenth-century timing, likely very late in 
the century when ballooning started to look like a viable practice rather than an insane 
experiment, but such fleeting references are easy to overlook.) His later adventures—
shipwrecks, pirates, a bit with a harem—do little to alter the perception of “long ago and 
far away.” By the Siege of Ismail, however, Don Juan has been brought nearly up to date, 
if not close to home; most adult readers would be old enough to have heard of the 1791 
battle. By Canto XII, he is both close to home—the reader’s, not his—and up to date, in 
England, in a ruin of a medieval house that would be familiar to many early nineteenth-
century readers, at least as the moldering pile up the road. Through this progression, 
Byron advances Juan’s examination and critique of the world from the more comfortable 
focus of then and there to the less comfortable one of here and now. A reader who has 
been lulled by the fairy-tale trappings of Juan’s foreign adventures may awaken from 
complacency to discover that it is his or her life and values that are suddenly under 
attack. Alternatively, the reader may not wake at all, internalizing the condemnation of 
London and the games played by the Duchess Fitz-Fulke with the same ease he or she 
accepts the condemnation of the harem and the schemes perpetrated by Gulbeyaz.       
 The point to disarmament and personalization is to bring the victim—the reader—
within reach of the seducer—the poet—and to create the appearance of an intimate 
relation between them; after that, during the enticement phase, the seducer is free to 




enticing displays for best effect. With Byron’s narrative, this is true on two levels.  Since 
the poem was published serially, the publication phase was prolonged. By the point in the 
narrative that Don Juan is being shipwrecked, abducted into seraglios, and besieged, 
Byron is receiving regular feedback on the text first from his publishers and then from his 
readers. (His publishers, as we will see later, were frightened indeed.) Later cantos are 
thus the product of compromise, of that passing back and forth of power that Baudrillard 
notes characterizes seduction, between Byron and what he wanted to say and his 
readership and what they wanted to hear. Within the text, the enticement phase is 
prolonged partly because so much work has been done to make the seducer 
unthreatening, there is little left with which to entice. Impenetrable innocence is only 
interesting briefly; it must be challenged, fall, and change to merit sustained attention. 
This phase is also prolonged because this act of building an enticing character is 
necessary to carry out Byron’s ultimate political critique condemning externally imposed 
moralities:  in order to model the way men should be, Don Juan must be forced into 
circumstances that invite self-determination. His adventures in exile achieve this, 
challenging the primacy, or in Baudrillard’s terms the reality, of the most common social 
signifiers by stripping him of all the distinctions that would normally predetermine his 
position as a being of power, all the distinctions that define the traditional libertine—
nation, class, language, and finally gender.  
Although Juan’s banishment and the subsequent stripping away of his power 
shares picaresque qualities with similar exploits in de Molino and Molière, in Byron’s 
iteration they are freighted with more philosophic import and less narrative exigency.26  




between acts and get Juan’s head in yet another woman’s lap. It is manufactured offstage 
by means of a shouted “Help! I’m drowning” during the fishergirl Tisbea’s soliloquy 
about her own disdain, a speech of such length that even the inattentive playgoer must 
realize that irony is in the offing. Then a dripping Juan, carried by his valet, finds himself 
thrust into the scene and into verbal intercourse with the girl, who even recognizes the 
potential for danger and betrayal when she calls him “my Trojan horse, come out of the 
sea” (13). There is neither philosophy nor poetry, not even much thought, in the 
seduction of Tisbea—Juan’s patter seems formulaic and reactive, derived from what must 
be only a cursory examination of his surroundings and the things he hears. Waking damp 
and in a woman’s lap, his speech is peppered with images of death at sea and sirens; 
when Tisbea says, speaking of her own desire, “you promise a scorching flame,” Juan 
responds with the words “charred,” “scalding” and “burn” in the next three sentences, 
foreshadowing the eventual immolation of Tisbea’s virginity and then her house. The 
seduction seems to be no more than a means for the seducer—and the playwright—to fill 
up time and keep in trim. In Molière, the same scene seems to be an excuse to stage 
incredulous peasants for comic effect. Pierrot relates the tale of the shipwreck to 
Charlotta as evidence of his own heroism, but his valor is suspect: though he sees the 
shipwreck victims swimming, he only sails to their rescue after winning a bet regarding 
their existence. Like Tisbea, Charlotta seems a touch diffident about love, but the 
sentiment is conveyed, not through a self-assessing soliloquy, but through Pierrot’s 
illogical contention that she must not love him because she fails to play tricks upon him.  
Don John himself does not make an appearance until the beginning of the next scene, and 




possible, even more formulaic than the seduction of Tisbea, because it lacks metaphors 
entirely and seems to take no account of the particular woman complimented. Charlotta is 
told that her whole self and her body are “fine,” her eyes are both “fine” and “piercing,” 
and her hands, black with dirt, are the “finest in the world.” Her teeth are peculiarly 
designated “amorous” and her lips “provoking,” by which he presumably means they 
together provoke an amorous response in him, as Charlotta has as yet said nothing at all 
contentious (70). The inadequacy of his rhetorical technique makes it seem as if Don 
John has provided himself a list of suitable adjectives for amorous occasions and now 
applies them willy-nilly to the various presentable appendages a woman is expected to 
have. Don John expends less effort winning Charlotta’s favors than he does boxing with 
Pierrot over the insult. As in El Burlador, this episode has little in the way of literary 
depth or philosophical content; the long speeches to which both Don John and Sganarelle 
are prone only recommence once they have escaped the peasant village in advance of a 
dozen pursuers. The whole affair seems to be little more than an intermezzo between the 
crime of Donna Elvira’s abandonment and the punishment of the nodding statue. 
In Byron’s poem, instead, the shipwreck is an entire drama in itself, one which 
compromises both Juan’s national identification and his pretensions to class. It takes 
more than one hundred stanzas to cover the same narrative period de Molina dispatches 
in a single exclamation, “Help! I’m drowning,” from Juan’s embarkation in Cadiz to his 
deposit on the shores of Haidée’s pirate island. Those hundred stanzas chronicle a 
transition during which the budding libertine empties himself, in stages, of what little 
remains of his Spanish adolescent existence—emptiness being a necessary condition 




universality of Juan’s responses. First he empties himself of tears, crying from grief over 
the loss of his mother, his lover, and Spain.  “…[H]is salt tears dropped into the salt sea,/ 
‘Sweets to the sweet’…” (I, xvii), the speaker remarks, quoting Hamlet, creating a slew 
of associations in the mind of even a semihabitual playgoer, and linking this journey with 
Ophelia’s death, because both are arguably a product of illicit liaisons and both are a shift 
to a new state of being. He then empties his stomach from seasickness, a universal human 
experience and a condition that is “death” to the passions, at least according to the 
speaker: 
But worst of all is nausea, or a pain 
About the lower region of the bowels; 
Love, who heroically breathes a vein, 
Shrinks from the application of hot towels…(II, xxiii) 
 
Evidently a lover may bleed romantically, but he may not vomit romantically, and he 
certainly may not suffer a problem of the bowels and remain a romantic figure; this 
contradiction suggests that, like so much else with immorality, there are some aspects of 
the human condition whose existence is commonly believed unfit to acknowledge in 
sensible discourse. Love is an idealized concept, separate from the messy realities of the 
physical form like emesis and excrement, and cannot, the speaker proposes, survive such 
exposure. Rutherford sees this as a moment of self-delusion: “showing how [Byron’s] 
hero, in all sincerity, exaggerates and falsifies his feelings, and how those feelings… can 
soon be dissipated by sea-sickness, bowel complaints, and other vulgar illnesses” (153).  
What Rutherford does not acknowledge is Juan’s persistence, because just as with his 
contradictory capacity for immoral activity in the absence of immoral knowledge, Juan is 
able for a time to maintain the contradictory states of love and nausea simultaneously. 




more complete human being. The strength of his love notwithstanding, this seasickness 
counts as a further stage in the process of emptying begun with lamentation.  In the third 
stage, it is the ship that is emptied, as water is pumped from her hull and the masts cut 
down to keep her from sinking. These efforts fail, and she is emptied of people as she 
sinks. Juan, adrift in a longboat, begins a course of starvation, the fourth stage. While 
other survivors consume all available sustenance—shoes, caps, a spaniel, even Julia’s 
farewell letter—Juan abstains for various sentimental reasons which set the precedent for 
refusing meat when the crew turns to cannibalism and sacrifices his tutor Pedrillo: “’T 
was not to be expected that he should,/ Even in the extremity of their disaster,/ Dine with 
them on his pastor and his master” (II, lxxviii). Juan loses everything he possesses on this 
journey including his society, his memory, and even his most basic sustenance; it is as if 
the gaps manifested in his early education have expanded to make him a kind of walking 
absence, space within a shell of humanity. By refusing to dine on Pedrillo, “pastor” and 
“master,” Juan is effectively refusing to fill that space with either religion or 
contemporary notions of adequate education. It turns out to be a wise choice, because the 
ingestion of Pedrillo’s flesh drives its consumers mad; no doubt this is meant to be a 
trenchant commentary on the dangers of church and college. Incidentally, traditional 
education as personified in Juan’s teaching master is not to be confused with the kind of 
education by experience Juan has tasted at Julia’s hands and is about to receive in 
abundance. In utilizing a “hydraulic theory of education” not unlike Byron’s dynamic of 
emptying and refilling to structure her study of Gide, Segal notes a unidirectional flow of 
most models of education that apes traditional heterosexual sexual mechanics:  the master 




stages of libertine pedagogical discourse as found in whore’s dialogues, as Turner’s 
analysis indicates; however, in whore’s dialogues as well as Don Juan, that flow becomes 
increasingly bidirectional as the novice develops expertise. Until now, Juan has been, in 
effect, “the girl” in his relationship with his tutor, his mother, and the world; had he not 
been seduced by Julia and then exiled, that condition would have persisted until he 
achieved his majority and turned the tables on that dynamic in accepted male-dominant 
fashion. (His refusal to be nourished by his tutor’s body may be a spark born from that 
abandoned expectation.) His sexual experiences, on the contrary, have allowed, at least 
occasionally, for bidirectional flow across divisions of both age and sex—Juan fills as 
well as being filled; is sometimes master, sometimes slave; can be both victimizer and 
victim. But the majority of such complications are in Juan’s future; for the moment, as he 
washes up alone on Haidée’s isolated beach, he is utterly empty, receptivity personified, a 
state signified by his loss even of speech. 
 As Inez’s program of education followed Juan’s birth, so Haidée’s follows Juan’s 
rebirth. Juan’s condition in the second half of Canto II is not unlike his condition in Act I, 
Scene 3 of El Burlador—wet, insensate, and in a woman’s lap. But in Canto II it is 
Haidée who is accompanied by a servant, not Juan, and it is Haidée who has both 
initiative and the power of speech. She endeavors to fill the emptiness within him with 
practicalities—first with warmth, then with dream, then with food, and finally with 
language. Juan is reeducated, not through books, but through experience of the female 
physiognomy:  
 And now, by dint of fingers and of eyes, 
 And words repeated after her, he took 
 A lesson in her tongue; but by surmise, 




 As he who studies fervently the skies 
 Turns oftener to the stars than to his book, 
 Thus Juan learned his alpha beta better 
 From Haidée’s glance than any graven letter. (II, clxiii) 
 
The metaphor of the stargazer in this passage recalls Juan’s highly sexualized 
astronomical contemplations before his first encounter with Julia, an affair which 
proceeded in spite of the gaps in his understanding. The juxtaposition of that reference 
with the idea of an alphabet suggests that, in this affair, some of those omissions are 
meant to be remedied, particularly since such remedy involves prolonged close contact 
with, and study of, the lady’s person. Here, perhaps, is the first lesson in Juan’s new 
morality. Haidée’s illiteracy prevents her from teaching him theory of any kind; she only 
has access to practical and current experience, and her role as both “Nature’s bride” and 
“Passion’s child” makes her instruction a viable complement to Inez’s program of math 
and moral stricture in the same way that the applied sciences augment the pure. That first 
kiss, for instance, is characterized as an act of integration, the kind “[w]here Heart, and 
Soul, and Sense, in concert move…” (II, clxxxvi). A common language is then 
developed: “though their speech/ Was broken words, they thought a language there,—/ 
And all the burning tongues the Passions teach/ Found in one sigh the best interpreter…” 
(II, clxxxix). Next, there is a kind of practicum as the affair moves from the concealment 
of the caves on the beach to the society of Haidée’s father’s house, where, thinking her 
father dead, she has adopted the mantle of queen of the island. The final lesson is in 
impermanence, as life’s caprice, through the instrument of Haidée’s father, strikes down 
first Juan and then Haidée.   
By the end of Juan’s time on the island, he has been stripped of the 




male. Haidée’s death manifests the underlying gender bias that underpins much of Don 
Juan, as well as the other nineteenth-century reinventions discussed in this argument: a 
woman may be a pedagogue, a tool for pedagogy, or even a subject of study, but she does 
not, cannot, undertake the libertine journey herself because she is intrinsically 
unchangeable. She is the star to wander by, not the wanderer.27 Once no longer relevant 
to the libertine’s direction, a woman removes herself or is removed. Donna Julia’s last 
letter, the one that gets eaten, is quite explicit on this point: “Man’s love is of man’s life a 
thing apart,/ ‘T is a Woman’s whole existence; Man may range/ The Court, Camp, 
Church, the Vessel, and the Mart…” (I, cxciv). It is for Juan to journey; it is for his 
women to disappear. Julia removes herself by taking the veil; Haidée is removed by 
death. In this way the women of Don Juan remain discrete and equal experiences, the 
Other that serves as catalyst to the hero’s development, but remains, in the substance of 
their experience, unknowable—until the seraglio scene, when the libertine is abducted, 
threatened, and forced to act the part of the woman. Byron’s treatment of the experience 
is much more extensive than the toying with transvestitism that we will see in 
Beardsley’s treatment of the Tannhäuser myth or the vague homosocial/homosexual 
undertones in Swinburne’s. Juan’s first-person experience of the physical and social 
subjugation of the harem—from the disempowered end—communicates a real sense of 
threat, a disempowerment that Byron himself may have known intimately; as Marchand 
notes in the preface to Don Juan, Byron “felt himself the most pursued of men” (xi). In a 
story that goes to great lengths to strip away the contrived signifiers that empower the 
libertine, signifiers that might be seen to differentiate the essence of one man’s 




unthinkable, attacking the one seemingly immutable divide in human experience, that of 
gender itself.  
 
The Cuckoo in the Harem 
 
 Having been schooled in the theory of seduction by a woman with moral 
pretensions and the practice by a woman without, the next logical step in Juan’s 
development is the opportunity to apply the seductive skills he has learned under 
controlled circumstances; from this, he develops a foundation for and tendency to 
sympathy. To do so, not from the powerful, defined position of the traditional libertine, 
but from the disempowered, undefined position of a slave, victim, and simulated female, 
develops in him the kind of intimate understanding no libertine has ever before had of the 
female condition, the kind you get inside the skin rather than inside the vagina. The 
harem episode of Cantos V and VI, in which Juan seduces, or so the imagery suggests, 
Dudù in the seraglio of the sultan, accords Juan the agency to seduce for the first time as 
a traditional libertine, the power behind the seduction, but those controlled circumstances 
also force him to experience sexual attention in conditions of subjugation, passivity, and 
threat as the object of forced attentions—i.e., as a woman, in a stereotypical woman’s 
role at the bottom of the male/female power dynamic. Andrew Stauffer’s analysis of the 
content of the Juan/Dudù scene in the course of tracing its origins in the medieval 
romance of Floire and Blancheflor concludes that the appropriation of the medieval love 
story permits the Dudù seduction to remain innocent in spite of its sexual content. 
Innocence in experience is certainly a theme Byron traffics in, as it is the foundation of 
the Haidée episode, so it is reasonable to expect it to carry over here, but Stauffer makes 




be incorrect, yet telling. Stauffer writes: “In the sixth canto of Byron’s poem, Juan gains 
access to a Turkish seraglio by disguising himself as a woman” (85). In electing to array 
himself in feminizing attire, Juan is thought to parallel Floire who, in this version, hides 
himself away in a basket of flowers in order to rescue a beloved. Unfortunately Juan is on 
no such mission, and lacks even the pretense of self-determination. He is simply, and 
repeatedly, the victim of circumstance. As with the knowledge-sapping early education 
and the language-impairing shipwreck, his sale in the slave markets of Constantinople 
once again empties him of critical signifiers through a sequence of diminutions by which 
Juan is stripped of the little identity that birth and heritage have accorded him. His sale as 
a slave to the Turkish sultanate, for instance, renders his nobility, family, and country 
irrelevant constructs. The conversion of his name from Don Juan to plain Juanna demotes 
him twice, divesting him of title and diminishing him by emasculation. Likewise, the act 
of circumcision, an honor proffered by the “third-gendered” slave master Baba, whose 
sexual ambiguity and African origins suggest that he/she is likely ignorant of the true 
magnitude of the loss to be sustained, would render Juan no longer recognizable as a 
Christian. Juan’s rejection of this distinction appears to be precipitated less by fears of the 
appearance of religious infidelity, however, than physical harm, because his protests are 
couched in terms of fatality: “Strike me dead,/ But they as soon shall circumcise my 
head!/ Cut off a thousand heads, before-” (V, lxxi-lxxii). This metaphor elides the 
difference between the loss of the foreskin and the loss of the penis, and equates 
castration with decapitation and the kind of mass slaughter that foreshadows the later 
Russian assault on the city. The terms are even the same—Canto VIII describes the 




made/ Its sanguinary way good—then another;/ The reeking bayonet and the flashing 
blade/ Clashed ‘gainst the scimitar…” (VIII, lxix). In contrast to the actual facts of the 
battle, Byron’s account has the town passively receiving the assault; the Russians attack 
not in waves but in invading columns, a formation whose phallic implications are evident 
when “sanguinary way” is read as both a description of the progress and the 
characteristics of the passage. The only full-sized weapon clearly identified in this stanza 
is the Arab scimitar; Russians forces are credited with use of the indefinite “blade,” a 
term as easily applicable to scalpel as to sword. The result of this incursion? The 
lamentation of women and children, results just as characteristic of rape as invasion. 
Circumcision can thus be seen as a violent assault on the barriers of the self, differing 
from the rape of a woman or the invasion of a fortified town like Ismail only by factors of 
scale; Juan’s sympathy for the plight of Ismail later, the Childe-Harolde-like weltschmerz 
(world-pain) that induces him to adopt a refugee child, is thus a natural outgrowth of 
having to suffer the threat of similar assault here.28 
Though Juan is never actually circumcised—he is dressed as a woman and 
delivered to the sultan’s wife, Gulbeyaz, intact—the threat of discovery, castration, or 
death hangs over his head for the entire episode. These tragic outcomes can only be 
avoided by successful impersonation of a woman, and so Juan’s manner and appearance 
are feminized through cross-dressing and depilation. The perfection of his transformation 
notwithstanding, it is undoubtedly an incredibly alienating experience for Juan to mimic a 
woman’s form, to feel the unfamiliar weight of dragging skirts and dressed hair, the smart 
of freshly-tweezed flesh, and the occluding thickness of makeup; Susan Wolfson argues 




seem to be the intent, if not the result, of the effort. It is certainly an unusual experience 
for the libertine; as his first practical experience occupying the shell of a woman, rather 
than just particular orifices of her body, it is a lesson in being, rather than possessing, the 
Other.   
Feminine attire requires submissive behavior, lest the masquerade be found out, 
so Juan is also instructed in comportment:  
‘If you could just contrive,’ he said, ‘to stint 
That somewhat manly majesty of stride… 
To swing a little less from side to side,  
Which has at times an aspect of the oddest;— 
And also could you look a little modest,’ (V, xci) 
 
Juan is further diminished by being required to limit his actions as befits a submissive 
individual—to shorten his stride, to reduce his requirements for space, and to moderate 
his emotional expressiveness—as a precursor to meeting Gulbeyaz and undertaking the 
submissive role in that relationship—so he is othered for a second time, as a subjugated 
entity curtailed in matters of expression and movement, the slave in a master-slave 
dialectic.  
It may be useful at this point to note that such enforced relinquishment of power 
is not a trope typical to Floire et Blancheflor or any other traditional hiding-in-the-harem 
tale, where the masquerade is undertaken as a ruse by which the protagonist gains access 
to, and undermines, Oriental and female secrets. Though Eric Meyer is inclined to read 
this episode as a particularly twisty imperialist subversion, where “Juan’s 
feminization…provides Byron with a motive for penetrating the veil of the Oriental 
phantasm, thus allowing him to get inside the alien culture in order to colonize it from 




party. He is sold into this situation. Feminized or not, as an acquired object he occupies 
the lowest rung of the harem hierarchy. This is why even Baba, the third-sexed, is 
allowed, in proxy for his mistress, to threaten and command the Westerner. In this 
episode, the Oriental female has so much power over the Occidental male she can deprive 
him even of his masculinity, and the masquerade is a means of undermining the existing 
power structures for her own satisfaction. The Gulbeyaz liaison is thus simultaneously a 
paradigm of revolution, as the sultana thwarts the male hegemony of her own culture, and 
of reverse colonialism, as the European is subordinated to the demands of an Eastern race 
and a female gender, and thus quite an important moment for Oriental female equality.29 
It is a wonder, then, that Juan escapes with his head after he refuses Gulbeyaz’s sexual 
advances; in fact, decapitation is only the first of the Sultana’s impulses, chronicled in a 
long list of possibilities including, in order, castration, aspersions on his upbringing, 
persuasion, sulking, suicide, punishment of an underling, and finally tears (V, cxxxix). 
According to Meyer, it is “[o]nly when both the sensual lures of the East as well as its 
more aggressively threatening features have been brought under the regulation of the 
economy of discourse can the Western mind rise triumphant over the Oriental will” 
(690). Unfortunately, the Western mind as featured in a man like Juan is no stalwart 
thing, for it is to this last, most feminine, and least imperious emotional reaction that Juan 
caves. It shows he is taking the lessons of his feminine experience to heart; he responds 
sympathetically to displays of emotion in ways he would not to displays of overt 
dominance. 
The sultan’s interruption of the Gulbeyaz affair rounds out Juan’s indoctrination 




emphasizes the pantomime hilarity and transvestite possibilities of the episode, first in the 
interaction between the dominant Gulbeyaz and a Juan in women’s wear, and then with 
the Sultan, who is “a stage Ottoman of the first order…he could easily be played by a 
woman as a man; and his stagily masculine appearance enhances the canto’s air of 
androgyny,” suggesting the theatricality calls into question the fixity of “all externally 
imposed or superficially delineated identities” (86). The poem credits the Sultan with 
total control of his household, indicating that “Four wives and twice five hundred maids, 
unseen,/ Were ruled as calmly as a Christian queen” (V, cxlviii). These vast numbers of 
lovers, as well as the fifty daughters and forty-eight sons, seems to indicate that the sultan 
is a bastion of heterosexual male potency, especially since that number increases by a full 
third in Canto VI. However, the very next stanza introduces the notion of undefined 
scandal: 
If now and then there happened a slight slip, 
Little was heard of criminal or crime; 
The story scarcely passed a single lip— 
The sack and sea had settled all in time, 
From which the secret nobody could rip: 
The public knew no more than does this rhyme; 
No scandals made the daily press a curse— 
Morals were better, and the fish no worse. (V, cxlix) 
 
The punishment referred to here—being sewn into a sack and thrown into the sea—is a 
common response to infidelity, and one risked twice over by Juan, first for his 
involvement with the sultana, and then for his interference with Dudù. Curiously, the 
stanza uses a passive syntactic construction to refer to potential scandals punishable by 
drowning, intentionally obfuscating the agent of the infidelity. Based on what is claimed 
of the sultan’s omnipotence, it would be logical to assume that the scandal refers to 




emphasis on secrecy?  Because a secret kept from the reader acts as a gap, creating the 
space for visualization of the vice which most speaks to the individual—whether it is 
mere fornication or something more transgressive. 
 For example, the sultan’s reaction to Juan as Juanna suggests that the concealed 
crime might well be one of homosexual desire. Though his powers of sight are much 
emphasized, his observations are often rationalized in self-centered terms: “He saw with 
his own eyes the moon was round,/ Was also certain that the earth was square,/ Because 
he had journeyed fifty miles, and found/ No sign that it was circular anywhere…”(V, cl).  
So when he spies Juan in the company of the damsels and eunuchs, it is not clear whether 
“perceived/ Juan amongst the damsels in disguise,/ At which he seemed no whit surprised 
or grieved…” (V, clv) is meant to indicate that he perceives the apparently-female Juan, 
and finds “her” pretty, or that he perceives the disguise and finds Juan pretty. Either way, 
his self-interest would have him publicly abet the masquerade. The rhymed pairing of 
“disguise” and “no whit surprised” in the stanza seems to emphasize the possibility that 
Juan’s true sex is evident to the sultan—it is the disguise, rather than the beauty, about 
which he is not surprised—which underpins the compliment to Juan’s face with the threat 
of an implicit forced homosexual encounter. Such an undertone would justify Juan’s 
response, which is to “blush and shake,” and also explain the poem’s reference to him as 
a “new-bought virgin” when the reader well knows he is not (V, clvi). The poem 
conspires to maintain the silence surrounding such a “slight slip,” if one happens; apart 
from the ambiguity of the adjectives in the statement “…as a man/ He liked to have a 
handsome paramour/ At hand, as one may like to have a fan” (VI, xci), no more is said of 




sultan’s open appreciation; this is the potential that Charles Donelan refers to when he 
speaks of Juan’s “polysexuality” in the harem scenes (95). 
 In her analysis of harem stories in opera, Ruth Bernard Yeazell defines the 
underlying anxiety of such tales as “not only a general concern about the problem of 
knowing other people but a peculiarly masculine anxiety about the erotic secrets of 
women.” Libertine stories seeking to address and salve that anxiety are not new. 
Crébillon’s The Sofa, for instance, a popular Orientalist piece, attempts to divine the 
feminine mysteries by concealing a narrating sentience within a piece of furniture 
commonly used for harem assignations; Denis Diderot’s Indiscreet Jewels takes a more 
direct approach, imagining a magic ring that invests female genitalia with the power of 
speech. Neither solution is entirely effective because meaning is always modulated by the 
narrative—the sofa is privy to events, true, but must judge motivations based on what it 
understands; in giving voice to organs previously mute, the ring also opens the door to 
personality and rhetoric, creating multiplicity and conflict, but no real persuasion or truth.  
Byron’s harem scene seems to tackle the problem of understanding feminine experience 
with more success precisely because it does not bother to express its findings. It models a 
method for obtaining access to a woman’s experience, and thus her secrets, by stripping 
the libertine of his masculine ego and then forcing him first into a woman’s dress, then 
into her behavior, and finally into her intimate relations. That it forbears in the end to 
narrate a revelation validates the understanding the reader should have gained; to narrate 
Juan’s discoveries, particularly through the mouthpiece of the poem’s world-weary and 




indication that sympathy and understanding together constitute the terminus of Juan’s 
development, not mere sexual prowess.   
 
The Harrowing of London 
 
The exile from Spain remakes Juan, emptying him of all predetermined qualities 
and filling him with new traits built from experience with the theory of desire, the 
practice of sex, and the emotional ramifications of power and subjugation. Juan is now an 
enticing prospect, and England is destined to be the proving ground that shows just what 
kind of seducer this exile has turned out, and what kind of ramifications the acquisition of 
that knowledge will have. If Byron’s seduction of the reader, so excessive in its strategies 
of disarmament and personalization, can be said to undertake strategies of control at all, 
that manipulation happens here, in the English cantos, through the attenuation of 
expectation. Back in Canto I, the speaker-poet explicitly directs the reader to expect Hell 
at this stage of the narrative. In the Don Juan tradition, some form of supernatural 
retribution always occurs just before the descent into Hell; the libertine’s sins are 
revealed and he is submitted to a higher power for judgment and condemnation. The last 
act of El Burlador, for instance, condemns de Molina’s Don Juan for arrogance, short-
sightedness, and general stupidity. In a moment of hubris, Don Juan invites the statue of 
his victim Don Gonzalo to dinner. Politely, the statue turns up to proffer a return 
invitation; the ensuing meal, before which Juan neglects to seek absolution, offers a 
foretaste of Hell’s punishments in a menu of vipers and scorpions washed down by gall 
and vinegar.  Juan is dragged below-stage to Hell, undoubtedly to be punished for 
adultery and general forgetfulness. Molière’s version of the dinner scene instead makes a 




repentance, Don John actively feigns conversion in order to manipulate his father and 
insult Don Carlos, claiming that his betrayal of Donna Elvira was necessitated by his 
new-found faith (V, iii). John is warned to seek Heaven’s mercy twice, first by Sganarelle 
and then by a spectral woman, but after he clarifies his position on repentance by 
dispatching the spirit with his sword, the statue speaks, and the play ends on a nice 
moment of thunder, lightning, and spectacle where John falls into the earth and is 
consumed by flames. In either version, the audience gets to go home happily alight with 
the joy of schadenfreude and with their pious faith in eternal judgment validated.  
In Byron’s version, however, the reader is allowed to depend on no such faith.  
The seduction has entered the control phase, and the narrative appears to uphold a set of 
beliefs held by the reader—that divine judgment is both possible and, in this story, 
inevitable—only to take them away by spinning out the moments leading up to climax, 
the same way a seducer might engineer the expectation of love with promises of a 
wedding, only to continually put off the date. Seemingly in accordance with the speaker-
poet’s claim to morality made in Canto I (“If any person should presume to assert/ This 
story is not moral…/ That this is not a moral tale, though gay…I mean to show/ The very 
place where wicked people go” (I, ccvii)), Byron feeds the reader’s expectations with the 
twin tropes of dinner and ghost.30 A reader with any experience at all of the moral sermon 
delivered by the story’s progenitor narratives—and it is useful to recall that Haslett’s first 
chapter demonstrates that everyone in England has experience with this story at this 
time—assumes Hell is inevitable, and would expect, at the beginning of the poem, to 
have Canto XII put a period to the protagonist, likely with the aid of demons and 




readers who have memorized the face of Haidée and quailed at the prospect of 
emasculation along with Juan should no longer rely unthinkingly on paternalistic 
oversight, supernatural or otherwise, and inescapable heavenly justice. The received 
morality of the nineteenth century, politically derived and externally imposed and 
enforced, is shown to have no legs. The only functional morality is a practical one, 
derived from an experience of immorality, built on sympathy, and tailored to the 
particular conditions of the moment—conditions that, as Byron’s Don Juan well knows, 
can change in an instant. A reader that has travelled with Juan through shipwreck, pirates, 
harems, and the like realizes that there is no such thing as inevitability in this narrative, or 
this world. This change results from the broadening influence of travel generally, and the 
particular caprices of this journey particularly, vicariously upon the mind. In 
contemplating travel as one of the predominant themes in Don Juan, Boyd emphasizes 
this effect:  
To the educative influences of contact with rude nature and personal experience 
of distance and physical hardship, Byron adds firsthand acquaintance with a wide 
variety of peoples, places, and manners… Travel in Don Juan serves a double 
purpose. It fosters and chastises the hero, educating him as no mother or book 
learning in Seville could do; and it educates the reader, by juxtaposing view after 
view of the modern real world. (73)  
 
That Canto XII turns out to be the London society canto instead speaks volumes about 
both the unreliability of the speaker-poet and Byron’s own derision for the city from 
which he remained exiled. The change can also be interpreted either as the relocation of 
the judgment scene to a less efficacious courtroom, or the deflection of what might 
otherwise be seen as Juan’s headlong rush—through exile, shipwreck, enslavement, and 




multiplies the mystical encounters in a way that thwarts the condemnatory potential of 
the ending.     
This is not to say that the journey has left the hero unscarred; he has lost some of 
that innocence that characterizes the first six cantos. After his time on the battlefield and 
in the Russian court, he is said to be “[a] little blasé—‘t is not to be wondered/ At, that 
his heart had got a tougher rind:/ And though not vainer from his past success,/ No doubt 
his sensibilities were less” (XII, lxxxi). According to the poet, this is due in part to the 
peculiarities of British women, whose virtue is a product, apparently, of the intersection 
of a reserved manner and society’s surveillance (XII, lxxiv-lxxxi); however, the adoption 
of the orphan of war suggests that, however toughened, Juan’s sensibilities have altered, 
rather than diminished. The reader being told that Juan “was more glad in her/ Safety, 
than his new order of St. Vladimir” (VIII, cxl) suggests that his heroism in the orphan’s 
rescue is motivated by something other than vanity or reward; likewise, the next stanza’s 
“—and Juan wept,/ And made a vow to shield her, which he kept” (VIII, cxli) implies the 
development of a very un-libertine emotional connection with the child, in spite of the 
fact that taking on a female ward is an event fraught with licentious possibilities in an 
ostensibly libertine tale. (That Juan lodges the child with a tutor as soon as she obtains 
school age is perhaps telling in this regard.) The structure of this line is interesting, as 
well, because of its Biblical resonances: the clause isolated between the em-dash and the 
end of the line echoes John 11:35 in the King James translation, which reads “Jesus 
wept.” Famous for being the shortest verse in the Bible, this line also marks a moment 
when, in a gospel whose narrative is about Christ’s transcendence, his humanity shows 




manifested in subsequent verses, Christ first cries in empathy with Mary’s grief. A reader 
familiar with the biblical context would recognize that, perhaps because of his early 
adventures, this version of Don Juan poised on the precipice of judgment is meant to be a 
radically different character than those monolithic versions which, incapable of 
repentance, challenged the statue and lost; he may, in fact, be judged and yet escape. For 
this reader it is fortunate, then, that the story remains unfinished, for the speaker 
promises, but again does not deliver, “a huge monument of pathos/ As Philip’s son 
proposed to do with Athos” (XII, lxxxvi), a metaphor that suggests future immutability 
by comparing Juan to the statue of Alexander proposed for, but never built on, Mount 
Athos. To deliver such a metaphor is to fix Juan, once again, within the signifiers that 
would have defined him (class, nation, language, gender) had his exile not happened; to 
promise such an event but not deliver is to string the reader along in a endless quest for 
certainty and resolution (the kind of result many expect from religion), punishment or 
escape, even though the narrative, like the world it tries to emulate, is only about change.   
It is while musing on change—and mistresses—that Juan encounters the poem’s 
version of the stone guest, an apparently evanescent manifestation known as the Black 
Friar. Juan meets the Black Friar a total of twice, a number that echoes the original Juan’s 
encounters with the stone guest. Juan dines three times between these mysterious 
encounters—a dinner with an extensive menu before the first encounter, a breakfast and 
dinner between the encounters, and a breakfast after the second encounter that reveals the 
specter to be the Duchess Fitz-Fulke. The first dinner is described in terms of conflict that 
echo the braggadocio of the original challenge in de Molina—we are told there are 




as here “more mystery lurks… [in the food]/ Than witches, b—ches, or physicians brew” 
(XV, lxii). The context of the meal has changed since El Burlador. Byron’s world is a 
new world where the supernatural commands significantly less attention than the menu, 
even to the speaker who is crafting the tale; he gives eleven stanzas to the contemplation 
of the bill of fare for this dinner, and only six to the subsequent haunting. Even when 
contemplating his own methods, the speaker-poet cannot help but take recourse to images 
of consumption: 
But Politics, and Policy, and Piety, 
Are topics that I sometimes introduce, 
Not only for the sake of their variety, 
But as subservient to their moral use; 
Because my business is to dress society 
And stuff with sage that very verdant goose. 
And now, that we may furnish with some matter all 
Tastes, we are going to try the Supernatural. (XV, xciii) 
 
Every philosophical construct in life, thanks to the speaker’s metaphor, is shown to be 
sublimated to the appetites; cater to the appetites, the reasoning goes, and wisdom—
sagesse—may be implanted in society like sage-and-onions in the entree. The 
supernatural is to be used in this narrative, not because it has metaphysical power or 
validity, but to round out the selection on the plate. As Helen Gardner notes, “he displays 
with great force the satiety which dogs, as its appropriate nemesis, the life of sensation.  
He offers no panaceas and does not pretend that men can be saved from themselves by 
love…by politics, or by patriotism…[only] a positive devotion to the truth” (119-20). 
Rationalism trumps metaphysics, then, by offering an antidote to the jaded palate, a 
digestive to a stomach bloated on faith and philosophy, a tiny dose of the emptiness that, 




 After such a meal, it might be reasonable to suspect that the Black Friar, like 
Marley’s ghost, is merely a manifestation of prodigious indigestion, but the next meal 
reveals him to have a proper, if immaterial, history. The monk is a relic of the 
suppression of the monasteries under Henry VIII, a spirit haunting the family of the man 
who dispossessed him. His story clearly marks him as an outmoded construct, a relic of 
past beliefs that, though the speaker does much to defend them as “the source of the 
Sublime and Mysterious” (XV, xcv), has no actual effect—he stands by the cradles and 
the coffins of the Amundeville family, but exacts no revenge. Even its method of delivery 
marks his irrelevance to the modern world; his story, told over breakfast, is used as a 
vehicle by which Adeline may show off her singer-songwriter capabilities. Though Juan 
is distraught, he is not at risk, because as an instrument of threat and repentance the Friar, 
like the religion he represents, is clearly impotent as well as incorporeal. 
The fact of the spectre’s existence is less clear. During the second manifestation, 
Juan discovers that the Friar exhibits a remarkable solidity of bustline and two rows of 
pearls, and then finds the ghost to be the Duchess Fitz-Fulke, a revelation which throws 
the metaphysical origins of the first encounter into some dispute. Anthony England points 
out that this encounter is phrased in “language of ascent and progression,” which 
indicates “an impressive advance in [Juan’s] capacity to pursue a salutary demystification 
of his world” (1415)—in effect, Juan’s intellect has matured notably in the space of a 
single day. This contradicts Rutherford’s criticism of Juan’s behavior as immature: “Juan 
passes from sublime musings about Aurora to an involvement with the Duchess of Fitz-
Fulke, and this is perfectly in keeping with Byron’s view of human nature—Juan’s 




man’s state to his conceptions” (203). However, the speaker’s eleventh-canto exhortation 
that Juan “be/ Not what you seem, but always what you see…” (XI, lxxxvi) lends weight 
to the notion that perspicacity, not consistency, is the relevant feature of development 
under consideration—the will to self-determination is key, even if the results of that self-
determination are less than laudable. The agent of supernatural retribution becomes 
another means of revelation; no challenge is issued or accepted; no opportunities of 
repentance are offered or rejected. The divine justice that puts an end to previous 
incarnations of Don Juan here has lost its teeth. It is demoted to mundane seduction, 
another corporeal adventure that will result in further refinement of Juan’s self-derived 
morality, an adventure aptly followed up with images, not of hellfire, but of breakfast, 
suggesting that this advancement is part of a cycle that can be endlessly perpetuated. The 
reader’s expectations of punishment, if any remain, along with whatever remnants of self-
assurance and moral superiority he or she has retained through the events of the narrative, 
are further undermined by the bathos of that breakfast scene. That which Catherine 
Addison calls the “cumulative, polygamous, open-ended form” that results from the 
removal of the judgment scene plays with the reader’s desire for certainty and 
expectation of judgment, rewarding the lengthy effort of identifying with Juan and 
following him through his exile and development only with space, a floorless, uncertain 
void that can only be filled with more work, more experience, more development. It is 
teleology without terminus; the road to damnation has developed a roundabout, the 
dogma that promises judgment is thwarted, and the God, if there is one, of this world that 




Written from exile, Don Juan’s novel manipulation of power, morality, and 
judgment takes aim at, and finds its target in, the newly bourgeois politics of a reform 
movement which sought to fortify its position—and stave off the threat of revolution—by 
openly and consistently curtailing free will under the guise of rejecting the moral 
excesses of the Regency. The poem very nearly did not get published because of Byron’s 
publisher’s early qualms. Caroline Franklin summarizes the political situation, and the 
editorial reaction, thus: “For expediency… it was necessary these days for all friends of 
Liberty to castigate the sexual immorality associated both with the Tory court of the 
Prince Regent and the ossified Whig aristocracy who made a mockery of an Opposition” 
(131). Byron’s editors recommended suppression. Timorousness in the face of phantom 
charges of sedition, libel, and immorality would have been like a red rag to a bull for 
such a fire-breathing radical; for Byron, a child reared under the shadow of Scottish 
Calvinist determinism, a young man ironically heir to money enough to fulfill his most 
radical philosophical aims and a position in the aristocracy that meant he could not be 
seen to try, the prospect of exercising true free will—without fear of critique, 
condemnation, or damnation—must have shimmered, like the Grail, just out of reach for 
most of his life.31 In order to get the initial cantos of the poem in print, Byron acceded to 
the uncharacteristically self-effacing step of anonymous publication, undoubtedly 
because this poem directly attacks this practice of summarily adopting morality as a 
summary means of political and social control, rather than a patiently-derived framework, 
based on experience, for balancing the demands of free will with the needs of one’s 
fellow human. This sequence of departures that the poem takes from the Don Juan 




experience whose ultimate result is the refinement of the character and the expansion of 
the intellect—the development of just such a practical morality. In the Donna Julia 
episode, Juan is stripped of his education and instructed in the essential human appetites 
in an environment free of philosophical obfuscation. Against the backdrop of Julia’s self-
delusion, he learns the truth of himself. In the Haidée encounter, he is stripped of 
communication and learns, instead, communion—the truth of the beloved. In the 
Gulbeyaz scenes, he is stripped of sexual identity and experiences, first-hand, the reality 
of the object—the otherwise incomprehensible truth of the Other.  He becomes a new 
kind of libertine—from this sequence of lessons, he acquires the empathy that he 
demonstrates toward his ward, shown in his understanding of the dislocation she 
experiences as a Muslim, an orphan, and a girl; his commitment to her care and 
protection; and the moderation of his own appetites, which, in any other libertine 
including Casanova, might make use of her as a kind of lover-in-training. He also 
acquires true lucidity, as evidenced by the demystification of the stone guest. The new 
morality Juan is sent to seek is a rational one, and is simultaneously predicated on and 
antidote to the experience of immorality, so when the poem names Newton “the sole 
mortal who could grapple/ Since Adam—with a fall—or with an apple” (X, i), it is 
endorsing a rationalist project of immersion in and analysis of immoral as a method of 
redressing both the insufficiencies of extant nineteenth-century dogma and of human 
nature. Should such overt endorsements be insufficiently compelling, the narrative is 
perfectly willing to seduce, manipulate, and dissemble to help its reader achieve a 













ASTRIDE THE WORLDS: BAUDELAIRE 
 
AND THE REINVENTED VALMONT 
 
 
As we have seen, Byron’s Don Juan deploys all four of the phases of seduction on 
a grand scale in order to coerce his reader into a perspective that both questions the kind 
of morality promulgated by British reformers in the new century as a means of 
consolidating political power and ameliorating revolutionary threat, and values the 
revelations of self-determination above all received notions regarding power and the 
signifiers of identity. He disarms by converting a protagonist defined by intent and 
manipulation into a hero defined by inadvertency and self-discovery; he entices through a 
prolonged narrative that responds to, and partly fulfills, his reader’s changing desires for 
titillation and revelation; he personalizes by pulling the narrative, which begins in Spain 
as the tradition dictates, both forward in time and closer to Britain as the adventure 
continues; and he controls by playing with expectations of judgment, retribution, and 
escape, promising but not delivering, keeping the reader locked into a relationship with 
the narrative and its hero in hopes of a resolution that is never delivered. By contrast, 
Baudelaire’s seductive efforts in his analysis of Valmont, “Notes sur Les Liaisons 
dangereuses,” are almost too subtle to identify. These are, after all, merely notes for an 
argument that was never written, a sketchy set of reminders whose purpose is never made 





considers “a good man,” Baudelaire’s notes do little to disarm; as criticism, rather than 
fictional narrative, Baudelaire can lean on the authority of his role as critic and the 
appearance of intellectual objectivity in order to ameliorate the perceived threat of 
immorality. The notes personalize the argument slightly for the nineteenth-century 
French reader by utilizing nineteenth-century notions of love as epitomized in the works 
of Georges Sand as the point of comparison by which to understand—and ultimately 
valorize—love in the eighteenth-century style. Control never happens at all, perhaps 
because as a strategy it is more likely to be deployed at the level of syntax and thus would 
not be apparent in mere notes, or perhaps because, as the work of argument is always to 
“compass about” (to borrow Kierkegaard’s terms) its reader and direct his or her 
perspective, control underpins all the choices made in the selection and arrangement of 
the notes themselves. Baudelaire’s revisions to Valmont instead entice—they are, in 
many ways, more startling than Byron’s disarming changes to Don Juan—building 
Valmont up into a right-thinking product of immoral practice, a rational revolutionary. 
Following Byron, Baudelaire’s argument is poised to present as Valmont a new character 
based on Laclos’ libertine rather than the libertine Laclos writes, a more alluring version 
of the aristocrat that will stand head and shoulders above both the eighteenth-century 
libertine’s peers and the nineteenth-century critic’s contemporaries. These notes are, as 
notes must be, brief and disconnected, so undoubtedly some of the characteristics of the 
story that remain unconsidered are so because Baudelaire did not need to make note of 
them—they were already in his head. Yet there are other omissions that are significant, 
and telling. When considered in their entirety, the notes seem designed to recast the 




Baudelaire, as we shall see, considers Byron one of the geniuses of the nineteenth century 
when it comes to recognizing matters of sin and the human heart, so it is perhaps no 
surprise that he follows Byron in also attempting to mold an eighteenth-century libertine 
into a rational hero for the new age (largely by exploiting the omissions of history and 
motivation which are, by necessity given its form, rampant in Laclos’ novel), an ideal 
political model capable of development, self-perfection, and ultimately unparalleled 
ratiocination. Unlike Byron’s Don Juan, however, who must be stripped of his adult 
autonomy, recreated as a feckless adolescent, and even then still broken through a 
prolonged and damaging series of diminutions and evacuations before he can become 
self-aware and self-determining, Baudelaire’s Valmont requires only augmentation of 
those libertine talents so fundamental to successful seduction, a complete understanding 
of both the self and the victim, to complete his development. The claim that “Notes sur 
Les Liaisons dangereuses” is apparently preparing to defend is that Valmont’s divided 
nature is already heroic; in order to carry out his seductions masterfully, he must have 
already cultivated the essential skill of self-awareness, a necessary political skill 
nonexistent, Baudelaire finds, in the new Empire. It requires only the right circumstance, 
the seduction of the correct victim, to convert that self-awareness into self-knowledge, 
making Valmont an apt autodidact—both dandy and devil, trainee and trainer—in a 
curriculum that teaches a concept Baudelaire believes the age has forgotten—that 
awareness of one’s impulse to evil is the critical first step to any sort of redemption at all.     
 
Obscenity and the Curriculum of Vice 
 
Any reader who keeps up with Baudelaire’s critical work across his career knows 




mechanical reproduction and imaginative genius. In Salon de 1859, for instance, 
Baudelaire derides all photography—including obscene pictures—as a valueless medium 
mistakenly credited by the public with a truth value superior to art merely because of its 
unmatched capacity for faithful reproduction. For Baudelaire, the horrors of the 
imagination are preferable to any such image captured on a plate, particularly to those 
posed, costumed, possibly pornographic tableaux which appeal to “[l]’amour de 
l’obscénité, qui est aussi vivace dans le cœur naturel de l’homme que l’amour de soi-
même…” and are thus a natural outgrowth of the technology (1034). Yet in the Salon de 
1846, Baudelaire establishes an equally clear thesis valorizing obscenity when depicted in 
paint by the likes of Tassaert, Ingres, Watteau, or Delacroix. The same provocative 
subjects and decadent historical contexts one might find in a photograph are here 
redeemed for inclusion in Baudelaire’s museum of love by the delicate realism of the 
work. “…[L]e génie sanctifie toutes choses, et si ces sujets étaient traités avec le soin et 
le recueillement nécessaire, ils ne seraient point souillés par cette obscénité révoltante, 
qui est plutôt une fanfaronnade qu’une vérité” (901). For Baudelaire, the key to this value 
is the genius of its creator. Obscenity artificially posed and captured by a machine is 
valueless; obscenity artificially posed and captured by an artist is brilliance. This 
obscenity is neither illicit pleasure nor tainting experience, but a means by which subjects 
could be experienced and understood. Truth is revealed through care and contemplation. 
The study of those obscene works produced through care and contemplation thus 
becomes a study, not just of the “how” of vice, the pedagogical curriculum of names and 
techniques with which the whore’s dialogues like the Satyra Sotadica are concerned, but 




self-examination, Baudelaire considers that he sits at Byron’s feet. In “Réflexions sur 
quelques-uns de mes contemporains,” which went to press in 1860, Baudelaire designs a 
similar metaphor that fleshes out the intrinsic problem of mankind’s sin in the modern 
age; the issue is not that we do it, but that we delude ourselves about what we do and why 
it happens. Applying that sanctifying genius to modern writers, Baudelaire identifies 
Byron as one of those authors whose particular brilliance is in the revelation of the 
wicked impulses of passion. He writes that they: 
…ont admirablement exprimé la partie blasphématoire de la passion; ils ont 
projeté des rayons splendides, éblouissants, sur le Lucifer latent qui est installé 
dans tout cœur humain. Je veux dire que l’art moderne a une tendance 
essentiellement démoniaque. Et il semble que cette part infernale de l’homme, 
que l’homme prend plaisir à s’expliquer à lui-même, augmente journellement, 
comme si le Diable s’amusait à la grossir par des procédés artificiels, à l’instar 
des engraisseurs, empâtant patiemment le genre humain dans ses basses-cours 
pour se préparer une nourriture plus succulente. (739-40) 
 
It is this image of man as a farmyard goose, being stuffed with all the delights of sin for a 
purpose about which he knows nothing, which provides a telling account of Baudelaire’s 
ambivalence about traditional notions of morality which dictate that immorality is best 
ignored in public, but reveled in in private. He mentions often that the inclination to sin 
seems to be a natural impulse, like hunger, and there is a suggestion that engorgement 
upon sin enriches or perhaps sweetens in the manner of the medlar, which must rot before 
it may be eaten. The act of being stuffed, however, implies a surrender of free will 
facilitated by stupidity.  The bird gorged on food is physically forced to eat; mankind 
suffers no such physical compulsion to stuff itself on sin (although Baudelaire’s inclusion 
of the Devil suggests there might be a supernatural one). That humanity does gorge may 
be because it fails to understand the nature of its own reckless impulse to pleasure and 




apparent to the libertines of the Ancien Régime, is his ability to uncover the workings of 
this infernal part, to shed light upon the dark corners in which this “latent Lucifer” 
operates. The image here is very nearly that of the Platonic philosopher king, except that 
where philosophers journey out of the cave of the world into the light of understanding, 
poets like Byron have already achieved that enlightenment and return with it—as 
“splendid rays”—into the world. Baudelaire may be thinking less here of Byron’s 
libertine characters than of Byron himself; Carrasus notes that Byron wears dandyism 
with a critical difference: “…Byron lui confère une autre dimension: ennui fatal, lassitude 
aristocratique, dérision de l’existence, provocation orgiaque, mépris des conventions 
morales…il communique précisément au dandysme un accent de révolte morale” (158). 
Boredom, lassitude, and derision characterize Byron’s speaker-poet in Don Juan far 
better than it does the juvenile, energetic Juan himself; however, by the end of the tale, 
both manifest a degree of moral revolt. 
 If the sins of the fathers are inevitably visited on the sons, then the problems of 
vice in the industrial age—so admirably illuminated by Byron as a lack of imagination, 
the incapacity to understand the depths of one’s own motivations—must be rooted in the 
eighteenth century, a topic Baudelaire had long intended to tackle. Baudelaire saved his 
consideration of Valmont, Laclos’ exemplar of the homme dangereux, for the end of his 
career; Claude Pichois dates the notes to 1866, just a few months before the collapse of 
Baudelaire’s health and his retreat into a sanatorium. If this date is correct, then 
Baudelaire’s interest in libertinism, and in this project, is very nearly life-long; it has been 
twenty years since Salon de 1846, when Baudelaire first pinned a Chorier epigraph to an 




critique of Byron. They undertake a provocative comparison between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, asking: “La fouterie et la gloire de fouterie étaient-elles plus 
immorale que cette manière modern d’adorer et de mêler le saint au profane?” (640). 
Baudelaire seems to present eighteenth-century sensuality as a healthier approach to vice 
than nineteenth-century emotionalism precisely because it is predicated on seduction and 
the analytical capabilities required to make seduction work, and then fleshes out the bare 
bones of the Laclos protagonist to make Valmont the archetype of the successful student 
of the self.   
 
The Eighteenth Century 
 
Because Dangerous Liaisons is an epistolary novel, the reader is only allowed to 
know of any character what the character—or any of his peers—chooses to reveal. We 
have already seen, in the chapter on seduction, how the gaps in the narrative leave 
Valmont’s motives open to construction; in the matter of the facts of Valmont’s life, we 
actually know even less. Like de Molina’s Don Juan, Valmont is conceived and delivered 
into the story as an adult; his past is delicately hinted at—a previous relationship, of 
indefinite depth, duration, and seriousness, with Madame de Merteuil in Letter 4, a 
scandalous and nearly criminal past (without any of the salacious details) in Letter 9, a 
passing reference to surveillance on a Duchess in Letter 101, an even briefer reference to 
love “in cold blood” with a Comtesse in Letter 115—but never writ plain. And since 
nearly every letter in the volume is either a rhetorical construct, motivated by seduction, 
ingratiation, dominance, or fear, or written by characters that prove, by the end of the 
story, to be idiots, even such insubstantial hints are suspect. In fact, apart from his title, 




Rosemonde, Valmont’s life has to it no details at all. The story expends most of its 
expository capital focusing instead on Madame de Merteuil and the elaborate and artful 
seduction of her that Valmont attempts and bungles. The much-discussed origin story in 
Letter 81 is her revelation, not his; she successfully juggles a double life, in public a 
woman of propriety but in private a destructive seducer; her schemes are the more 
serpentine (manipulating a cohort into deflowering a virgin to exact revenge on that 
virgin’s future husband, as opposed to Valmont’s merely seducing a pious woman) and 
demonstrate a more incisive understanding of the people she manipulates. By 
comparison, Valmont is a blank slate. 
 As we will see, Baudelaire’s notes marginalize Merteuil’s role in the Valmont-
Merteuil relationship, choosing instead to inscribe that blank slate that is Valmont with 
all manner of admirable intellectual qualities like self-analysis and self-comprehension.  
Dangerous Liaisons, it seems, is less a moral text than a revolutionary one in 
Baudelaire’s eyes, and Valmont is very much the best brand of Republican—self-
motivated, self-defined, and capable of growth. Though Baudelaire makes the 
provocative claim that “tous les livres sont immoraux,” suggesting that the act of writing 
might somehow necessitate and presuppose immorality, and the act of reading perhaps 
communicate it, he states explicitly that this one is meant as a novel of history, one of a 
genre that “commentent donc et expliquent la Révolution” (640), because after their 
fashion, Baudelaire claims, the libertines were responsible for that revolt. It is not clear 
from the notes whether this was because the philosophy of individual agency that 
permitted libertines to exercise their capricious free will was a useful vehicle for 




libertinage provided evidence of an aristocratic degeneracy which demanded eradication; 
however, Baudelaire’s claim that Valmont’s character is a study of the search for power 
through dandyism lends credibility to the power of libertine individualism, as the dandy 
is, for Baudelaire, a positive, powerful, and potentially revolutionary figure. 33 The notes 
even explore Laclos’ biography, including his role in the Revolution, at some length, 
making a point of his participation in the Thermidorean reaction, a move simultaneously 
revolutionary and reactionary, as if the political philosophies of the author must, by 
necessity, color and improve the beliefs of the character. The libertines also, in their 
seductive practice, paved the way for Romanticism: there is some unexplained 
connection between something Valmont says—no quotation is cited—and the advent of 
Byron, who Baudelaire believes “était préparé, comme Michel-Ange” (640). So if Byron 
is free to be the philosopher-king of the nineteenth century, it is because a quality in 
Valmont paved the way.  
The enlightened understanding that is supposed to be Byron’s signal talent can be 
found at the core of every aspect of the eighteenth century’s sexual philosophy—
Valmont’s philosophy—that Baudelaire uses as counterpoint to and implied critique of 
nineteenth-century morays. Unlike “l’extase,” a quality of contemporary romantic 
philosophy the reader is expected to recognize and find familiar, where love induces a 
transport or a stupor that removes the act entirely from the realm of the functioning 
intellect, for Baudelaire libertine sex is instead an act designed merely to create or 
express positive spirits. His shorthand term to characterize the libertine approach is “le 
délire,” which suggests at best only a momentary derangement of the reason—the 




(641). Delirium passes, either into wellness or death, and, unlike ecstasy with all of its 
metaphysical connotations of religious transport and divine interference, is a biological 
manifestation of either illness or chemical interaction. As a biological manifestation, it 
can be expected to either resolve itself or be cured by the external application of 
intelligence. Thus Baudelaire’s condemnation of the century—and Sand—seems to stem 
from the accusation that the contemporary lover seeks transcendence in an act that the 
eighteenth century knew to be transient and ultimately subject to the will and to 
knowledge. In its essence, sex is trivial act; what is not trivial is the refinement—of 
intent, of technique, of morality—made possible by its subjection to the intellect. When 
well-played, sex is the libertine equivalent to Lord Goring’s perfect buttonhole—the 
mark of a socially and intellectually evolved man. When romanticized as the ecstatic gift 
of a capricious universe, sex invites boredom, disappointment, and passivity. Since ennui 
and a subtle sense of disappointment are common outgrowths of many adult human 
experiences besides sex, including meals, birthdays, and some marriages, Baudelaire’s 
argument is based on the kind of universal emotion his reader might be expected to 
recognize, sympathize with, and believe to be problematic; his seduction is thus 
personalized, becoming both an intimate discourse about the individual and a larger 
critique of the age.         
 Where the nineteenth century (and, by extension, its readers) specializes in self-
delusion, in not knowing, the eighteenth century specializes in deluding others, an act 
which requires complete knowledge of both self and other. Like Valmont, using his lover 
as a desk upon which to write of his lovelorn state to la Présidente de Tourvel, a specialist 




own desires and the way his lies will be understood. If the specialist is really good, he can 
manipulate language so that his delusion is never quite a lie, again like Valmont, whose 
explanation of his exhausted condition in that letter describes his postcoital physical state 
but can—and is intended to—be read as an emotional one. There is a telling comparison 
of libertine texts and the works of George Sand at the center of the notes that is made in 
just these terms:  “Le mal se connaissant était moins affreux et plus près de la guérison 
que le mal s’ignorant” (640). Libertines know their own evil; its exploitation is their art 
form. George Sand, and by extension the nineteenth century, does not. The critical 
difference, then, between the sexual philosophies of these two centuries rests in 
whether—and how—the intellect is deployed. That self-knowledge is key to the value of 
a character like Valmont, who, in order to perfect his seductions, must both self-analyze 
(in Baudelaire’s language, must perform the work of the dandy), and seek to understand 
and reconcile the substance of the self his analysis reveals. Baudelaire’s reconstruction of 
Valmont will privilege those gaps in the text when self-knowledge and self-analysis may 
be “read in,” and will utilize Baudelaire’s own perverse lexicon of valorization—reliant 
on figures of dandies and satans—to challenge the reader’s preconceptions regarding 
“good” characters and to build a sympathetic (and thus more enticing, to a reader in the 
current, more emotional age) hero out of Laclos’ fallible protagonist.      
 
The Object: Valmont as Dandy 
 
Of the twenty-one citations Baudelaire selects from the novel for his notes, two-
thirds pertain specifically to Valmont. Eleven have to do, not just with his genius for evil, 
but with his own assessment of the effects of that evil. Valmont does not self-delude in 




regarding the seduction of Cécile on the grounds that it provides far less challenge than 
the conquest of Tourvel. He remarks elsewhere that it is the difficult experience —as well 
as the unusual, which is what eventually alters his position on Cécile—that he is driven to 
pursue. Seduction thus constitutes a regimen of continually advancing study in the 
acquisition, the manipulation, and the satisfaction of desire. Others are well aware of 
Valmont’s proclivities; Baudelaire makes a point of Madame de Volanges’ remark that, 
all of his life, Valmont has never done anything without a motive, and everything he has 
done has been dishonest. Yet somehow, Valmont is never challenged about his 
intentions, and his conquests are never thwarted. Even knowing something of his 
reputation, Tourvel walks willingly to the slaughter. This is consistent with the libertine 
capability to disarm, manufacturing a public persona that is milder than the truth their 
actions would suggest. (Baudelaire ignores the fact that, while Valmont is good at this, 
Madame de Merteuil is better, maintaining a reputation for prudery even as she seduces 
and discards Prévan and Danceny in a public milieu.) To do this effectively, the libertine 
must constantly audit his persona as if it were a work of rhetoric—not just the practical 
outcomes of his actions, but how they are perceived.   
The dandy is the Baudelairean personification of this pursuit of external perfection.  
As the poet tells his journal, the dandy “droit aspirer à être sublime sans interruption; il 
doit vivre et dormir devant un miroir” (1273). This construct of the dandy living in front 
of the mirror may imply a greater degree of passivity than Baudelaire intends; after all, 
Constantin Guys, Baudelaire’s model for dandyism, is known as a boulevardier and 
praised for his habit of seeking out and getting in among people, and Byron labored 




dandyism usually use Baudelaire’s conception as their basis, so it may be significant that 
most of them privilege active, rather than static, contemplation; for instance, the 
mythological dandy figure Emilien Carassus constructs is defined by demonstration: 
“Mais si le propre de la vanité est l’autosatisfaction, dépourvue d’inquiétude et stagnant 
dans la béatitude du confort intellectuel, tel n’est pas assurément le cas du dandy. Il 
professe un culte de soi actif, exigeant, démonstratif” (45). As such, the libertine in 
vigorous pursuit of perfection in his seductive appeal and the Brummelian dandy in 
vigorous pursuit of the perfect cut of coat are more clearly two faces of the same coin. 
The dandy’s particular brand of narcissism provides an unparalleled opportunity for self-
study, because the dandy is involved, not in theoretical spheres of pursuit, but in practical 
ones, the minutiae of the self and its effects. The dandy believes, in Françoise Coblence’s 
terms, “[q]ue la vie soit œuvre, qu’elle soit la seule et la plus grand œuvre” (9); after the 
revolution in 1848, in part due to Baudelaire’s critical views, the scope of that work of 
life expanded to include politics (243). This postrevolutionary reformist zeal informs 
Domna Stanton’s belligerent definition of the dandy as a member of a “meritocratic 
minorit[y] engaged in sublimated warfare against unworthy, vulgar, meritless majorities” 
(7), as well as Richard Pine’s subclassification of the herald-dandy as a progenitor of 
change, “an eponymous hero, who, by virtue of action related to thought, makes possible 
a liberation, a revalorization, of the great gestures and metaphors of the tradition within 
which he exists” (12).   
There is scarcely any better description of Valmont than the dandy living in front of 
a mirror, because his ongoing correspondence with la Merteuil serves as both mirror and 




individual; the reader is forced to occupy only one point of view at a time, and accept all 
narrative events through the filter of the putative writer’s perceptions—a common 
eighteenth-century strategy for making fiction feel like fact.  Because the reader spends 
so much of Laclos’ novel eavesdropping on the conversation between Valmont and 
Merteuil, these characters become the authoritative voice of events. That feeling of 
authority is bolstered by the realization that Valmont’s careful account of every action 
implies continual self-vigilance; every letter is an examination of his desires and a post-
mortem of his technique. His perpetual rationalization of motives and philosophy permits 
refinement of his outward personae of libertine, repentant lover, or dutiful nephew, as 
rhetoric and recipient require.   
Baudelaire acknowledges that this emphasis on surfaces complicates the role of 
the reader, both within the text (the reader to whom each letter is addressed) and outside 
the text (the reader of the novel itself.) Those of us reading the novel assume we are the 
audience for the seductive manipulation described at such length; it is those whom the 
letters address that are their intended victims. However, since all we can know as readers 
is governed entirely by what the narrative chooses to share, and the narrative of 
Dangerous Liaisons is governed primarily by the Valmont/Merteuil correspondence, the 
realization that both characters are masters of the undetectable lie suggests that such an 
assumption is false. While Valmont is busy documenting his proclivity for vice, he is also 
demonstrating the reader’s propensity to be duped.34  Baudelaire draws attention to this 
effect in the disclaimer and the preface of the novel, which work at odds to undermine, 
yet validate, this “truth value” in the text. The preface maintains the illusion that the 




challenges their contents, contending that “nearly all the sentiments expressed are either 
pretended or dissembled,” and thus merely an intellectual novelty. The disclaimer calls 
the novel a novel, thwarted in its “verisimilitude” by “setting the events… in the present” 
(Feher 937). If the preface is correct, the contents of the letters are not to be believed, but 
the events are accurate. If the disclaimer is correct, the events are suspect, never mind the 
state of the sentiments. So even before the reader gets involved in the layers of 
prevarication that constitute the libertine existence, the shifting sands of fact and fiction 
about the text itself must be navigated. Where, and how often, we are allowing ourselves 
to be seduced into belief is never clear. 
 Sensitivity is the unexpected anomaly under Valmont’s surface, the chink in his 
libertine armor, and the reason his seduction of Tourvel ultimately fails; Baudelaire 
nonetheless treats it as an advantage. While seemingly out of character for a normal 
libertine, someone of, say, Merteuil’s stripe, it is invariably part and parcel of a 
Baudelairean dandy’s character. In his encomium on Constantin Guys, “Le Peintre de la 
vie moderne,” Baudelaire remarks in passing that “car le mot dandy implique une 
quintessence de caractère et une intelligence subtile de tout le mécanisme moral de ce 
monde ; mais, d’un autre côté, le dandy aspire à l’insensibilité…”(1160). The dandy 
aspires to insensibility because, at heart, he is too sensitive. Monsieur Guys is not 
handicapped by this pretense to insensibility; Valmont is. It blinds him to his own 
circumstances and corrupts his assessment of his effects. As early as Letter 4, 
Baudelaire’s notes show, Valmont acknowledges that falling in love with Tourvel is 
something from which he must be saved, ostensibly by his own seductive capabilities. 




(644). This is a remarkably vulnerable statement for a libertine to make, particularly to an 
audience as cuttingly effective at criticism as Merteuil; it echoes the dynamic of 
Baudelaire’s definition quite well, however, in that the vulnerability is so quickly 
parlayed into boast. Valmont shields his sensitivity, suggesting that, for him, in the role 
he performs, it is a weakness. Merteuil concurs; Valmont has allowed himself to become 
a victim. Baudelaire, however, appears to treat this feeling as a strength, a testament to 
the epic scale of Valmont’s desires, as well as the extraordinary mastery of his reason, to 
which those passions submit.   
Tactics, rules, and methods—the tools of this reason—turn out to be insufficient 
against such a passion, because, in the novel, Valmont does appear to fall in love, and the 
circumstance ultimately invites his death. The weakness Valmont confesses by Letter 
21—“Mes yeux sont mouillés de larmes… J’ai été étonné du plaisir qu’on éprouve en 
faisant le bien…”—could be taken merely as evidence of circumstantial generosity and 
sarcasm thickly applied.  After all, Baudelaire remarks early in the notes that “…Valmont 
est surtout un vaniteux. Il est d’ailleurs généreux, toutes les fois qu’il ne s’agit pas des 
femmes et de sa gloire,” a declaration which fails to acknowledge the obvious point that, 
for Valmont, women and glory are synonymous and pervasive (639). However, given the 
circumstances—and in spite of the fact that this moment is part of a larger strategy 
involving the story of a seduction told to seduce—it could also be read as a product of the 
softening effect of his relationship with Tourvel. Baudelaire chooses to take it as direct 
evidence of some latent compassion, “un reste de sensibilité par quoi il est inférieur à la 
Merteuil, chez qui tout ce qui est humaine est calciné” (645). Though Merteuil is 




openly, that metaphor of ashes is telling. It reinforces the idea that Valmont, the ideal 
libertine, is neither static, not fixed; he is capable of some kind of emotional 
development. Of recovery, to invoke again the language applied to the kind of evil that is 
self-aware. Madame de Merteuil is not; her humanity has been burnt out. She is a shell of 
a human. It is her external disfigurement by smallpox that serves as the retributive 
moment in Baudelaire’s consideration, not Valmont’s death—perhaps because the notes 
were incomplete, or perhaps because although a human has a content, an interiority, that 
may be snuffed out, a shell may only be damaged on its outside—thus Merteuil’s 
punishment reveals her true nature.35   
Baudelaire goes so far as to call Merteuil depraved, a word he never applies to 
Valmont: his comment on Letter 81, the much-discussed moment where the lady details 
her program of libertine self-fashioning, is limited to a missish sort of pique. Madame de 
Merteuil is too much the man for his taste, as “[l]a femme qui veut toujours faire 
l’homme, signe de grand dépravation” (646). One has the sense that contravening gender 
roles in this fashion, wanting to do as the man does, denotes a particularly excessive 
brand of excess, meriting a lower circle of Hell even than that to which most libertines 
aspire.36 Then again, Baudelaire is not inclined to sugar-coat that which he considers the 
criminal nature of women, though he does find it to have, in the end, an ameliorative 
effect on the man. In his maxims on love, he lays out the evolution this way: “Et c’est 
ainsi, grâce à une vue plus synthétique des choses, que l’admiration [pour votre 
maitresse] vous ramènera tout naturellement vers l’amour pur, ce soleil dont l’intensité 




relationship is the distancing of the one from the other, the introduction of light into the 
dark corners, and the refinement of the male nature.   
Though refinement is the outcome, the desires are rather different. The impulse of 
the lover is to lose himself in the beloved and yet still maintain a discrete identity: 
“L’amour veut sortir de soi, se confondre avec sa victime, comme la vainqueur avec le 
vaincu, et cependant conserver des privilèges de conquérant …” (1247). This impulse 
explains the very un-libertine empathy that creeps into Valmont’s approach to the 
seduction of Tourvel; it also explains the ease with which Merteuil manipulates Valmont 
into destroying his beloved. As a peer and a libertine, Merteuil is the only audience that 
matters in the novel, and she does not permit Valmont to maintain the pretense of 
conquest. Baudelaire is very clear about placing blame.  “Valmont est dupe,” we are told; 
even though it is Valmont’s sensitivity and vanity together that permit him to be 
manipulated, it is Merteuil whom Baudelaire credits with the murder of Tourvel, and by 
implication also the estrangement between the libertines which precipitates the tragedy of 
Valmont‘s death  (642). Baudelaire’s survey of the text ends well before the point in the 
novel where the estrangement escalates, so Valmont’s complicity in the tragedy is elided, 
perhaps intentionally. It is, after all, easier to accept Valmont as a rational hero if one 
ignores his vain and self-destructive love of power, the propensity for one-upmanship 
that controls him, and his inability to let go the compulsion to have the last word.  Or that 
he does whatever Merteuil tells him to. 
 In his efforts to catalogue Valmont’s finer points, Baudelaire sidesteps many of 
those moments in the plot when Valmont is most active in deploying the duplicities of 




blackmail Cécile, even though it is an extraordinary example of a victim’s impropriety 
being turned against her— through the promise of illicit communications from her lover, 
Cécile is duped into providing the key to her own room to her seducer. Baudelaire does 
not quote from her education in vice, even though pedagogical exchange, where the 
acolyte is introduced to immorality through the naming of the parts, is a trope of libertine 
fiction. He does not quote from the letter that Valmont writes to Tourvel using his lover’s 
sated body as a lap desk, even though it is an exquisite manipulation of irony and shows 
extraordinary command of the language. He also does not quote from the letter with 
which Valmont crushes that pious lady, the moment that solidifies Valmont’s identity as 
a libertine conqueror—because it is not a true seduction, by eighteenth-century standards 
of the home dangereux, until the seduction is revealed and the victim is publicly 
humiliated. Though these are some of the most memorable moments of the novel, 
moments when Laclos shows just how competent Valmont is with the tactics and 
methods of libertine seduction, they lack the inward narcissism, the relentless self-
exploration, of the moments that Baudelaire select instead.  In these contemplative 
moments, Valmont is the goose comprehending his engorgement; in the seductive ones, 
he is the diabolic fattener. 
 
The Agent: Valmont as Satan 
 
The capability for self-analysis characteristic of the dandy thus provides Valmont 
with the intellectual mechanism to evaluate and improve outward manifestations, the 
rhetoric of the self; it does not, however, give him the imagination to acknowledge and 
comprehend the substance of the self—the contradictory drives, desires, and impulses 




the identifying characteristic of the devil—Satan is, after all, the manifestation of schism 
in God’s creation—and is thus the basis for Baudelaire’s repeated connection of Valmont 
and Satan throughout the notes. Baudelaire begins by characterizing Valmont merely as 
satanic, i.e., having qualities similar to those of Satan, but in the midst of analysis of 
Valmont’s impiety, the poet begins to equate Valmont so closely with the Devil that the 
man begins to function as a substitute for the demon; Valmont comes to stand in for 
God’s opposite number. Laclos’ treatment of Valmont’s impiety certainly smacks of a 
confrontational attitude toward God; it is difficult to tell whether, in the original story, 
this impiety is born of true belief or merely the willingness to manipulate the affectations 
of belief in others (in other words, is it Valmont being a devil, truly committed to his own 
disbelief, or Valmont behaving as a dandy, modulating the appearance of irreverence for 
desired effect). Baudelaire cites two instances of Valmont’s impiety in the notes. In one, 
Valmont vows to force his conquest to sacrifice her own virtue, simultaneously robbing 
both her husband and her god of a faithful adherent.  In a second, he engineers a moment 
of generosity, in order that his conquest may hear of it and think him reformed, and then 
asks those to whom he was generous to pray to God on his behalf. In both cases, it is 
impossible to separate libertine conviction from audience reception; in Baudelaire’s 
analysis, however, God is a real and present concern, for it is against God that Valmont’s 
extraordinary prowess is ultimately to be pitched.   
Satanism is a recurrent theme in Baudelaire’s work; at one point in his journal, he 
raises the question: “Se livrer à Satan, qu’est-ce que c’est?” (1260). Evidently, it is the 
opportunity to understand human impulse. For Baudelaire, modern man is inherently 




Dieu, l’autre vers Satan” (1277). To make these allegiances correspond exactly to the 
duality between reason and nature is to miss the lesson of the satanic Valmont, in whom 
reason is the tool by which the nature is first understood and assimilated, before being 
controlled and perfected. Indeed, Baudelaire’s theology suggests that the duality of man, 
though the current condition, is by no means ideal. “La théologie. Qu’est-ce que la chute? 
Si c’est l’unité devenue dualité, c’est Dieu qui a chuté. En d’autres termes, la création ne 
serait-elle pas la chute de Dieu?” (1283). In this view, God was originally an entity, 
whole and complete. As each of his creations—first Lucifer, then man—falls, that unity 
fragments, and thus God is diminished. The seed of the fragmentation of God manifests 
in Satan as pride; in man, it shows as original sin, the vice man inherits rather than the 
one he makes for himself. The most narcissistic of the seven deadly sins, pride requires 
detailed knowledge of one’s own capabilities, so Satan, Valmont, and Baudelaire’s dandy 
are all similarly aligned in their capacity for self-examination.37 Once the acceptance of 
original sin as doctrine, however, provides a pat explanation for the source of sinful 
tendencies, Satan loses substance, becoming “an elegant shorthand for the sum of human 
passions and weaknesses” (Dendle 22). He becomes that latent Lucifer whose effects 
Byron—philosophical heir to Valmont—is so good at revealing through extended 
examinations of the effects of seduction like Don Juan. Both Byron’s version of Don 
Juan and Baudelaire’s version of Valmont arrive at the same conclusion regarded truth 
and received morality, which Baudelaire proposes in his journal as a “[t]heorie de la vraie 
civilisation” contingent on such revelation: “Elle n’est pas dans le gaz, ni dans la vapeur, 
ni dans les tables tournantes, elle est dans la diminution des traces du péché originel” 




or moral perfection, but in addressing the gaps in human knowledge—the substitution of 
actual understanding for original sin. Fill the gaps adequately, and suddenly the potential 
exists to address the problem of the Fall. Valmont’s project of self-awareness, it seems, 
may be the path back to divine unity.38 
Where moralists would see the rejection of sin, original or otherwise, as the path to 
grace, Baudelaire seems to be arguing for the integration of it into the human experience.  
This is handled explicitly in “Les Drames et les romans honnêtes,” where Baudelaire 
claims that moral literature is deficient precisely because it fails to depict the immoral: 
L’art est-il utile? Oui. Pourquoi? Parce qu’il est l’art. Y-a-t’il un art pernicieux? 
Oui. C’est celui qui dérange les conditions de la vie.  Le vice est séduisant, il faut le 
peindre séduisant; mais il traîne avec lui des maladies et des douleurs morales 
singulières; il faut les décrier.  Étudiez toutes les plaies comme un médecin qui fait 
son service dans un hôpital, et l’école du bon sens, l’école exclusivement morale, 
ne trouvera plus où mordre…la première condition nécessaire pour faire un art sain 
est la croyance à l’unité intégral. Je défie qu’on me trouve un seul ouvrage 
d’imagination qui réunisse toutes les conditions du beau et qui soit un ouvrage 
pernicieux. (620). 
 
Baudelaire here argues for the value of vice as a subject of study using medical 
terminology. Vice, he contends, is a condition of human existence just like morality; to 
neglect it is to violate the unity, and therefore the validity, of art. This passage suggests 
that art for art’s sake is less a philosophy of artificiality than one of integrity, in the sense 
of wholeness. If unmotivated, art is useful because it has all the conditions of life inherent 
in it. It becomes about essence, not effect. If motivated, as in the case of these moral 
dramas, the conditions of life are fundamentally misrepresented, skewed, or omitted. 
Morality is only half the picture, the way the diminished God is only half the 




adversary; a metaphor for the human capacity for sin; and the reason that is capable of 
understanding that capacity.   
 Baudelaire applies similar medical terminology to his explanation of love; to 
Baudelaire, “[i]l y’a dans l’acte de l’amour une grande ressemblance avec la torture ou 
avec une opération chirurgicale” (1257). Though the invocation of torture suggests that 
this is perhaps merely a facetious statement meant to equate love and pain, the idea of 
surgery also suggests both a pedagogical and ameliorative value, designed to vivisect or 
to heal; the notion raised by Baudelaire's excoriation of Sand, that self-knowing evil is 
capable of healing, permits an interpretation where the two functions go hand in hand. 
Georges Blin finds the fragment about torture to be the key to a philosophy of eroticism 
in Baudelaire’s work predicated on distance and pain: 
Le caractère presque révoltante du tableau tient au fait que Baudelaire décrit l’acte 
érotique absolument du dehors et à froid, comme pourrait le faire un spectateur pur; 
un témoin qui ne se prendrait pas la contagion…il nous contraint à assister en 
observateurs impartiaux à un drame dont nous ne sommes jamais que les acteurs ou 
parfois, come ‘voyeurs,’ les complices. (16) 
 
In these clinical terms, the disease of love can also be thought of as the ideal experiment, 
because it is capable of simultaneously testing the limits of both reason and desire—it is a 
human impulse that lends itself far better to romantic poetry than rational dissection. The 
heart is a pump, and judicious vivisection can teach us what makes it beat; the desire is a 
far more ephemeral attribute. Too, where torture reveals mental capabilities, in particular 
the mind’s ability to transcend or escape the physical condition, a surgery opens the body 
and permits comprehension—if not alteration—of that physical condition. So Valmont’s 
continual self-documentation in his letters to Merteuil is more than just a dandy seeking 




persona; it could be read as a set of case notes, written, as it were, by a doctor seeking to 
understand the symptoms of his own disease.  
Baudelaire’s poems trace the developing conviction that self-understanding is 
Satan’s particular benediction. The most damning human flaw is passivity; without 
encouragement, man never confronts himself. “Au Lecteur,” the invocation piece to Les 
Fleurs du mal, announces its preoccupation with such human fault in the first line: “La 
sottise, l’erreur, le péché, la lésine” (79). Like ennui, these are not particularly significant 
vices; they are also not sins of execution. The middle of the poem is populated by 
demons both mythological and psychological:  first Satan Trismégiste, the alchemist who 
vaporizes free will, “le riche métal de notre volonté” and the puppet master who ensures 
that men find charm in the repugnant; then legions of demons that occupy the brain like 
worms. Man, we are told, descends a step further into Hell every day; this is the only 
action in the poem that is consistent and productive.  All the rest—the seething of 
demons, the pulling of strings, the rocking of souls, the gamboling of animalian sins—are 
just repetitive and unproductive motion. “L’Irrémédiable” follows that descending man 
deeper into Hell. The poem presents a sequence of images of suspension, of entrapment 
in the dark: an angel sucked into a nightmare vortex, a bewitched man in a viper’s pit, a 
damned man descending an endless staircase, a ship trapped in ice. In spite of its 
irremediable condition, in each case the fallen object reaches for freedom and, in the case 
of the bespelled man, shafts of light. That light, it seems, is not that of God’s grace, but of 
the Devil’s, because these moments are said to be proof of Satan’s best work; that light 
manifests again when descent reaches its crisis, the moment “[q]u’un cœur devenu son 




star gathers strength, becomes a torch, and is revealed at last: “La conscience dans la 
Mal!” Although there is no escape from entrapment, the poem suggests there is 
nonetheless purpose to the descent—Satan’s work forces man into confrontation with the 
truth of himself; Satan’s grace awakens the spark of conscience amid the evil and fans it 
into flame. “Les Litanies de Satan” explicitly enumerates Satan’s gifts to mankind, 
among them “le goût du Paradis” conveyed, through love, to those who would never 
otherwise know it, after which the supplicant speaker requests the boon of knowledge, in 
the form of the chance to rest eternally “sous l’Arbre de Science,/…à l’heure ou sur ton 
front/ Comme un Temple nouveau ses rameaux s’épandront!” To call Baudelaire’s vision 
of Satan benevolent in these poems may be a step to far; it is clear, however, that in his 
view, Satan holds knowledge in his gift, and, regardless of the hazards posed by sin and 
damnation, receipt of that knowledge is beneficial. 
       As a stand-in for Satan on earth, Valmont would also have knowledge in his gift.  
The arena of seduction in which a libertine operates provides not only a means for 
understanding the self, but also a means of discovering the nature of others, a seemingly 
necessary tool in the workbag of a specialist in delusion. A significant part of Valmont’s 
practice in the novel is refinement of his reception; all the time he is seducing Tourvel 
and training Cécile, Valmont is cataloguing their reactions, evaluating and validating his 
techniques. You could even consider the letters to Merteuil a kind of peer review.  But 
these are matters of effect, rather than essence, so it is perhaps natural that these passages 
do not make it into Baudelaire’s notes at this stage. Baudelaire’s analysis of most of the 
female characters in Dangerous Liaisons is cursory, so perhaps it is difficult for him to 




best, dirt—literally—at worst. Rosemonde is spoken of as two-dimensional. Volanges 
does not even merit a character sketch. Only Tourvel is spoken of in positive terms, as an 
“admirable création…[u]ne Eve touchante”; like Eve, she is the arbitrary creation of 
some absent power, left to wander the garden without even the benefit of a pocket guide 
to snakes (643). Valmont’s seduction may be her apple, the route to essential knowledge, 
but she fails to overcome her submissiveness.39  In her study of Baudelaire's notes, 
Marguerite-Marie Stevens extrapolates this failure, and Baudelaire’s deficiencies of 
attention, into a reading where these women, though scarcely more than animals in 
Baudelaire’s view, are also complicit victims of the Valmont-Merteuil machine. She 
defines the libertine “will to power” as “the knowledge of evil brought to light in the 
conscience, the cruelty of self-comprehension, the penetration of the depths of the 
heart…” Self-knowledge is, in her view, the horror Valmont and Merteuil inflict on their 
victims.40 The victims find themselves introduced unexpectedly to their own baser 
impulses. Without the rational apparatus to make sense of this essence, to integrate it into 
the idea of the self, these victims are forced back into the arms of effects-driven 
traditional morality. For Cécile, whose naïveté is her sole convent-approved personality 
trait, exposure to her dark side inspires rejection of her sensuality and withdrawal into the 
very convent life that failed to educate her adequately. For Tourvel, whose pious morality 
is a long-cherished part of her self-conception, the revelation of her own vulnerability 
shatters her faith. These women are victims precisely because they are unable to face up 
to the degraded aspects of human nature; they lack the capability to reunite the moral and 
the immoral in the manner that Baudelaire prescribes for moral literature.  However, 




the libertine victim is not a matter for extensive consideration. The notion of the 
involuntary imposition of self-awareness does, however, have interesting implications for 
the novel’s readership; if we are victims of the novel the way these women are victims of 
libertine seduction, then our impulse to submit is worthy of the same rational examination 
as the libertine impulse to seduce.  Indeed, it is essential. In any case, Stevens’ reading of 
Laclos suggests that libertine literature was already preoccupied by issues of knowledge, 
exposure, and experience, so Baudelaire’s preoccupation with Satan and original sin is 
less a projection than an appropriation under new terms. Laclos might not be quite 
prepared to acknowledge Valmont’s parity with God, but he certainly positions him as a 
being that transcends the human, permitting him to challenge the world in terms of 
timelessness: “Voyez mon ouvrage et cherchez-en dans le siècle un second exemple” 
(646). Clearly, Valmont’s self-perception as a titan of the age, with an unparalleled talent 
for seduction and destruction, omnipotent and untouchable, differs little from that of 
Baudelaire. 
Baudelaire’s notes for the analysis of Dangerous Liaisons isolate two components 
of libertinage—the capacity for self-awareness and the acquisition of self-knowledge—as 
crucial. But his notes never specifically address issues of contemporary relevance. Why 
make this a subject of criticism? Why not leave Laclos, like Chorier, to be an obscure 
reference in a hypothetical museum or a color-coordinated book moldering on an 
aesthete’s library shelf? The answer may lie in Baudelaire’s brief—but life-changing—
attack of republican zeal. Lois Hyslop argues that the disappointment after Baudelaire’s 
personal involvement in the failed revolution of 1848—he founded one revolutionary 




than-reliable anecdotal evidence, have taken up arms—resulted in an ongoing contempt 
for both the indolence and apathy of the common man and the practical ineffectualness of 
most political reform.41 The critical exception, for Hyslop, is Proudhon, whose brief but 
repeatable aphorism “Dieu, c’est le mal,” emphasizing that God is tyranny, could 
believably have been Valmont’s own. In the Valmont depicted in the notes, Baudelaire 
builds a figure capable of pursuing a philosophical path in an eminently practical manner, 
an incisive thinker who executes strategies, refines methods, understands his own evil 
(and thus his own failures), and can cope with his own emotions—in short, an attractive 
model of the practical revolutionary and the effective political thinker, everything that, in 
Baudelaire’s view, the nineteenth century is too romantic to produce itself. Unlike the 
Utopian reformers, Valmont’s philosophical pursuits necessitate continual action—
instead of retreating into the stunted, sequestered inactivity of Danceny, Cécile, or 
Merteuil at the end of the novel, Valmont’s death can be interpreted as an active pursuit, 
self-destruction as a strategy by which other schemes are set in motion. Unlike the 
common man, who, a mere three years after revolution, voted in the authoritarian rule of 
Napoleon III without a murmur, the philosophical standards Valmont sets for his success 
rescues sex from mere repetitive motion and short-lived gratification. It is the genius 
behind the obscenity; it creates goal-oriented philosophical journeys out of what would 
otherwise be mere mechanical encounters. Valmont seeks experience, actively choosing 
targets, means, and methods. He takes responsibility for his choices, initiating suicidal 
duels which simultaneously expiate his guilt and act as the catalyst which removes the 
incompetent from the path of wisdom. His late-blooming sensitivity suggests the 




Knowledge, self-awareness, and sensitivity are the competencies that make him a 
successful peripatetic in this sense; libertine literature’s vaunted ability to substitute for 
experience permits the reader to review the original text with fresh eyes, to make the 
journey with him. Once Baudelaire’s critique outlines the libertine’s advantageous 
qualities, Valmont’s story provides the model for how to be the sort of philosophical and 
political animal the century needs. This critique of Dangerous Liaisons permits 
Baudelaire to set the stage for the possibility of a new road to personal and cultural 
redemption, a method predicated, not on the rejection of immorality that romantic 
nineteenth-century notions of religion and love might advocate, but on its recognition and 
integration. The hunger for experience that makes man human, rather than angelic, 












SWINBURNE’S “LAUS VENERIS”, OR 
 
THE NIHILIST TRIUMPHANT 
 
 
The writers examined so far tend to privilege the early phases of seduction—
disarmament, enticement, personalization—at the expense of the final phase, control, 
perhaps because the exercise of free will is considered such an important exercise in the 
development of an appropriately libertine politics. In order to critique the newly moral 
platform of his fellow reformists, Byron deploys all four strategies of seduction in the 
story of his reimagined Don Juan, disarming his reader with a quaintly inoffensive 
adolescent rather than a rapacious libertine, enticing with a prolonged narrative that 
speaks to and responds to a reader’s desires for titillation and revelation, personalizing 
with a narrative that moves gradually but convincingly through a series of seemingly 
exotic escapades from the shores of feudal Spain to the nineteenth-century British 
reader’s own back doorstep, and finally controlling the reader’s realizations by 
attenuating the delivery of judgment and resolution beyond the point at which it becomes 
meaningless. In order to model in Valmont a thinking revolutionary that is suitable to 
cope with the romanticism of the nineteenth century, Baudelaire lays the groundwork for 
an argument that disarms through an emphasis on the goodness of the author and the 
sympathies of his hero, contrives a sense of intimacy (and need for change) by using the 





libertine philosophy and critique nineteenth-century rational failings, and entices by 
aggrandizing his Valmont into a titan for the contemporary world, a rationalist intelligent 
enough for objective self-analysis and strong enough for complete self-knowledge.  
In “Laus Veneris,” instead, although Swinburne also advocates for the advantages 
of free will, the bias is distinctly anticlerical rather than antiparty or prorevolutionary, and 
his strategy for seduction emphasizes personalization and control, performing only brief 
nods in the direction of disarmament, in the framing of the poem, and enticement, in 
Tannhäuser’s doubled heroism as both a knight and a monk, before the poem entraps the 
reader in an intimate, behind-the-eyes experience of Tannhäuser’s subjectivity, his 
culpability in his own corruption, and his experience of memory, love, and guilt. The 
result is a vigil in the crypt shared by Tannhäuser and the reader, a crucible from which 




 The story of Tannhäuser, a topic which enjoyed a faddish popularity throughout 
the nineteenth century and was rewritten in a number of genres including verse, prose, 
and opera, was already tainted with pagan associations before Wagner got ahold of it and 
turned the story into a love triangle between a singer, a sacred love, and a profane one. It 
is very loosely based upon the existence of a fourteenth-century German minstrel; in the 
myth that bears his name, Tannhäuser the singer is drawn to (or abducted by) Venus 
because of his musical gifts, disappearing for seven years. Though at first glance it fits 
the tradition of supernatural seduction stories beloved by Romantics more closely than 
the randy literary exploitation of nunnery, harem, and palace favored by libertines, the 




seven-year hiatus, which leaves huge gap in the middle of most versions of the story, ripe 
for reader personalization; and the sexual expertise that characterizes both of its main 
players.42 Venus is, after all, the exiled goddess of love, a deposed figurehead from a 
pagan religion whose business is profane love and whose bedsports might reasonably be 
expected not to conform to any Pauline precept. As a minnesinger, Tannhäuser’s 
profession hinges on the ability to write about and sing the conventions of love 
convincingly, if not seductively, so even before the abduction it seems clear that he and 
Venus share similar interests. Like libertines, they are both in the “business” of love: 
what Tannhäuser knows in theory, Venus can supply in practice. What Tannhäuser sings 
of for money, Venus manipulates for power. Add to this common interest a seven-year 
hiatus away from prying eyes and Christian influence, and the development of a 
pedagogical relationship regarding sexual matters—the dynamic that underpins libertine 
texts such as Venus in the Cloister and Philosophy in the Bedroom—appears likely, if not 
inevitable. Nineteenth-century writers, in particular, would rush to fill in the details of 
this relationship, with varying degrees of explicitness, in ways that suit their ultimate 
aims, some preferring a more domestic tone, some a more tragic one. Few focus entirely 
on the knight’s sojourn with Venus. As we will see, Beardsley and Swinburne are among 
those few who look to make the hiatus the whole of their story, building on that erotic 
preoccupation and the comparatively recent publicity generated by performances of the 
opera to make Tannhäuser a libertine après la lettre, in the manner of the libertine 
adaptations of Byron and Baudelaire. 
The bones of the nineteenth-century Tannhäuser story is the same in almost all 




the mountain, but then emerges, contrite, often with the help of the Virgin Mary, to atone 
for his apostasy, with mixed results (frequently, the miracle of the blooming staff 
overrides the papal denial of salvation, but too late).43 Though in many cases the plot 
focuses on the peregrinations of the knight in his quest to repent his sins and save his 
soul, Tannhäuser’s story is seldom seen through Tannhäuser’s eyes; writers go to great 
lengths to separate the knight’s story from the knight’s perspective, and to avoid talking 
about what happened in the Hill of Venus. In Ludwig Tieck’s “The Trusty Eckart,” for 
instance, the third-person narrative is told from the point of view, not of the knight, but of 
the friend Friederich, to whom the knight must justify his long disappearance. Driven by 
grief at the loss of his parents and beloved, the knight calls upon Satan to show him the 
song that bewitched the legendary Eckart; the song acts as a map and a key, drawing 
Tannhäuser to the Venus-Hill. The seven years are dispatched in a page of febrile prose; 
the pilgrimage to Rome, likewise, is but the work of a moment. The cyclic form of the 
narrative—the features of loss, sorrow, and bewitchment that are identical in the cases of 
Eckart, Tannhäuser, and Friederich—suggest that Tieck’s version is less a story than a 
parable; it is not about the individual and the particulars of his seduction, it is about the 
ease with which the honorable may be driven from the path of righteousness by distress. 
Heinrich Heine, instead, turns the lesson into a joke. Like the Von Arnim version from 
which the Once a Week poem is translated, Heine’s narrative is in the third person 
objective; framed as a ballad, it relates the events of what is effectively a domestic 
dispute primarily through dialogue. Both versions begin with the departure: Tannhäuser’s 
disillusionment with Venus results in immediate repentance and pilgrimage to Rome. The 




the bottom of the change of heart, but spends no time describing her or the situation. It 
also deploys the trope of the blooming staff to signify mercy from on high; however, the 
messengers announcing the beneficence fail to find the knight before he returns to the 
Hill, making that absolution moot. Heine dresses a similar narrative of futility and 
schadenfreude in the vestments of comic opera: because he is jealous of the lovers the 
immortal Venus will have after him,44 Tannhäuser storms off to Rome to be saved from 
his obsession. Salvation is denied, the hero speeds home, and the myth becomes a vehicle 
for tongue-in-cheek German socio-political critique. In either case, the ballad frame 
demotes the dialogue from experience to hearsay; there are essentially two levels of third-
person narration, the perspective that recounts the dialogue and the perspective of the 
balladeer. In the Once a Week version, the balladeer editorializes on Venus’ wonders, 
which is at least suggestive of Tannhäuser’s experience. The balladeer in Heine merely 
proposes the introductory admonition to avoid replicating Tannhäuser’s sins, an 
irrelevant point because the only real sin in play is gluttony; as Clyde Hyder points out, 
the damned knight is “a burgher with a good German stomach” and the evil seductress 
“his Hausfrau” (1203). 
Wagner’s opera and the Edward Lytton-Julian Fane poem attempt to restore the 
high moral tenor to the story by making it a tale, not so much of the Tannhäuser’s 
repentance, but of a woman’s noble sacrifice. To reinforce the altered focus, Wagner 
melds the circumstances of the Tannhäuserleid with the singing contest from Der 
Wartburgkrieg. The attractions of the Hörsel are dispensed with in a single orgiastic 
scene where nymphs, cupids, satyrs, and Bacchantes cavort balletically for the 




dissatisfaction with the static nature of eternity, and he departs the Hörsel; immediately 
thereafter he is drawn into a minnesang competition for the hand of his former love. The 
remainder of the opera follows the beloved, rather than the lover: Elisabeth capriciously 
visits the singing hall; Elisabeth hints at her secret love; Elisabeth is betrayed by 
Tannhäuser’s song, but stands firm in the sinner’s defense; Elisabeth offers her life in 
exchange for mercy for the sinner. It is only after Elisabeth’s death that Tannhäuser 
returns, in the final scene of the final act, to relate the story of his pilgrimage and his 
failed petition for absolution. Even then, Elisabeth steals the scene as her corpse’s 
entrance vanquishes the Venus couchant and salvages the knight’s soul. For an 
eponymous opera about a singer, Wagner’s Tannhäuser spends remarkably little time 
letting Tannhäuser sing—an attribute perhaps designed to avoid the interjection of too 
much first-person perspective in an otherwise third-person spectacle.  
While the Lytton-Fane version, Tannhäuser, or the Battle of the Bards, elaborates 
on the singing competition, it gives the knight more opportunity to speak, but less to say.  
It opens with 110 lines of third-person editorializing about Venus and her history of 
seduction and corruption, and talk about her prey’s disillusion as a universal condition, 
rather than a particular experience of the knight: Venus is invoked out of despair over 
love for Elizabeth and a decadent interest in the music of the past; the knight then 
disappears from the court at Wartburg—and also from the reader’s view. He arrives back 
just in time for the contest, the theme of which is love and its “mystery of mysteries” 
(44); however, his contribution to the proceedings is anything but revelatory. After much 





Tannhäuser scandalizes the crowd with the exhortation to: “Dare as I dared; to Hörsel 
go,/ And taste love on the lips of Venus” (64). This rather tame declaration of 
licentiousness preempts the contest, drives the audience screaming from the room, and 
gets the knight forced into a pilgrimage to Rome. Tannhäuser may issue the invitation to 




The usual handling of the Tannhäuser story fails to deliver on the seductive 
promise of the original myth, distancing and protecting the reader (or the audience) from 
the licentious interactions between the minnesinger and the goddess of love. Swinburne’s 
version, on the other hand, obliterates the distance between observer and subject, rolling 
in both its licentiousness and an inescapable first-person perspective within which the 
reader, like the knight, is trapped. It may be useful to take a moment to examine the point 
of that licentiousness, and whether Swinburne had a larger philosophical project in hand, 
of which this poem is but one example. As many critics have noted, dwelling lovingly on 
his encomia on de Sade, his repeated use of images of alternative sexuality in his work, 
and his personal predilection for flagellation, Swinburne had an early and particular 
interest in libertinism, and, as Jerome McGann notes in passing during a chapter 
otherwise taken up with flagellation, an appreciation for Sadique irony (Swinburne, 273). 
However, in spite of the enthusiasm expressed in “Charenton en 1810,” a work 
Swinburne composed before ever actually reading de Sade, Swinburne remained aware of 
the limitations in Sadean sexual philosophy and literary technique, and the need to tone 
down such sexual grotesqueries. In a letter to Richard Monckton Milnes, dated 18 August 




experienced quite the wrong reader response. He laughed. He then read excerpts out loud 
to an audience, and they laughed. De Sade failed to draw Swinburne into an intimate and 
absorbing experience of private titillation, because he fails to engage the reader’s mind. 
Swinburne searches for “some sharp and subtle analysis of lust—some keen dissection of 
pain and pleasure…at least such an exquisite relish of the things anatomized as without 
explanation would suffice for a stimulant and be comprehensible at once even if unfit for 
sympathy…” but what he finds is a writer who “takes bulk and number for greatness” 
(Letters vol. 1 54). Swinburne responds to the infinite recombination of sexual 
variables—organ A in orifice B, with a sidebar of violent act C—with boredom; there is 
no room for readerly personalization of experience in such a reductive, declarative text. 
Swinburne couches his objections in the language of that old adage of twentieth-century 
fiction, “show, don’t tell,” apostrophizing: “You have asserted a great deal; prove it now; 
bring it face to face with us; let the sense of it bite and tickle and sting your reader” (55).  
He concludes that Sadean anticlericalism is a sham, and that his violence is built from the 
same impulse to abstinence and rejection of the flesh as the Christian practice of self-
mortification. As a libertine writer, it seems, de Sade is worthless46; as a poet, however, 
he is accomplished. 
This early critical response to de Sade’s work sketches the outlines of a 
developing personal philosophy that underpins Swinburne’s body of work, including 
“Laus Veneris.” The marquis takes the mechanics of sex as his subject; Swinburne 
explores the mechanics of lust. The marquis explains exhaustively; Swinburne examines, 
but seldom explains, seeking to impart his message through deployment of the reader’s 




hallucination much remarked upon by his modernist critics. The marquis fails to examine 
the boundary between, or the interrelatedness of, pain and pleasure; Swinburne, in pursuit 
of that bright slash of feeling and an annihilation of boundaries, never writes pleasure 
without pain as its counterpoint.47 The marquis alienates the reader from the fantasy by 
filling every instant, every corner of the narrative with declarations of excess; Swinburne 
disarms and flatters the reader by creating a traditional narrative frame, often allusive and 
thus familiar, and then undermines his victim by filling that frame with ambiguities, 
uncertainties that the reader must actively negotiate into a semblance of coherence. For 
Swinburne, sex matters as more than just a list of deviancies meant to shock and horrify; 
it is a personal experience, one of emotion and feeling, and so Swinburne personalizes its 
handling to the fullest extent possible.48   
“Laus Veneris,” like so many other Swinburne poems, personalizes the 
experience of the narrative through the use of the dramatic monologue in a medieval 
setting whose twin preoccupations with courtly love and religion make conflict between 
the Christian and the temporal passions inevitable. As Adam Roberts notes in his brief 
attempt to rescue the poem from allegations of length-for-length’s-sake, the stanzas of 
“Laus Veneris” are arranged topically into two tri-partite sections with a coda tacked on 
at the end. The first section is organized by location of interest, Horsel-world-Horsel; the 
second by Tannhäuser’s function, knight-singer-knight. The coda looks to the future, 
theorizing on love and eternity. Nearly everything that makes up other versions of the 
tradition—the seduction, the singing, the journey to Rome, and the failed bid for 
absolution—is related only in the second half of the poem. The entire first half (fifty-two 




points out, this reverie mimics the form of an alba, a lover’s dread of dawn and 
departure, but the threat of dawn is replaced by the threat of damnation, conceived in 
terms that are absolutely true to the knight’s Christian past. To read the poem is to await 
that damnation with him, experiencing as he does the utter confusion of life in the Horsel, 
the agonizing conflict between his Christian and “satanic” allegiances, and the 
overwhelming nature of his passions.  
The poem establishes an atmosphere of confusion the moment it opens. Unlike 
nearly every other rendition of this myth, here Tannhäuser is not the eponymous hero of 
the piece; the only name that is invoked in either the title “Laus Veneris” or the elaborate 
sham epigraph that purports to summarize the story is that of Venus, suggesting that this 
will be a poem about Venus—which, in a passive sort of way, it is. (It is about Venus 
only as the object of Tannhäuser’s gaze.) The epigraph or preface in libertine texts is 
usually used to protect both writer and reader from the perceived immorality of the piece, 
explaining away any deficiencies of virtue with the excuses like bad writing, obsolete 
manners and morals, or childish impulse, justifying the text’s existence as artifact or 
object lesson in how not to behave. (The reader is then free to revel in the account of the 
bad behavior, confirmed in the notion that his or her own motives are purely intellectual.) 
This epigraph disarms that way also, burying the artifact of its narrative under layers of 
artificial medieval French and invented Renaissance authority, implying a purely 
historical interest and flattering any reader with enough linguistic capability, or 
persistence and a dictionary, to decode it. It also obfuscates identity through the brevity 
of its allusion: an astute reader would have to disregard the red herrings of authorship, 




of the Pope, together with “mes faicts d’armes et de toutes mes belles chansons” and the 
particular placement of “boutons de feuilles,” actually refers to that popular German story 
about the singing knight. While Hyder makes note of Swinburne’s frequent predilection 
for making up imaginary sources, or “mystifications” as he terms it, as kind of a game, 
this particular hoax may be more than just idle entertainment (Swinburne’s Literary 
Career 10-13). Harrison, for instance, reads the intent of this construction as 
developmental, so the astute reader would be rewarded with a realization of the cultural 
significance of his own astuteness: “That the epigraph feigns a Renaissance recapitulation 
of a medieval myth now appropriated by a nineteenth-century poet reinforces our 
awareness that matters of literary genealogy are crucial to human ‘progress’” (62). 
Effectively, reiteration changes the way we see—an idea crucial in Tannhäuser’s later 
restatement of his past, and in Swinburne’s selection of this popular aesthetic plot to re-
tell. Its literary genealogy has already taught the reader all that the external, objective, 
intellectual trappings of the legend can; it is for Swinburne’s version to impose the 
experience of the knight’s internal conflict directly upon the reader—to take the gap 
already existing in the story and fill it with more gaps. Julia Saville’s précis of 
Swinburne’s cosmopolitan views, on the other hand, suggests that the epigraph could be 
read as a demonstration of the author’s powers of national and historical empathy: “to 
understand the history of another culture well enough to represent it convincingly…the 
writer must be both passionately invested in the nation represented and experience a 
spiritual affinity with it…” (697). Since, over the course of the poem, passionate 
investment and reinterpretation set the stage for such affinity, doing the work to decode 




proof of the author’s authority to speak on such issues—but it still fails to clear up basic 
confusions like the identity of the poem’s subject or speaker.   
Swinburne robs the reader of the pretense of historical distance and demands an 
intimate engagement of the reader’s imagination in the very first verse. The initial 
problem the reader confronts in the poem is one of identity; many readers would not be 
able to establish identities for speaker and the object spoken of without, in some fashion, 
negotiating to fill the gaps and thus personalizing the text. Without such personalization, 
the grammar of the opening stanza is vague to the point of incomprehensibility. The first 
image appears to be lover’s-eye view of the beloved, delivered by (as those of us who 
have decoded the epigraph and understood the allusions therein know) the as-yet-
unnamed hero and knight. The lovers have been caught, apparently, at a moment of post-
coital stillness: 
 Asleep or waking is it? For her neck, 
 Kissed over close, wears yet a purple speck 
 Wherein the pained blood falters and goes out; 
 Soft, and stung softly—fairer for a fleck. (ll. 1-4) 
 
A less astute reader of the epigraph—or one without the patience to wade through it with 
a French dictionary in hand49—may have missed the allusion, and would, at this point, be 
utterly confused about who is speaking and about what, as he or she is confronted at the 
outset of the verse by an unidentified “I”, a question in the first line, and the multivalent 
pronoun “it.” It is reasonable to assume that the “her” whose neck is on view is Venus, as 
the poem is in praise of the goddess; however, that “it” is deeply problematic, as the 
possible grammatical referents in the stanza are “neck,” in the first line, or “speck” later 
on, and neither of these are typically seen to have either a sleeping or waking state, even 




somnolence would obviously apply to the beloved as a woman. With it, there is no 
comfortable antecedent for the pronoun, unless the beloved’s stillness in the first few 
stanzas is taken to signify death; in that case, though, the corpse is identified 
pronominally as both an object and a female in the same line, so the vagueness 
ameliorated by that venture into necrophilia is converted almost instantly into 
inconsistency. Perhaps more reasonable is the supposition that grammatical correctness 
has been thwarted by the technique of in medias res storytelling, and the “it” refers to 
some concept about which the speaker was thinking before the reader was introduced.  
The nature of that notion is impossible to fix with certainty, although the focus on 
bruises, sucking lips, and the presence (or absence) of blood suggest a number of possible 
sleeping things, including the soul, the flame of life, and the impulse to sadism. As it 
stands, however, unless he or she has recourse to that historical understanding of the 
legend to which the epigraph so briefly and teasingly refers, the reader has no 
foreknowledge with which to resolve these uncertainties; he or she can only apply 
personal experience, negotiate tentative identities for the raft of uncertainties presented, 
and hope for the best. In this manner, from the very beginning of the poem Swinburne 
demands, rather than invites, the personalization of the relationship between the reader 
and the hero of this poem. He thrusts the reader into that intimate connection with the 
narrative and its players that Sade cannot manage by forcing the reader immediately to 
identify with and define the nature of the speaker from personal experience; it is the 
simplest way for the uncertainties in the grammar to be resolved.  The intimacy thus 




Fortunately, the referents of those pronouns may not, in fact, be the point. The 
relevant attribute may be shared experience; the reader does not—cannot—know, the 
same way that Tannhäuser cannot know his unresponsive beloved. The opening of the 
poem, from title through epigraph to first line, seems to be configured for the purpose of 
thwarting expectations, much in the same way Byron’s attenuated ending to Don Juan 
thwarts expectations of judgment: anything even the most literary reader thinks he or she 
knew about Venus, the Tannhäuserleid, medieval love poetry, the conventions of 
panegyric, or of oration is to be undermined by Swinburne’s highly original handling of 
“Laus Veneris.” It becomes impossible to maintain a separate perspective; the reader has 
no recourse to historical, mythological, or intellectual distance. Thaïs Morgan points to 
the reader here as a kind of a peeping tom: because of the first-person perspective, “we 
are placed in the position of voyeurs, looking in through the bedroom window at the two 
lovers” (“Swinburne’s Dramatic Monologues” 186). Like traditional pornography, then, 
the poem could be expected to stimulate the erotic feelings it simulates. Richard Sieburth 
suggests instead that the very vagueness lulls the reader into a state of erotic receptivity 
“by numbing the analytic faculties of the intellect—an effect achieved not through trance-
inducing music, but through a systematic indefiniteness of reference” (351). To be sure, 
this would be a new strategy in the history of libertine literature, as a titillating 
definiteness, signified by the invariable lesson in the naming of the genitals, is usually an 
early step in the suborning of the innocent. Rather, this indefiniteness here stirs the reader 
to an action much more intimate than voyeurism and much more intellectually active than 
trance; in order to make sense of the narrative going forward, the reader must actively 




Byron invites with careful disarmament and Baudelaire incites with grandiose praise, 
Swinburne forges with strategic grammar. The intellectual shell, the basis for calculation 
so flattered by the epigraph is stripped away, and the reader is decanted, not into a seat 
some safe distance away from the heretical action, but directly into the space behind 
Tannhäuser’s eyes. The reader is not told his story, the reader hears his thoughts. The 
speaker’s lack of identity comes to make sense because Tannhäuser does not think of 
himself in the moment as anything but “I”; the “it” remains undefined because 
Tannhäuser’s thoughts have been already defined; the beloved stays unnamed because, in 
the proximity of the lovers’ clinch, ruled by a visual rather than a verbal paradigm, she 
does not need one.51    
 This unstable paradigm prevails through the rest of the poem as Tannhäuser first 
sees, then metaphorizes, then interprets; the reader experiences in tandem because, until 
the Pope speaks the curse of the blooming staff, the poem sustains no other voice, no 
other viewpoint than Tannhäuser’s own. Unlike every other version where she appears, 
the Venus here is silent. She fulfills the trope of the seducing fairy only by virtue of her 
existence, not by her interaction. She has passed the staff of seduction on, to Tannhäuser 
or to the poem itself. Her stillness allows the self-analytical reverie that will become the 
mechanism for emotional growth to persist. As in Baudelaire’s depiction of Valmont, it is 
the libertine’s narcissism that is the key, eventually, to understanding the self as well as 
the beloved; the internal work of understanding and refining the self is required in order 
to embark on the external work of refining the circumstance with others. (This mimics 
the reader’s situation as presupposed by Byron and Baudelaire, as well—the intellectual 




development of the literary hero is meant to influence and assist in the practical moral 
development of the political man—in effect, to create a better politician, voter, or 
revolutionary.)       
Venus’ lack of interaction also calls into question the reality of the knight’s 
situation, even within the poem. Tannhäuser’s utter inability to distinguish between the 
literal and the figurative infects the reader; there is no stable referent, no boundary 
between the concrete and the imaginary, no solid purchase for an independent 
interpretation of reality. This recalls Barthes’ requirement for seduction, a closed world 
within which the libertine may dictate terms and simulate realities. For example, when 
Tannhäuser sees “[c]rowned with gilt thorns and clothed with flesh like fire,/ Love…” 
(ll.35-6), the simile that is then constructed—Love as the weaver—is made literal by the 
following line:  “Till when the spool is finished, lo I see/ His web reeled off, curls and 
goes out like steam” (ll. 47-8). Enumerating the changes is like riding a swing, or perhaps 
a roundabout: Love (a figure) is seen standing at the head of the bed (an allegory, the 
figurative made concrete), then is compared to a weaver (a figure) whose weaving is seen 
coiling (a concrete image) which is compared to steam (a figure)… It is as if the poem 
compresses and cycles the phases of the romantic ode—observation, meditation, vision—
into one grand sensory hallucination. Or a remarkably fantastical reality. The Horsel is, 
after all, a supernatural world; who is to say which figures may not in truth exist? 
Over time, exposure to this kind of compression against a background of 
uncertainty trains the reader to elide expected boundaries—between the real and the 
imaginary, the literal and the figurative, the modifier and the modified. For instance, 




“dry desire,” as well as a reference to red chambers—indicate that the Horsel is an 
analogue of Hell. Her argument makes the fair point that these similarities support the 
reading that the eternal pleasures experienced there constitute an active sabotage of the 
knight’s Christian belief system (“Swinburne’s Dramatic Monologues” 187). However, 
the majority of these references to heat are part of figures that have little to do with place. 
The air may be hot and the daylight burning, but it is Love that is clothed with “flesh like 
fire,” the knight’s body that shakes “as the flame,” “hot hard” night which “falls like 
fire,” and time which has “hot hungry days.” The image of red chambers coexists in a 
stanza with references to Venus’ body and its adornments, suggesting that the figure is 
dealing as much with orifices as with rooms. Such reapplication of modifiers to other 
nouns—this synesthesia—violates both the boundaries of syntax and the expectations of 
experience. Seeing beyond such boundaries is a critical skill in the sort of literary 
interpretation that Morgan is performing, because it permits access to possibilities beyond 
the literal meaning of the sentence; seeing beyond such boundaries is a critical ability in 
Tannhäuser’s repertoire because it eventually permits him–and the reader—to see the 
divergent possibilities of present experience without reference to preconceptions, free of 
the biases that might make him prey to malign influences, untoward social pressure, and 
the temptation to rush to judgment.52 
 Tannhäuser’s past, the poem points out at some length, is all preconception. “Laus 
Veneris” follows Von Arnim and the Once A Week translation in emphasizing the role of 
Tannhäuser the knight at the expense of Tannhäuser the singer. Swinburne does Von 
Arnim one better, however, by elevating Tannhäuser the knight from general service into 




 For I was of Christ’s choosing, I God’s knight, 
 No blinkard heathen stumbling for scant light; 
I can well see, for all the dusty days  
Gone past, the clean great time of goodly fight. (ll. 209-12) 
 
At first glance, the knight once occupied an enviable proximity to perfection; from the 
standpoint of seduction, he is a figure who is always already enticing. At the moment of 
which he speaks, his faith affords him a clear-sightedness of which the followers of other 
religions can only barely conceive. He is appointed to his position, not by fallible men, 
but by the Redeemer and ultimate judge of men; he serves the Creator, and is thus, 
logically, a cog in God’s great plan. And he has the comfort of knowing that the violence 
that is his métier is sanctioned by the progenitor of universal order itself. His work seems 
to have a pleasing geometry, with its “rows/ Of beautiful mailed men” (l. 216), the 
opponent’s “square cheeks” (l. 245), even the angle of the sword that “dips/ Sharp from 
the beautifully bending head” (ll. 218-9). It has uniformity, in that those he served, served 
with, and fought against were all men. It also has rhythm—in the battle noises alluded to 
by the alliteration of “breathing battle sharp with blows,/ With shriek of shafts and 
snapping short of bows” (ll. 213-4) and “sounds of sharp spears at great tourneyings” (l. 
279), as well as in the moments of peace, when “chiming bridle smite and smite again” (l. 
240) and the knights sing of a love they, as clergy, are not supposed to understand. His 
universe is dualistic, and he is perpetually on the side of right, as evinced by his 
rationalization upon the death of a foe:  “Some woman fell a-weeping, whom this thief/ 
Would beat when he had drunken; yet small grief/ Hath any for the ridding of such 
knaves…” (ll. 249-51) Apparently, the fact that he is an enemy makes him a knave, 
therefore a thief, therefore a wife-beater, and therefore his wife’s grief is trivial and 




reasons, this man deserves death. McGann underlines the cruelty of such virtue-laden 
clarity:  “His whole understanding is so crammed with his religious principles that he 
cannot see the gruesome inhumanity not only in the deed himself, but in his sense of 
delight over it, and—perhaps worst of all—in the moral blindness which alone could 
provoke his last, callous remarks” (Swinburne 257). Yet in the dualistic universe defined 
by a deity—as is shown in the recapitulation of Venus’ violently capricious rule—
inhumanity is not the issue. Compliance is, and Tannhäuser complies. (Until he meets a 
naked woman in a field, anyway.) This seems a simple, unequivocal existence, to be sure, 
but not one replete with empathy. 
 Venus is the catalyst for Tannhäuser’s growth because her world, by contrast, 
exists outside these dualistic options. The Tannhäuser myth traditionally treats Venus as a 
deity whose obsolescence has, effectively, made her human. She may hold court in 
exile—Wagner’s stage directions in the final version of the opera, for instance, specify an 
elaborate opening ballet performed by Venus’ subjects for which Venus herself is the 
audience, making the opera itself a kind of meta-command performance—but she loves, 
speaks, angers, and even cooks in the manner of a normal, if arrogant, human woman.53 
The preface to the Once a Week translation goes so far as to present Heine’s version of 
the downfall of the Greek gods as necessary context. Mars and Venus fare the best post-
Olympus, considerably demoted but continuing on in situations true to their appetites: 
Mars capitalizes on his destructive bent by going to war as a German soldier while 
“Venus…took refuge, with a licentious crew of nymphs, in an enchanted mountain, 
called the Mons Veneris, where she spends her time in riotous living. Woe to the rash, 




appended warning notwithstanding, it seems very much as if Venus, whose caprice once 
motivated and destroyed heroes, is now herself a victim, a bird in a gilded cage. In any 
case, the manner of her presentation implies that she is no more than one of a crowd.   
Swinburne’s Venus, however, is a different entity entirely, because she is 
constantly represented as something that exists outside the human dimension, in a 
perpetual liminal state of betweenness. Once upon a time, it seems, she, like the Christian 
God, was the author of a dualistic world, because “The strewings of the ways wherein she 
trod/ Were the twain seasons of the day and night” (ll. 11-2). The trend in previous 
versions of the Tannhäuser story is to preserve this dualism by fixing the goddess in 
opposition to a female figure of Christian virtue—the Virgin Mary or, later, the self-
sacrificing Elizabeth. Such a duality preserved the antithesis between sacred and profane 
love, and permitted a clear and objective choice.54 As we know, however, libertine 
literature is less taken with the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane (except in 
cases where it can show the sacred is profane) than the effects of that which is generally 
thought profane upon the person, sacred or not, so, for Swinburne, such an antithesis is 
obsolete. After her fall, Venus is shown to be something other: not the sacred goddess of 
Greek mythology or the profane idol under Christian theology, but a third kind of power, 
existing outside of a world of theological constructs. Her effect becomes polyvalent—she 
creates a tertiary state by being impossible to fix in a binary proposition.  In Tannhäuser’s 
first sighting of her, for instance, she is framed by the world, but not necessarily of it: 
 …A great elder tree 
 Held back its heaps of flowers to let me see 
 The ripe tall grass, and one that walked therein, 
 Naked… 





The knight presents a contradictory account of the meeting, first claiming that the naked 
figure is in the grass, then in the space between the flowers and the grass. Given that the 
only flowers identified in the scene belong to a “great” tree, it appears that the lady must 
be cutting a swath through the air, between the tree canopy and the field, rather than 
across the land—that third option teased out between the two possibilities of under the 
blossoms or through the grass.55 Too, Tannhäuser’s revision is suggestive of a change in 
his manner of interpretation. A naked woman walking, while fortuitous and surprising, is 
still a condition that conforms to the natural order of things and is thus consistent with the 
knight’s preconceptions about reality. A naked woman floating is not. It is as if, in 
retelling the story of his first encounter with the lady, his initially literal perception is 
colored by the uncertainties that characterize his stay in the Horsel—the binary options of 
a dualistic reality (she is/is not walking in the field) are fractured into a multiplicity of 
possible states (she is/is not walking in/over/under the field/tree)—inducing revision, but 
no clarification, in the second iteration. Her actual location remains unconfirmed.  When 
Tony Garland argues that Venus’ unattainability throughout the poem is a function of 
Tannhäuser’s recognition of her sin at this moment, maintaining that “as much as he is 
attracted to her, his recognition of the religious transgression she represents is repulsive,” 
which creates “a state of union and division between attraction and revulsion that has no 
end” (640), he effectively replicates Tannhäuser’s original, rigidly dualistic mindset.  But 
the passage he quotes may also indicate that the knight has progressed beyond repulsion; 
where Garland reads the beautiful body and the sin as a compound object of the verb, two 
separate entities that Tannhäuser sees, they may also function as compound objects of the 




is the case, the line only indicates attraction to that anomalous third state in which 
splendor and sin may be combined. The antithesis between the sacred and the profane is 
thus dissolved; all that is left is love. 
Exposure to such a perpetual state of uncertainty apparently alters Tannhäuser’s 
previously polarized thinking, but it also suggests that he is the agent behind his own 
corruption. His nostalgic reminiscences of a bracing, homosocial, clerical past are 
infected by creeping equivocation—in speaking of the idyllic then he is inclined to use 
images drawn from the tortured now. For instance, in describing the light on the 
battlefield, he lapses into descriptors applicable to the subterranean caverns of the Horsel: 
“My sword doth, seeming fire in my own eyes,/ Leaving all colors in them brown and 
red/ And flecked with death…” (ll. 222-4). Physically, the knight is experiencing a 
complementary afterimage induced by the excessive light reflected from the sword blade; 
figuratively, however, the temporary blindness, the red like Venus’ chambers, the brown 
like the dust, and the flecks—recalling the bite mark on the lady’s neck and the flecks of 
blood on Love’s loom—suggest that he can no longer view the events of his past from 
that original, seemingly lucid point of view. The Horsel exists as both a negative print, a 
reversal of his past experiences, and a kind of taint in his thinking: he remembers himself 
blinded by the light, so was perhaps—his new perspective suggests—not so lucid after 
all. He will emerge from these caverns to make his pilgrimage blind once again; one 
wonders if he has ever been capable of vision. That glare, that “edged light” of the sword 
in action is “like a snake,” “lithe as lips” (ll. 217-20) evoking Venus’ snake-like woven 
hair and lovely mouth, making his violence in the service of Christ in some way 




As Tannhäuser’s reverie continues, the binaries of God and Venus amalgamate, 
by virtue of certain shared metonyms, into a single figure of power, danger, and violence. 
Venus’s woven hair, for instance, is also a characteristic of the knights of God, even 
though it seems, at first glance, ill-suited to the gender and occupation of Tannhäuser’s 
compatriots. However, when Elisabeth Gitter traces the Pre-Raphaelite fascination with 
women’s hair, she finds it a symbol with a range of contradictory meanings, aligned in 
turn with associations of wealth, exhibition, expression, disorder, volatility, and 
entrapment. These connotations apply beautifully to the pre-Christian Venus, in all of her 
fickle glory. Early in the poem, the knight undertakes a point-by-point comparison of 
Christ and his beloved, and Venus’ preeminence is due to the wealth, the plenitude, and 
above all the aesthetic of her “wonderfully woven hair” (l. 18), worn “most thick with 
many a carven gem” (l. 203). Her lovers first recognized her unpredictability and their 
own danger when, lying under her, they “[h]eard sudden serpents hiss across her hair” (l. 
116).  Later her “chaplet” and her jewelry would “drip with flower-like red” as she 
destroyed them (l. 122). Of course, this is the Venus of some distant past; by the time she 
is seen by the Christian knight crossing that field, “[n]aked, with hair shed over to the 
knee,” she has ceased to be the scourge of the pagan world—Tannhäuser is the only lover 
ever to survive her attention, lying over her inert form and gazing at the prospect of 
eternity. The power of the hair, and all that it implies, has in the contemporary world 
becomes the purview of the minstrel knights, whose swords with their serpentine 
movement do the work of the Medusa, who as knights wear their hair “[c]rowned with 
green leaves beneath white hoods of vair” (l. 278) and as minstrels sweetened by “the 




perplexing note of effeminacy in an otherwise masculine moment may merely be an 
expression of Swinburne’s fascination with androgyny as an aesthetic expression.56 Gitter 
reads Swinburne’s passion for the phallic women as just such a manifestation. “[T]he 
Medusa is beautiful [because]…at her most potent she is no longer a woman. Her hair-
serpents are not symbolically phallic but actually so: the phallic woman, as Swinburne 
imagines her, has thus successfully metamorphosed into a hermaphrodite, if not into a 
boy” (952). Yet the crowned hair adds a suggestion of supremacy and the broken bay leaf 
a note of violence and disorder at odds with these men’s service as God’s knights, 
subservient to God’s plan, intimating that there is perhaps more going on here than just 
the violation of gender definition. McGann’s reading of the Medusa as a figure which is 
“the manifest symbol of the equivalence between the hero and his victim” who “accuses 
in order to reveal what has been buried away, and thus make possible a new life” is 
perhaps more apt (“The Beauty of the Medusa” 23). Killed by a mirror, she is herself the 
mirror in which the hero’s delusions are shown to be what they are. It seems that 
Tannhäuser, whose vision has been clarified by his continued examination of the 
Medusan Venus, is now in a position to see commonalities between his Christian past and 
his heretical present; he is opening to the possibility of a monist universe.  
The sudden self-awareness that Baudelaire’s Valmont takes in stride spins 
Tannhäuser into a crisis; he has seen his sacred service to his deity devolve into mere 
violence, and his interaction with his lover evolve into pagan service. Much of the 
unhappiness Tannhäuser expresses late in his time in the Horsel may be due to the 
difficulty of finding his place in this new reality. He vacillates between the conditions of 




Harrison points to a fundamental misunderstanding of medieval history as the source of 
“Tannhäuser’s psychological bifurcation…a mirror of the opposition between poet-lovers 
and priests, which Swinburne believed prevailed during Tannhäuser’s age” (66)—but 
which may have more to do with the removal of discrete boundaries, as his prayers for 
escape are expressed in the same terms used to describe that third state that characterizes 
Venus’ fall: 
Ah yet would God this flesh of mine might be 
Where air might wash and long leaves cover me, 
Where tides of grass breaks into foam of flower, 
Or where the wind’s feet shine along the sea. (ll. 53-6) 
 
The long leaves, the pairing of grass and flower, even the mention of feet recalls the 
moment of that first meeting between the knight and the goddess, when she occupied that 
uncertain condition between field and flower, as though what the knight yearns for is 
God’s permission to lose himself in this new, unbounded, and above all uncertain state. 
He seeks approval for this new paradigm from an old authority. The juxtaposition in the 
stanza of grass and flower, products of the land, with foam and tide, attributes of the 
sea,57 evokes another illusory space beloved of the tradition of “impossible task” ballads 
like “Scarborough Fair,” “The Elfin Knight,” and “The Fairy Knight,” in which, in order 
to obtain the favor of a supernatural beloved, a suitor is set a number of tasks, often 
including crop cultivation in the space between ocean and strand. Typically, such 
requests are never performed, and fulfillment of the love affair or seduction is thwarted.  
As the petitioner and the one setting the impossible task, Tannhäuser’s plaint reverses the 
direction of desire expected by his former role as one of “Christ’s choosing”—God is 
now positioned as a kind of suitor, with the knight the supernatural, and unobtainable, 




utterly consistent with the knight’s past—to lie as a corpse on the battlefield, to pass 
beyond the ever-present battle, even if it is a passage into death. Many critics read this as 
indication of suicidal tendencies; these lines also suggest a craving for an even more 
ephemeral state than the knight’s already-illusory eternity in the Horsel.58   
The devolution of his sacred service can be marked in the fact that it is not 
assumption or ascension to Heaven he desires, in spite of the fact he is appealing to God; 
it does not even seem to be about judgment and condemnation, as his imagery remain 
resolutely terrestrial and his plaint emphasizes fatigue rather than forgiveness. He seems 
to be after death for its subsumptive and transformational qualities—like Byron’s Don 
Juan, who must be stripped of the class, nation, language, and gender that define him and 
his relations to others before he can develop into someone who can truly see, sympathize, 
and seduce, Tannhäuser seeks the removal of the signifiers that bound his old world in 
order to find his place in the new one. To invoke Baudrillard’s construct of the universe 
once again, Tannhäuser must reject imaginary constructs of sacred and profane, virtue 
and vice, in order to operate on the level of truth, the level of seduction. This is not a new 
idea for Swinburne—the subsumed speaker is a common feature of the work in Poems 
and Ballads, because subsumption is both relieving and revelatory. In “Triumph of 
Time,” for instance, the speaker, like Tannhäuser, blurs the lines between sex and death, 
searching for integration, not with the earth, but the great maternal sea:  “I will go back to 
the great sweet mother,/ Mother and lover of men, the sea/…Close with her, kiss her and 
mix her with me” (ll. 257-60). The end goal is rest: “The pulse of war and passion of 
wonder,/…These things are over , and no more mine” (ll. 361-368.) But such immersion 




demonstrated; McGann points out: “He undertook that pursuit [of knowledge] by plunge 
and engulfment…the near complete disappearance, absorption or extinction, of Romantic 
subjectivity” (“Swinburne’s Radical Artifice” 209). In “Les Noyades,” the speaker 
rejoices in the prospect of Carrier’s torture by “wedding,” the binding of a man and 
woman together naked and the drowning of them in the Loire, because death is both 
fixative and revelatory, smashing the boundaries and revealing all aspects of love to the 
lover: 
For the Loire would have driven us down to the sea, 
And the sea would have pitched us from shoal to shoal; 
And I should have held you, and you held me, 
As flesh holds flesh, and the soul the soul… 
 
But you would have felt my soul in a kiss, 
And known that once if I loved you well; 
And I would have given my soul for this 
To burn forever in burning hell. (ll. 69-80) 
 
Tannhäuser also seeks revelation through a loss of structure, as breaking of boundaries, 
but he is not quite ready; he still speaks in terms appropriate to his Christian existence, as 
“my body broken as a turning wheel” (l. 63) uses a simile that implies punishment and 
death upon a cartwheel, in the manner of Roman murderers and Christian martyrs. But 
the use of the term “turning,” rather than “breaking,” suggests an alternate reading of his 
desire as one for incorporation into a natural and eternally cycling system, seduction’s 
passage of power from agent to object to agent again, which is also shown in his request 
“that stems and roots were bred/ Out of my weary body” (ll. 57-8) and “my blood were 
dew to feed the grass” (l. 61). The idea of weariness is reiterated, blurring the lines 
between death and repose, in the imposition of sleep’s seal and the unuttered exclamation 




is a remnant of a belief in a soldier’s afterlife, a place where the soul goes when it cannot 
go to Heaven or Hell. In Christian terms, this is Purgatory, but in pagan terms its 
analogue is Avalon, where heroes wait and rest until they are again required to fight, thus 
participating in a cycle of renewal more in line with Tannhäuser’s militaristic past than 
the naturalistic imagery at first suggests.60 In any case, there is a sense of potential return 
to the world, as if whatever understanding is gained from the dissolution of boundaries 
and the subsumption of the lover into the beloved is not wasted in death, but merely held 
awaiting transfer or transformation. In Tannhäuser’s prayers, he exists upon the earth as 
he lays on Venus’ body, craving some means—a response, an aperture, the beneficence 
of God—by which the boundaries between the two might be dissolved, they become one, 
and he can find some peace. It is not boredom, fear of eternity, or repugnance at his sins 
which will drive the knight from the cavern before his time; it is the desire for belonging, 
thwarted by an as-yet incomplete rejection of the signifiers that define him.   
Sadly, peace is no longer a possibility; subsumption has already happened. 
However, since Tannhäuser’s transition is not marked by the dramatic events found in 
other recreations—Juan’s experience with war or Valmont’s loss of Tourvel—he is slow 
to recognize the change. The elision that life in the Horsel has been training Tannhäuser 
to perform creeps into in the language of the knight’s prayer, coloring the reader’s 
understanding of his terms and leading the reader to the realization the knight himself has 
not yet had: 
 …that love were as a flower or flame, 
That life were as the naming of a name, 
That death were not more pitiful than desire, 





The stanza opens with Tannhäuser tidily bundling disparate concepts as if creating a 
taxonomy of the ineffable.61 Love equates to both the fertility of the flower and the 
destructiveness of fire, but is distinct from life, which is made an analogue to identity (the 
division of one thing from another through the convention of language). Desire and 
death, though they may constitute individual categories, share positions on the continuum 
of tragedy; desire, Tannhäuser seems to feel, should be rated the more severe, possibly 
because it lasts longer. The last line then undermines all previous attempts at the 
imposition of order by wishing for a world where such distinctions could be made. This 
point that love, life, desire, and death are all the same (as well as, presumably, flowers, 
flames, and names) signifies that Tannhäuser’s thinking is now ineradicably tainted by 
that between-state; the literal reader of God’s directives has become the critical reader of 
connotative similarities, and he can never again live in that world of order and blind 
adherence. Neither can the reader, who has been tidily confined in the space behind 
Tannhäuser’s eyes for the entirety of the intellectual transformation. This is not to say 
that knight—or the reader, for that matter—does not continue to crave its clarity; 
Tannhäuser abandons the Horsel, rejecting the seductive lessons of Venus, driven to 
Rome in a final, futile attempt to revalidate the comfortable binaries of his Christian 
existence. 
 The pilgrimage to Rome serves a test of the new mindset that has been forced 
upon both knight and reader, as here a challenging viewpoint—that of the Pope—is 
finally introduced. Unfortunately, Tannhäuser is already well past the point of being able 
to accept absolution in good faith. Faced again with the kind of choices he made as a 




definitively, because he has already learned to recognize that commonality in apparent 
opposites—life and death, love and desire, beauty and sin—that lays the groundwork for 
empathy. He finds himself well outside the pale in religious terms. As Swinburne puts in, 
the tragedy of Tannhäuser’s “immortal agony” is that he persists in paradoxical desires: 
“—believing in Christ and bound to Venus—desirous of penitential pain, and damned to 
joyless pleasure… The tragic touch of the story is this: that the knight who has renounced 
Christ believes in him; the lover who has embraced Venus disbelieves in her…Once 
accept or admit the least admixture of pagan worship, or of modern thought, and the 
whole story collapses into froth and smoke” (“Notes” 26). Unfortunately, if Tannhäuser 
has a fatal flaw, it is the inability to let go of obsolete paradigms and understand the 
present as it is.  Swinburne further compares the knight’s story to the Biblical parable of 
the foolish virgins from Matthew 25:1, in which a covey of bridesmaids fail to prepare 
adequately for the possibility of a bridegroom’s delayed arrival. Left in the dark by an 
insufficiency of lamp oil, they are away searching for light when the wedding starts. 
When the chosen arrives, they are excluded from the celebration, still unable to see. The 
parallels to the Tannhäuser tradition, as well as the source of the pervasive image of 
blindness in “Laus Veneris,” are clear—the knight’s primary anxiety is the fear of being 
excluded from the Second Coming for lack of foresight, just as the bridesmaids are 
excluded from the wedding; his pilgrimage to Rome seems meant to precipitate a 
judgment he might otherwise miss. What is not clear in Swinburne’s commentary is 
whether this analogy is meant to apply to the damned knight of the Tannhäuser tradition, 
or the devotee of Venus in Swinburne’s version. Is a collapse into froth and smoke the 




As with Byron’s Don Juan, clutching at the ghost of the Black Friar but feeling 
only a very human duchess, for Tannhäuser that judgment never comes. The trip to Rome 
reveals the knight’s service to a supernatural power to be merely slavery to a very 
terrestrial dogma. The reader cannot help but be aware of the limited vision and value of 
God’s vicar—the Pope is said to offer denial of absolution in a voice like “a great cry out 
of hell” (l. 367), suggestive of the venality of his motivations, and the subsequent 
blooming of the staff underscores his fallibility. But such anticlericalist sentiment is not 
new in the Tannhäuser tradition; Claude Simpson goes so far as to try to name the 
particular pope that would have excited such ire.62 The novel addition to Swinburne’s re-
creation is the knight’s skepticism. The poem explains Tannhäuser’s hasty retreat, not as 
evidence of his sense of unworthiness, but as a feature of a pervasive nihilism: “Yea, 
what if the dried up stems wax red and green,/Shall that thing be which is not nor has 
been?” (ll. 373-4). The knight no longer operates in a world where the miracle matters; he 
has rejected the paradigm of his religion the same way Valmont rejected the paradigm of 
his association with Merteuil. A reader who has hung on through the hundreds of stanzas 
of uncertainty in “Laus Veneris” should not be surprised, at this point, to find that the 
“thing” in these lines has no clear referent; the context, however, is suggestive: 
candidates for the thing that would not be called into existence even by such a miracle 
include forgiveness, worthiness, virtue… perhaps even God himself.    
Again, the evidence of transformation at issue is not the depth or object of 
knight’s questioning, but that he questions at all—like Don Juan questioning the 
religious validity and supernatural origins of the Black Friar or Valmont questioning his 




experience to challenge received notions about the morality of his purpose. He is no 
longer the singing enforcer, deluding himself about the clarity of his perception and the 
virtue of his service; he now sees and comprehends, even when the view is unpleasant. 
Evidently, this ability is the key to his transformation, as the final few stanzas document 
his reconciliation with his frailties in an undefined world, linking understanding, sight, 
and an unexpectedly responsive Venus in syntax in which all uncertainties have been 
resolved. Tannhäuser can accept a future damnation because of the knowledge to which 
he has become privy; the virtuous, he is quick to point out, have no such understanding 
even in heaven: 
Ah love, there is no better life than this…/ 
Yea these that know not, shall they have such bliss/ 
High up in barren heaven before his face/ 
As we twain in the heavy-hearted place… (ll. 409-414) 
 
Heaven, it seems, is no less infertile than the “dry desire” of the Horsel; God and man are 
no less blind than the blinking knight, who, it turns out, can already see the only 
important thing he needed to see—the truth in his present circumstance. Though 
Swinburne characterizes the knight’s future as “abiding the day of his judgment in 
weariness and sorrow and fear” (“Notes” 27), Tannhäuser indicates that he has forgotten 
such concerns (l. 401). Thomas Brennan reads this attack of amnesia as an effect related 
to the goddess’ seductiveness because it occurs immediately after Venus kisses the knight 
in welcome, her only act in the entire poem (269). Yet the change in emphasis occurs 
even before the kiss; the last indication of fatigue before the moment of forgetting (l. 385) 
is located between a stanza contemplating the fragmentation of both body and soul—
“nothing whole therein but love” (l. 384)—and one relating the soul and the beloved—




its acquisition, at last, of the beloved: “…I hold thee with my hand,/ I let mine eyes have 
all their will of thee,/ I seal myself upon thee with my might…” (ll. 419-21). The knight 
has found the way in, the sexual subsumption he craves. He has a suitable outlet for his 
physical intensity. He has found the aperture he was looking for into that “between” state 
that permits him finally to grasp Venus, and permits her to clasp him back. As Harrison 
writes, “…out of Tannhäuser’s convoluted self-analysis, his analysis of love, his 
retrospection, and his resignation to the eventual torments of Hell he is bound to suffer, 
evolves Blakean ‘progress’: a powerful affirmation of eros that for Tannhäuser 
constitutes a psychological apocalypse” (60). Harrison’s argument is invested in seeing 
“Laus Veneris” as a poem only about the psychology of love, an interpretation that may 
limit the impact of Tannhäuser’s transformed worldview; it is clear, however, that the 





In the classical tradition, man does not get to look upon a god and live—no matter 
how intimate the relationship otherwise. Actaeon sees Artemis in her bath, and is torn 
apart by his own hounds. The all-powerful Zeus cultivates a variety of cunning 
impersonations for the seduction of mortals, coming to Antiope as a satyr, to Ganymede 
as an eagle, to Europa as a bull, to Danae as a shower of gold, and to Alcmene as her own 
husband. When he is tricked into showing Semele his true aspect, his divinity, tragedy 
strikes—she dies instantly, and he is forced to save their unborn child, that twice-born 
god Dionysus, by cutting it from her corpse and bringing it to term in a cavity in his own 




goddess now equally conscious of him, the poet is signaling not just a narrative recursion, 
the return of the failed hero, but a transformation, the hero ascending to a state of grace—
just a different kind than the knight had, as a Christian, expected. Like Ganymede, 
plucked from the mortal world to be the cupbearer to the gods, this new Tannhäuser gets 
to rub shoulders with divinity in the here-and-now, not after some promised last trump.  
The path to his transcendence—the true pilgrimage, in Swinburne’s version of the tale—
has been his sojourn in the Horsel, a traditional venue drastically redecorated to suit a 
philosophical purpose. Though it is a pornotopia, to borrow Marcus’ term, in the sense 
that it is an enclosed space, outside of the world as we know it, exempt from most 
considerations of time, and the host to a juxtaposition of bodies, it does not fulfill one 
critical criterion: the act repeated insatiably for the education of both the knight and the 
reader is not sex, it is doubt. Sex, after all, does not happen within the narrative, although 
it may have happened before it; doubt and confusion, on the other hand, inhabit every 
line. Like the poem itself, the sojourn in the Horsel is designed to encourage 
uncertainty—ambiguity in observation, qualms about memory, distrust of beliefs—
because uncertainty promotes questioning and questioning results in thought. Hyder 
considers the judgment of this as a philosophic poem to be evidence of “ineptitude” 
(Swinburne’s Literary Career 58), but I disagree; few other judgments seem possible of a 
narrative that exists almost entirely in a man’s head.   
Thus Swinburne’s process with this poem was to take the gap in the center of the 
Tannhäuserleid and turn it into a Carrollian rabbit hole into which the reader falls, like 
Alice; only instead of Wonderland the rabbit hole leads to a prison within the perspective 




circumstances. The reader is forced into intimate relations with that subjectivity by the 
problems of identity and definition with which the poem opens—Tannhäuser’s confused 
experience of the Horsel is mirrored by the reader’s confused experience with the shifting 
syntax and modifiers of the poem; his questions about who and what he is are echoed in 
the reader’s struggles to recognize and place the character. The reader is carried along on 
a journey of development back and forth through the libertine’s own history, a faithful, 
moral, and above all Christian past, which is revealed to be every bit as bizarre to 
Tannhäuser—and the reader—as pirate islands and Sultan’s harems are to Don Juan.  
Locked in the space behind the knight’s eyes, trapped in an environment of doubt so 
pervasive even the fundamentals of syntax are uncertain, the reader is subjected to a 
barrage of imagery, derived from both memory and present experience, in which the sure 
and certain binaries of a moral Christian’s experience are examined, questioned, 
dissolved, and turned into some third state. Having ridden postilion through this long 
night of the pilgrim’s soul, the reader is then taken up and out into the world in time to 
see that the contemporary Christian world is no less unsympathetic, self-justifying, and 
petty than that of Tannhäuser’s reconstruction. Finally, the knight and the reader retreat 
back into the world of doubt to find that profane love has accomplished what sacred 
could not, accessing the godhead in the form of the beloved. “Laus Veneris” 
demonstrates that the divine is accessible, not through unquestioning faith in received 












THE INTENTIONAL TOURIST:  BEARDSLEY’S 
 
THE STORY OF VENUS AND TANNHÄUSER 
 
 
To recap, then, where Byron’s re-creation of Don Juan leans heavily on the 
seductive strategies of disarmament and personalization and Baudelaire’s Valmont is 
crafted almost entirely through enticement, Swinburne instead leverages personalization 
and control aggressively, using prolonged uncertainty and a highly constrained point of 
view to force the reader almost immediately into a condition of intimacy and 
identification with Tannhäuser as he conducts a program of self-analysis so prolonged 
that his paradigm shifts and he abandons the Christian faith that had previously been his 
sole guide and moral compass in favor of the more terrestrial influences of Venus-the-
lover. In this transition of allegiance from sacred to profane, Swinburne’s Tannhäuser 
presages Beardsley’s, although, apart from a shared setting called the Venusberg, the two 
narratives have little else in common. Instead, Beardsley draws his characterization of the 
knight from Byron’s Don Juan, and the design of Venusberg society from Valmont’s 
milieu. In his illustrated novelization of the Tannhäuser myth, Beardsley deploys all four 
stages of seduction, but covertly, under the cover of more overt sexuality (one might 
contend pornography because of its explicitness) than any of the other authors considered 
here. What he does not do—perhaps because this is the least finished of all the unfinished 





aim. Beardsley provides, instead, an experience: a fully fleshed, full-frontal tour of the 
kingdom of Venus, variously titled “Under the Hill,” in its abbreviated release in The 
Savoy, or The Story of Venus and Tannhäuser, so thickly detailed, so explicit, so at odds 
with itself—character against character, text against illustration—in its tracing of the 
adventures of a young knight who abandons the nurturing influence of the Virgin Mary in 
favor of a rational project of lascivious experience, only to assume the maternal 
protection of the goddess Venus, that the reader becomes overwhelmed by the excesses 
of the novel the same way Tannhäuser is overwhelmed by the excesses of the Venusberg. 
Being overwhelmed is, of course, the point, because it is only in the face of experiences 
that are too much, too new, or too strange that one abandons one’s preconceptions about 
the world in favor of a more practical deductive philosophy.   
Beardsley openly acknowledges the novel’s debt to a libertine lineage, comparing 
his literary efforts obliquely to Byron’s (as well as de Molina’s) in a May, 1896 letter 
which comments: “the Juanesque continuation…begins to take form bootifully” (133). 
The continuation shares a number of key similarities with its predecessors. As with 
Byron’s Don Juan, Beardsley’s knight is an innocent embarked upon a journey of 
experience; here, however, that experience is actively pursued by the hero, rather than 
thrust upon him by events out of control. Though the novel shares a subject with “Laus 
Veneris,” while Swinburne inserts the reader into the contained space of a single 
awareness during a single (possible) sex act, Beardsley instead inserts his reader into a 
contained society engaged in a perpetual public orgy. As with Baudelaire’s Valmont, 
Beardsley’s hero is a peerless cultural achievement, but a pinnacle of aesthetic, as 




Beardsley’s Tannhäuser has obviously already embarked on a program of self-perfection 
through excess; the value of commencing such a project appears to be a foregone 
conclusion in Beardsley’s argument. Beardsley’s novel is instead a mock-libertine tale, 
perhaps a mocking one, seemingly critical of the society of excess through which a 
Valmont or a Dolmancé moves, but perhaps also critical of the kind of libertines that 
move through it. The text of the novel builds a pocket world of rampant sexuality—
passions satisfied so immediately and so often there is no time left for intellectual pursuit, 
the games of seduction, or the pedagogy of victimizer and victim—and into it interjects a 
hero who is confident, educated, aspiring, and clearly considers himself to be ready to 
conquer this new world in the best Don Juan style—though clearly he is not. The 
surviving illustrations of the novel, on the other hand, build a pocket world of oppression 
and entrapment—and show how inadequate the characters are to perform in that world, 
how easily it will break and transform them.     
 Begun in 1894, when he was still the art editor at The Yellow Book, Beardsley’s 
illustrated novel was the first of a number of erotic projects Beardsley would conceive of 
but never complete. It was a direct response to deficiencies in the Wagner opera; in a 
letter to F.H. Evans dated June 27 of that year, he damns the performance with faint 
praise and indicates what might be the beginnings of a new sketch: “Tannhäuser [the 
opera] went very well I thought after the first act…The concert must stand over for a 
month or so until I can finish a big long thing of the revels in act I of Tannhäuser—it will 
simply astonish everyone I think” (Letters 71-2). Whether by “big long thing” he means 
the novel’s story or some sort of panoramic illustration is not clear; if there was an 




undertaken “a large number of illustrations” for the book, and sets the intended 
publication date for the following year (Letters 76), and in November provides a brief 
description of one of the drawings: “I am just doing a picture of Venus feeding her pet 
unicorns which have garlands of roses round their necks” (Letters 79). That illustration 
also did not survive (although it may be telling to compare the roses in that description 
with a scene in the novel describing Venus, a single unicorn, breakfast buns, and 
masturbation). That Beardsley’s intention is to redress Wagner’s interpretation, and that 
the project is not going well, is made clear in his mention to Raffalovich in May 28, 1895 
(well past the time intimated for the novel’s release) that “On Friday I am going to hear 
Tannhäuser. I look forward to it with mixed pleasure for it puts me most terribly out of 
conceit with my own little variations on the same theme” (Letters 88). This would have 
been just after Beardsley was removed from his position with The Yellow Book on the 
coattails of the Wilde conviction, and at the very beginnings of a carefully cultivated 
relationship with the publisher Leonard Smithers, described by the editors of the Letters 
as “a man of audacious originality, an utterly unbusinesslike enthusiasm for literature and 
art, and no morals” (95). Beardsley’s disinclination to discuss his ongoing projects in any 
depth in his letters makes it difficult to tell if his original conception for The Story of 
Venus and Tannhäuser was to be as verbally erotic and visually tame as the final product, 
or if the transition from Lane to Smithers as publisher encouraged the artist to liven the 
narrative up to suit Smithers’ taste. It is clear, however, that at least five drawings 
specifically for the text were completed—the frontispiece, Venus between the Terminal 
Gods; The Abbé, also known as The Chevalier Tannhäuser, an illustration of the singing 




an illustration which was apparently finished, damaged, and begun again, but not 
completed.64 Though he indicates continuation of the project to Smithers in May, 1896, 
after the publication of “Under the Hill” in The Savoy, Beardsley becomes increasingly 
distracted by other projects, including the highly explicit illustrations for an edition of the 
Lysistrata. A proposed larger version of The Bacchanals gets a mention in October, 1896 
(Letters 188), but after that no more is said of Venus or Tannhäuser until Beardsley 
proposes a new story in November, 1897 (Letters 385). George Trail argues this 
abandonment of the original text is indicative of the artist’s attempt to relegate 
pornography and favor art, the expurgated version of the story being the art (17). 
However, Trail takes into account neither Beardsley’s concomitant plans for other 
explicit projects, nor his frenzied taste for novelty in both project and technique, which 
suggest that boredom, not shame, drove Beardsley on to other endeavors. Though quite ill 
at this point, in consequence of which many of his schemes go unfinished, Beardsley 
plans for both an illustrated translation of Dangerous Liaisons and an illustrated edition 
of Mademoiselle de Maupin, and his interest in libertinism persists throughout the year, 
in spite of his Catholic conversion. Repudiation of his subject matter occurs at the very 
last minute; just before his death in March, 1898, he exhorts Smithers to destroy “all 
obscene drawings,” citing the Lysistrata particularly, but not mentioning the Tannhäuser. 
Despite its overt and varied sexual proclivities, Beardsley’s Venusberg appears to escape 
its creator’s rue (Letters 439), suggesting that, although the book is stuffed full of explicit 
sexual description, at least in its early chapters, the author never really considers it 




Perhaps, for Beardsley, the explicitness is intended to be the vehicle rather than the 
destination, the first experiments along the knight’s path to higher, better ideals.  
 Beardsley’s comparison of Tannhäuser and Don Juan is apt because Beardsley’s 
Tannhäuser has been remodeled as thoroughly as Byron’s Don Juan, with the same air of 
blithe ignorance and practical inadequacy. Beardsley quite literally disarms 
Tannhäuser—depriving Tannhäuser the knight of his association with warfare and 
Tannhäuser the singer of his mastery of music. Where Tieck and Swinburne write a 
knight, Beardsley writes a courtier65; where Wagner writes a master singer, Beardsley 
writes a well-read aesthete with a lute he never plays. Beardsley’s hero retains power 
only in one key aspect—he is an active seeker after knowledge. Where the entire tradition 
writes an abductee, Beardsley instead writes an aspirant, a student of aesthetic theory in a 
quest for a venue to perform what he knows. Much is made in the opening chapter of his 
previously acquired appreciation of form and subtlety: the “labored niceness” of his 
clothing is maintained by checking “point to point of a precise toilet”; the tassel of his 
stick is carefully rearranged; he enters the Venusberg at what he judges is the “delicious 
moment” (22). The implication is that Tannhäuser, as a dandy and perhaps as a 
performer, has achieved a degree of proficiency. While the illustration of Tannhäuser at 
the gate reinforces this preoccupation with embellishment—curled hair, feathered hat, 
embroidered muff, ribbons, sashes, peculiar pendants—it also hints at neophytism by 
revealing just how young and girlish Tannhäuser is; behind the texture and movement 
and puffery of an incroyable is a knock-kneed, large-hipped, sweet-faced boy, a pretty 
rarity in Beardsley’s usual cast of monsters.66 So although clearly far more self-possessed 




contemplating astronomy in the presence of a pretty girl, though he might well be 
distracted by his own cuffs—it is questionable whether that poise will render him any 
more prepared for the world under the hill than Don Juan was for the world outside 
Spain. 
The kingdom under the hill is characterized by excess but also by isolation. 
Isolation is a persistent theme in Beardsley’s pen-and-ink work from the very beginning 
of his career, though at the time of transition to The Savoy, he had developed new 
techniques for expressing it. “Under the Hill” marks a transition from the single, sinuous 
line of Salome, crossing the page to connect figures in a scene at the same time as it 
established them as discrete forms, and the stark two-tone contrasts of the Yellow Book, 
which set off certain figures in a blaze of white against a shadowy background of others, 
to a far more complicated, textured style whose overall effect is one of half-tones. By 
filling his backgrounds with vegetation and his foregrounds with elaborately patterned 
fabric in an eighteenth-century mode, Beardsley emphasizes the way each static figure is 
trapped in, and about to be overwhelmed by, the scene he or she occupies.67 The 
Chevalier Tannhäuser illustration shows the effeminate knight self-consciously posed 
against the Venusberg gatepost, with an emphatically textured garden just behind him.  
The vegetation is busy with large blooms, taller than a man and sexualized; at least one 
moth sports a woman’s lower extremities. The scale of the garden suggests that the 
knight may not be up to the task—not only is he smaller than both the vegetation and the 
gate, he is also not so much dressed as puffed up, in a cloak and trousers of such a 
pronounced, ridged nap that the weight of the line causes his body to fade into the 




ruching of what is presumably a linen cravat, save him from near invisibility. The heavy 
inking and busy texture of the Venusberg gardens have all but consumed him, even 
before he has stepped over the threshold, suggesting that the Venusberg itself is poised to 
eat him alive—if one finds oneself inadequate to the front door, what hope does on have 
inside? The gatepost at the knight’s right hand bounds the left side of the image; though 
incised with strong diagonals and encircled by vines that add to the heavy textures in the 
illustration, it appears to be architecturally erect rather than symbolically phallic, robbing 
the scene of even a trace of dominating masculinity. Compare this to Swinburne’s 
account of Tannhäuser’s entry into the Venusberg, in pursuit of a fleeing, naked, possibly 
floating goddess; Beardsley’s knight is so bound up in textures and surfaces that the kind 
of activity needed to dominate, in the traditional libertine manner, is impossible. He 
suffers from chronic aesthetic passivity. There is no corresponding gatepost on 
Tannhäuser’s left, but the knight is nonetheless enclosed, standing in the only clear patch 
of lawn, with the flowers and the forest crowded in close ranks behind. A break in the 
trees showing tiny patch of sky above his right shoulder is the sole respite from the 
pervasive texture and overwhelming sense of enclosure. Chris Snodgrass argues that such 
a feeling of entrapment is a pervasive theme throughout Beardsley’s visual work, 
pointing to the emblem for Morte d’Arthur, with its cramped arrangement of Merlin’s 
body into a circle almost too small for it, as evidence (138). However, he reads the 
texture as an antidote, rather than a contributor, to that entrapment, postulating the 
circumstances of Beardsley’s illness as the motivator:  “His relentless desire to fill (even 
overfill) vacant space ironically highlights the Janus-faced impulses in his art—a desire 




smothering imprisonment he felt” (142). Yet in this illustration, rather than ameliorating 
the sense of confinement, the texture helps creates it, forming a tight little world of 
irritated line with only the tiniest avenue of escape, a vanishing point, upon which the 
knight has turned his back. The drawing thus reinforces the knight’s voluntary 
submission to the conditions of entrapment and frenetic energy of the Venusberg, but it 
also points out, paradoxically, that the vacant space, the means of escaping entrapment, 
persists regardless of his rejection, the same way God’s love, shown by the blooming 
staff in the Wagner opera, persists in spite of the knight’s failure to recognize it. If, on the 
other hand, Snodgrass’ interpretation of the texture is true, and redemption for Beardsley 
is a product of the filling of space, then this illustration may be intended to foreshadow 
the outcome of the knight’s pilgrimage through the Venusberg and on to the Vatican. 
Redemption would be an inevitable product of the experience, because sexual 
intercourse, in its most basic terms, is about filling space—a phallus in an orifice, a fetus 
in a womb. If the texture, so pervasive in the drawings, that creates a sense of 
confinement is the mechanism by which the confinement is given value, then, by 
analogy, the intercourse, so pervasive in the text, that creates the sin may be the 
mechanism needed to restore its virtue. The illustration thus may be seen to both 
underscore the risk Tannhäuser is taking by entering the mad world under the hill, and 
reinforce the value of Tannhäuser’s elective confinement there; the experience may 
temper and improve him, and the world above that he abandoned will still be there when 
he is done.   
 The text makes it clear the knight is at least nominally aware of both the risks and 




consumed by the frenzy. He seeks out the hill of Venus voluntarily, not just for the song, 
the seductiveness of which is acknowledged only once, in a single sentence in the 
opening chapter when he plays along with it, but for the goddess herself. He is aware that 
to enter the grotto is to “slip into exile” (21)—to cross a boundary, to abandon one world, 
at least temporarily, for another—but he times the moment carefully, for best effect, and 
“slip into” is a verb phrase which suggest the gentlest of voluntary actions—like 
changing one’s clothes or retiring to bed. His general goodbye to the world consigns it to 
God (“adieu”) with “an inclusive gesture,” perhaps a benediction, and his particular 
farewell singles out the Virgin (22), so while this Tannhäuser story, like its predecessors, 
also includes the virtues and the passions figured by Mary and Venus, respectively, there 
is no sense of a contest between them for the chevalier’s soul. Tannhäuser willingly 
relinquishes the world, religion, and virtue in favor of willing participation in whatever 
experience the Venusberg has to offer—he is a voluntary student of experience, 
intentionally pursued. 
Venus’ subjects delight in both sexual experience and social performance, and 
their world is designed for efficient enactment of both. As with Swinburne’s treatment in 
“Laus Veneris,” and in line with the tradition laid out by Philip Barto, Beardsley’s 
Venusberg is at least partly subterranean, but it is far more a palace, or an entertainment 
complex, than the crypt where Swinburne houses his sleeping Venus or the grotto in 
which Wagner’s pagans perform their ballet. Beardsley’s construction is more elaborate, 
containing not just rooms but also myriad structures for entertainment, including terraces, 
gardens, stables, casinos, theatres, and opera houses. The Venusberg is enclosed, but 




searching. The landscape recalls Barthes’ requirement for a closed libertine world, 
although here the manipulation of reality is the province of a whole libertine society 
rather than an individual seducer; it also fits the criteria for a pornotopia perfectly— the 
placement of the gate suggests the arrangement of female genitalia, with its pair of pillars 
in a jungle “dripping with odors” surrounding a “pretty portal” or a “cave” (21), and if 
there is an outside world from which Tannhäuser journeys, it is only acknowledged once, 
in the farewell, and only in the most general of terms.69 Each location within the hill 
appears to have its own dedicated sexual activity; to travel from room to room is to 
venture from practice to practice. De la Pine’s studio offers a venue for transvestitism; 
the casino showcases bestiality (or perhaps pony play) at its game tables and androgyny 
on its stages. The unicorn’s stable acts as the background for habitual masturbation. The 
bath provides room for homosexual pedophilia. In Venus’s closet, the goddess performs 
her toilette for the benefit of the voyeurs and dispenses objects for the benefit of the 
fetishists, as when “Florizel snatches as usual a slipper…and fitted the foot over his 
penis” (31). Indeed, the population of the Venusberg all but consumes their queen, if the 
following summary of obsessions is to be believed:  
Everything she wore had its lover. Heavens! how her handkerchiefs were filched, 
her stockings stolen! Daily, what intrigues, what countless ruses to possess her 
merest frippery! Every scrap of her body was adored. Never, for Savaral, could 
her ear yield sufficient wax! Never, for Pradon, could she spit prodigally enough! 
And Saphius found a month an interminable time. (40)  
 
Every bit of Venus’ effluvia is said to be desirable; therefore, she must constantly be 
giving of herself (every time she gets dressed, spits, blows her nose, or has a bath) in 
order to satisfy their fetishistic cravings.  There is no function, no location, no moment 




member of the Venusberg is private. They perform their proclivities constantly and 
publicly. A tour of the kingdom, which is what Tannhäuser is getting in the early part of 
the novel, is thus simultaneously a program of experiences—the continual consumption 
of novel sensations—and performances—sex as entertainment that will serve as a 
proving ground for his decadent beliefs. 
The self-conscious description of Tannhäuser’s entrance into the Venusberg 
suggests that he believes he is capable of fitting in to the perpetual show that is the 
Venusberg. He is wrong. Tannhäuser’s particular Aesthetic pose is of the kind usually 
termed “decadent” because it holds certain theoretical conceptions of the past that 
privilege the art and culture of dead societies; the Venusberg, as a dead society preserved 
like a bug in amber, would seem to him an ideal playground. But his allusive 
understanding of the past is fundamentally irreconcilable with the philosophy of the 
Venusberg, pointing to the inherent incompatibility between a decadent interest in 
libertine matters and the libertine matter itself. The former is a preoccupation with past 
practice, a kind of nostalgia for the obsolete; the latter is an interest in current practice, 
the stratagems and behavior that fulfill the libertine’s present desires and future 
intentions. The former has no stakes at all, and suffers no penalty for inaccuracy or 
inadequacy; the latter faces significant social penalties for failure, ranging from 
excommunication to damnation, embarrassment to exile. Tannhäuser is capable of 
contemplating past, present, and future (Wagner, the Romaunt de la Rose, Lady 
Delaware’s art collection, St. Rose of Lima, Racine, and a pair of blonde trousers, not yet 
commissioned) all before breakfast because such allusion is never realized as practice, 




everything into practice. Its artistic interests, as shown by performances of a de Bergerac 
rewrite and Rossini’s setting for Stabat Mater, a standard liturgical text, are apparently 
quite limited—two performances and the work of the painter de la Pine—and familiar, 
because, in the Venusberg, art is the means and sex is the end. Art is just another excuse, 
like gambling or gardens or dinner, for sexual performance, as when the orchestra rises 
up during a concert and rapes the conductor. Venusberg is more interested, it turns out, in 
itself than in art. So while, as Matthew Potolsky argues in The Decadent Republic of 
Letters, the peculiar allusiveness of the character of Tannhäuser and the voice of the 
narrator may both speak to, and by extension construct, a readership of decadent insiders 
who would recognize all such allusions (and find themselves gently flattered, kindly 
disposed, and inclined to identify with the sophistication of both the knight and the 
narrator—seduced by strategies of personalization)—that allusiveness does not, in any 
way, communicate itself to the Venusberg. The society under the hill sets itself apart 
from both knight and reader by the fact of its libertine practice; its affair with the past is 
tangible, born of exile and isolation. It does not pose itself decadently; it performs its past 
as present. For Tannhäuser and the narrator, these constant allusions to the artistic past 
are, to borrow Potolsky’s terms, “encomium, tribute, and eulogy” (Decadent Republic 7). 
To the people of the Venusberg, they are current culture, practical and real—the 
entertainment after dinner. For Tannhäuser and the narrator, these allusions may be an 
attempt to illustrate, as Emma Sutton argues, the “crucial distinction between 
consumerism and connoisseurship,” ironically exposing the retail foundations upon 
which Aesthetic principles of beauty were based (140); for the people of the Venusberg, 




practice his decadent poses in the mirror alone simply because they are, for him, poses 
rather than practices. To come to the Venusberg is to test his theories in a practical venue, 
the way a historian might take advantage of the invention of the time machine. Untested, 
those theories count for little.   
Fortunately, every scene is overloaded with opportunities for consumption and 
display, giving the knight ample opportunity to participate in the twin indulgences of the 
Venusberg on an excessive scale. The “four hundred couches” of the dinnertime orgy 
suggest both sybaritic leisure in the Roman manner, and the kind of pack-them-in 
mentality normally reserved for sporting events and rock concerts (35). Orgy participants 
consume each other twice, first visually and then, after the meal, sexually. Artifice is the 
catch of the day, and the text spends two full pages barraging the reader with detail of the 
diners’ attention-seeking strategies, yet curiously this scene is never illustrated: “dresses 
of ostrich feathers curling inwards,” “delightful little mustaches dyed in purples and 
bright greens,” and “black silhouettes painted upon the legs…like a sumptuous bruise” 
(38). Diners consume the meal twice as well, both orally and aurally; the menu is 
composed of eleven elaborate courses whose titles are themselves provocative—carp’s 
tongue ragout, pâté of goose thighs, pigeon at the turning point, apple tart Lucy 
Waters70—foreshadowing the consumption of bodies to follow. Even the after-dinner sex 
privileges the mouth: “Belamour pretended to be a dog…biting and barking and licking”; 
Venus bites, finding Tannhäuser’s “skin at once firm and yielding, seeming to those 
exquisite little teeth of hers, the most incomparable pasture”; Mrs. Marsuple “refused to 
be quiet at all until she had had a mouthful of the Chevalier” (41-2). These alimentary 




aesthete we see in the garden—the potential for conversion, to be broken down, through 
repeated and voluntary morseling out, and transformed by a kind of social digestion, into 
something else entirely. 
Dinnertime conversation provides the opportunity to perform another kind of 
digestion, the chewing over of fresh scandal. The range and intimacy of the knowledge 
indicate the kind of society the Venusberg is: cosmopolitan yet homogenous, insular, and 
very, very small. A host of sexual follies are picked over:    
The infidelities of Cerise, the difficulties of Brancas, Sarmean’s caprices that 
morning in the lily garden, Thorilliere’s declining strength, Astarte’s affection for 
Roseola, Felix’s impossible member, Cathelin’s passion for Sulpilia’s poodle, 
Sola’s passion for herself, the nasty bite that Marisca gave Chloe, the épilatiere of 
Pulex, Cyril’s diseases, Butor’s illness, Maryx’s tiny cemetery, Lesbia’s profound 
fourth letter, and a thousand amatory follies of the day were discussed. (26) 
 
In this cascade of gossip, fully half the topics under discussion have to do with medical 
matters—damage, disease, abnormal physiology, and the inability to perform. The 
remainder chronicles a range of what are, in nineteenth-century terms, deviant behaviors, 
from the promiscuity implied by the nonspecific “infidelities” to lesbianism, onanism, 
and bestiality.71 No family names or identifiers are used. The intimation is that the 
individuals discussed are as well known to the narrator—and by extension the reader—as 
they are to the scandalmonger and his or her audience.72 The first sentence alone features 
names that are French, Portuguese, Georgian, French again, a Greek version of 
Mesopotamian, neo-Latin, proper Latin, French a third time… suggesting that Venus’s 
coteries is drawn, not just from ancient Rome, but from across the world.73 The lack of 
family names also suggests that the Venusberg is relatively free of social stratification—
these people can speak indiscreetly about each other, too each other, because they are all 




gardeners, stable hands, or kitchen maids. (The barber who shaves Tannhäuser in the 
morning and the boys who bring him his towels are the closest thing to an underclass that 
the text manifests.) In effect, Venus rules a kingdom much like a salon writ large, 
populated almost entirely by a single class of accomplished, experienced individuals 
unencumbered by the responsibilities of family, money, or profession. Her subjects even 
dress like continental aristocrats, as The Toilet of Venus shows.74 
Their language is that of the salon as well. When Potolsky terms the language of 
the text “mock-precious idiom” (“Decadent Counterpublic” 17), he aligns it with the 
fashion for préciosité found in the seventeenth century salons of the Marquise de 
Rambouillet and her adherents, a kind of insider discourse so particular in its refinement 
that it led to the publication of a dictionary of idiom by Antoine de Somaize, and so 
exclusive in its application that it prompted a snide one-act play by Molière.75 Its use in 
the Venusberg does a great deal to situate that society ideologically. Philosophically, in 
its valorization of the feminine and emphasis on refinement and correctness, the 
discourse of the précieuses—and by extension that of the society of the Venusberg—can 
be seen as an evolution of the courtly ethos that underpins the more traditional versions 
of the Tannhäuser tale, a way of validating what might otherwise be gratuitous 
promiscuity and malicious social discourse. Historically, by invoking the memory of a 
social circle in retreat from the dodgy politics of the French court, it may recast the 
Venusberg’s pagan exile as a refuge for delicate, intellectual, and perhaps countercultural 
sensibilities from a harsh political reality.76 It also points up the similarities between the 
Venusberg’s populace and the French aristocracy, a social class decimated by revolution 




excess may provide fertile ground for transformation, such tendency is a means, not an 
end. Those for whom it is an end themselves are ended, messily. In any case, the 
language irritates some critics enormously; they find the excesses of the language in 
Beardsley nearly as objectionable as the graphic representation of the sex, perhaps it the 
kind of discourse that openly excludes, and they have been alienated by it; it is a 
language that makes a performance of its secrets.77 For instance, the reader watches the 
Venusberg residents speak, but seldom hears them:  
Mrs. Marsuple’s voice was full of salacious unction; she had terrible little 
gestures with the hands, strange movements with the shoulders, a short respiration 
that made surprising wrinkles in the bodice, a corrupt skin…The talk that passed 
between Mrs. Marsuple and her mistress was of that excellent kind that passes 
between old friends, a perfect understanding giving to scraps of phrases their full 
meaning, and to the merest reference a point. (28) 
 
The passage lingers on Mrs. Marsuple’s movements almost like a stage direction; it does 
not, however, tell the reader what she said, only that there was a “perfect understanding” 
to which the reader is not privy. As with the dinnertime conversation, there is a sense that 
the narrator is mediating between the residents of the Venusberg and the reader, 
interpreting their discourse for an unfamiliar audience. There are even two moments 
when the narrative, generally so accustomed to at least the illusion of explicitness, 
becomes unexpectedly dumb. Once, in describing Venus, the narrator cites an “enforced 
silence,” which prevents the relation of certain descriptive details of her form (although 
the reader has just been given the measurement of her shin bone) and thus makes any 
attempt at general description flawed and pointless (30). Once, during the otherwise 
exhaustively detailed after-dinner orgy, the narrator suddenly self-censors (or perhaps 
just runs out of ideas) about “what occurred round table 15” for unspecified “deplorable 




details as personal predilection dictates regarding both the looks of the heroine and the 
orgiastic activities of her retinue; on the other hand, they briefly reveal the contours of a 
controlling hand underneath what otherwise appears to be an objectively explicit, “warts-
and-all” narrative. The control is not as apparent as in Swinburne. The reader is not 
trapped and held; mostly, the reader is guided forward, but in these two instances, the 
reader is briefly pulled back. The effect is an instant of alienation; like the tendency 
toward préciosité, these are a reminder of the reader’s place (a place shared with 
Tannhäuser) as someone who, touring this world of display and consumption, is welcome 
to sample its delights, but not to stay.   
Like préciosité , this world under the hill of rampant consumption and carefully 
modulated display valorizes the feminine. The Venusberg is, after all, run by a woman, 
and as the court of adherents exiled with their goddess, her role would be as both its 
ultimate authority and its center of attention. One would expect Venus to exercise her 
absolute and supernatural powers as a dominant player in the games of her kingdom:  a 
sadist, perhaps, like the pagan goddess Swinburne describes, or a manipulator of men, the 
original predatory female. Yet, in contrast to the vigorous, self-serving, secretive, just-
slightly-alienating society of the Venusberg, Beardsley writes its queen as a deeply 
sympathetic, largely selfless, sweet-tempered child—disarmed, and disarming, not unlike 
Tannhäuser himself. She is complimentary to her hairdresser, apologetic to Mrs. 
Marsuple, tolerant of the constant attendance of her coterie, generous with both her 
possession and her bodily emissions in satisfaction of various fetishes. When illustrated 
in The Toilette of Venus, she appears partially clothed but not lasciviously so, bare-




effect and turns her into the picture of a bride, or perhaps a nursing mother.78  Her 
voluntary submission is underscored by the feeling of confinement, both by her subjects 
and the room itself—she is held down by her hairdresser with a hand on her lap and one 
on her head, and bounded on all sides by attendants or furniture. While Snodgrass finds 
that the monstrosity of the attendants taints the beauty of the goddess, contending that 
being “compositionally framed and ‘grounded’ by hideous grotesques …seriously 
undercuts that beauty and elegance…” implying that Venus and her people are cut from 
the same terrible cloth (168), these monstrosities are, for Beardsley, quite tame when 
compared to the bare genitals and misshapen heads of Enter Herodias, the Japonesque 
grimaces and twisted embryos of Dreams for Lucian’s Strange History, or the menagerie 
of bald-headed horrors found in Lucian’s Strange Creatures.79 The overall tone of the 
illustration may be baroque and just a touch excessive in its texture (although not as 
excessive as the illustration of Tannhäuser in the garden), but, outside of Mrs. Marsuple 
and a table with breasts, it lacks the overt horribleness found in much of Beardsley’s 
other work, suggesting that Venus herself, in spite of her sexualized identity, is not meant 
to be just another of his grotesques. She is the queen of this kingdom, but also its hostage. 
In Venus between Terminal Gods, the garden of texture that enfolded Tannhäuser 
becomes a cage of treillage that contains Venus. She is enclosed completely, positioned 
slightly behind the two statues of satyrs whose antlers entwine to form a roof, and slightly 
in front of the posts whose vines entwine to hold her crown a little above her head. Her 
movements appear constrained, and her sovereignty, as figured in the crown, seems 
bestowed and controlled by external powers. Her pose is patient but morose, her sleeves 




seems to emphasize the idea of abundance, in its cornucopias, and power, in its crown, 
just out of reach. This may be meant only as a metaphor for the incomplete gratification 
upon which all pornographic narratives depend for their impetus80; however, it also 
seems to play with constructs of confinement, suggesting that, for Venus, her reign over 
the Venusberg might be less an idyll than a sentence. There is no vanishing point in this 
composition, no break in the undulating foliage save the white of the floor and Venus 
herself, pale in a pale shift. If there is space left to be filled in this illustration, redemption 
to be sought, the illustration suggests, that space is within the goddess herself—she is 
generosity incarnate. She participates willingly in the sexual escapades of her world, but 
apart from the pleasuring of the unicorn, an act that seems to serve as a mechanism 
actuated—the call to breakfast—rather than a desire fulfilled, she never initiates them. 
Alone with Tannhäuser in the pavilion during a hiatus between orgies, she is remarkably 
retiring: the description of her body as “nervous and responsive,” her thighs “closed,” her 
buttocks “as a plump virgin’s cheek,” imply inexperience, or at least reticence, rather 
than libidinous gusto (54). She is even put to bed afterwards by Mrs. Marsuple like a 
child. Later, riding in the carriage that she and Tannhäuser overturn with the enthusiasm 
of their coupling, the hand she introduces into the chevalier’s trousers is described as one 
of “comfort”; she eases the difficulties of an unexpected erection rather than initiates 
intercourse on her own account. Like the narrator of Beardsley’s story, she behaves 
throughout the incomplete narrative as a guide, concealing her control under the veil of 
hospitality, drawing her guest forward on a tour of all the diversions her little world has 
to offer. This Venus is neither the temptress of Swinburne nor the spoiled goddess of 




of Madonna and the goddess, the sacred and profane love that is a trope of the 
Tannhäuser tradition.  In spite of the perversion, the paganism, the decadence (in both 
senses) of the society, in the figure of Venus, the terms are shown to be the same on both 
sides of the boundary that separates the Venusberg from the world. The quest for 
experience that Beardsley constructs brings the chevalier full circle, from the light of an 
interceding divinity through the dark gates…and back into the light of a sympathetic 
divinity.   
 Much of Tannhäuser’s time spent inside the Venusberg is also spent inside the 
goddess; for him, a single sexual act occurs within a quiet, gentle, generous body that is 
contained within a loud, predatory, self-pleasuring world under the hill, which is itself 
contained within the undescribed world of Aesthetes, Christians, and the nineteenth-
century morality that Tannhäuser abandoned. For Iser, the act of negotiating the 
dissonances in a story is the mechanism that changes a reader over its course; if that is 
true, then negotiating the conflicts between, and within, the worlds with which he has 
intercourse every time he has intercourse must also transform Tannhäuser. He does 
change; even in the few completed chapters Beardsley left, Tannhäuser becomes more 
active and more questioning. The effeminate practitioner of poses at the gates of the 
Venusberg begins to give way to the dominating lover; after dinner, alone in the pavilion 
with Venus, Tannhäuser initiates intercourse with some violence, tearing her garments 
and bruising her flesh with his rings—the power in the scenario is his, although the 
permission is still hers. His power consolidates through the rest of story, even in the 
moment in de la Pine’s studio when Tannhäuser dresses as a woman—a clear refiguring 




as though in sharing Venus’s body he has also been imbued with a degree of her divinity 
(79). The contemplator of artistic trifles ranging from Racine to romances in his bedroom 
becomes the ruminating, one might even say Romantic, thinker at the edge of the 
sleeping lake. The chevalier suffers a “strange mood,” almost a hallucination: “It seemed 
to him that the thing would speak, reveal some curious secret, say some beautiful word, if 
he should dare wrinkle its pale face with a pebble…Then he wondered what might be on 
the other side; other gardens, other gods?” (73). This lake, a hole in the enclosed world of 
the Venusberg and thus a potential avenue out into the larger world(s), offers either 
extraordinary potential for revelation in the form of secrets, gods, and gardens (or 
extraordinary potential to experience more of what the Venusberg already is.) The 
chevalier need only abandon his preoccupation with surface perfection—with 
aesthetics—and transgress the boundary its surface represents to find out. Tannhäuser is 
not yet ready; he diminishes both the threat and the potential of the lake by comparing it 
to one depicted on a stage set, and then reflects that, though he would like to swim, he is 
afraid of drowning, or in other words, being consumed by the lake and transformed 
irrevocably. (Swinburne’s Tannhäuser would have no such qualms.) But the desire is 
there, and that is the important thing. Unlike Byron’s Don Juan, born (initially, at least) 
into a spirit of sexual insouciance and brought to weltschmerz by exposure to worldly 
troubles like physical threat and the horrors of war, Beardsley’s Tannhäuser is able to 
touch the edges of world-pain only through carnality and exposure to the goddess. The 
lake scene appears to occur early, rather than late, in the plot, and even though the 
narrative is truncated the knight still ventures on to de la Pine’s studio and the casino; 




trajectory of the tale and its transformative effects would push him past his reservations 
regarding transformation before bringing him back to this lake and its mysteries. 
In The Story of Venus and Tannhäuser, then, the elements of seduction, which are 
still present in the disarming representation of the title characters, the intimate tone and 
flattering allusiveness of the narrator’s discourse, even the control evinced by the 
narrative as it reveals its gossip and protects its secrets, allow themselves to be 
superseded by the creation of a series of dissonances (in the worlds within the narrative, 
in the text and illustrations in which the narrative is wrapped) that both knight and reader 
must negotiate. The Chevalier, an innocent blind to his own limitations, seeks a 
redemption he thinks he has rejected in the guise of experience. He abandons a world of 
surfaces to immerse himself in a world of display. Willingly consumed by its excesses, he 
is himself remade. The society that breaks him is configured in imitation of one that is 
itself on the verge of breaking. The goddess that he seeks profane pleasure in becomes 
the haven in which redemption is sought. A text that is full of frenetic sexual energy and 
an excess of sensory detail is illustrated with static pen drawings of trapped figures in a 
world of texture about to smother them. Negotiating these inconsistencies—synthesizing 
a cohesive narrative in which consumption creates, in which display conceals, in which 
stillness is the highest form of activity, and redemption rejected is redemption found—
brings the knight to the point of agency and escape, and the reader to the realization that 
The Story of Venus and Tannhäuser reverses the usual dynamic of decadent writing, 
which Potolsky defines as “conversions to the aesthetic life, initiations into artistic 
mysteries, and students transformed into literal or figurative artworks under the influence 




student is instead transformed by excess from an artwork, a conceit of surfaces, 
techniques, and poses, into something more—something real, with depth and breadth and 
substance and humanity, standing against the imaginary backdrop of the Venusberg. In 
the wake of Byron’s Don Juan, Baudelaire’s Valmont, and Swinburne’s Tannhäuser, 
Beardsley’s Chevalier promises to transgress the boundaries imposed by signifiers (be 
they terms of class, gender, religion, or even the labels “aesthete” and “libertine” 
themselves) in order to access the level of the real, the level at which seduction operates 
and true dynamics of power may be understood and taken advantage of for the benefit of 












REBORN, REFASHIONED, REBOOTED, REPEAT 
 
 
It should be obvious, by this time, that nineteenth-century interest in the libertine 
tradition was anything but archival.  Indeed, these four tales give every indication of 
extending the tradition of the whore’s dialogue meta-fictionally, replacing the 
pedagogical relationship between experienced whore and novice with a similar 
association between text and reader. In the case of Byron, Baudelaire, Swinburne, and 
Beardsley, at least, a not-at-all-archival interest in seduction narratives signaled an 
intention to refashion new tools from old, in order to serve new masters, accomplish new 
aims, and promote new philosophies. Libertine literature has a number of seductive 
rhetorical advantages. As a peripheral appendage of pornography, its subject matter is an 
open secret, and so, by the very fact of picking up the book, the reader is already 
complicit in and primed to accept the expressed vices within. As part of a genre whose 
primary attraction is that it can stimulate real arousal through simulated acts, its nature 
presupposes, and encourages, an exceptionally high degree of reader identification with 
one or more key (usually masterful) characters. As a genre that is primarily about 
seduction, and the rhetorical machinations of individuals manipulating asexual situations 
into sexual ones through dialogue, it is prone to gaps, elisions, and dramatic irony, all of 
which provide space for the reader to negotiate and personalize aspects of the story’s 





of Romanticism and Decadence were nothing if not audience-aware—could control the 
duration, the nature, and the degree of that complicity through both the careful 
manipulation of gaps and the design of identification-worthy characters, in order to stage 
discoveries for and inculcate notions in the reader that fit the writer’s own ideas regarding 
religion, morality, and the value of sexuality to human experience.   
 Such a claim may provide a useful frame for examining certain works of 
nineteenth-century fiction that are not refashioned libertine texts. Stories containing 
unexplained vices—Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray and Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde spring immediately to mind—
often become unexpectedly coy regarding the sins their villains perpetrate, a coyness that 
may hint at the original sin that created the villain. After the death of Sybil Vane, Dorian 
is absent from society without explanation, to his peers or the reader, on many occasions. 
His scandalous activities, referred to by Basil indistinctly as “horrible charges” (170), 
perpetrated between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-eight, are the stuff of rumor and 
speculation. Of course, such gaps give the reader ample room to personalize the tale with 
those sins that are both most alarming and most delicious; they also suggest that Dorian 
might not understand them himself. In spite of the claim he makes to Basil, that “[e]ach 
of us has Heaven and Hell in him,” Dorian spends so little time in self-reflection it is 
doubtful he really understands the terms (175). From the beginning of the story Dorian 
Gray proves a beautiful, if unexpectedly obtuse, subject, a bit like the adolescent Don 
Juan as conceived by Byron. Upon seeing himself in Basil’s portrait, the reader is told, 
“[a] look of joy came into his eyes, as if he had recognized himself for the first 




his reflection that is such a novelty, the reader is left wondering how the boy shaves or 
ties his tie; if, however, this is his first experience seeing the other side of himself, the 
one that encompasses the passionate, sexual, even vicious possibilities of human nature, 
the reaction makes more sense. Had the portrait been hung in the drawing room rather 
than hidden away in the nursery, had Dorian launched into a series of Juanesque 
encounters recounted in the pages of the book as well as at the dinner table, had the 
effects of those encounters been allowed to mark the beauty of the boy as well as the 
paint, then The Picture of Dorian Gray might have turned out to be an aesthetic comedy 
rather than an aesthetic tragedy. But this does not happen; the essence of the tragedy is 
that the boy’s secrets are secret, even from himself. Dorian speaks of his childhood in 
terms romantic rather than realistic (the same way Swinburne’s Tannhäuser initially 
remembers his service as knight) calling his nursery an emblem of “the stainless purity of 
his boyish life” (135). The elaborate course of aesthetic experimentation he undertakes in 
hopes of finding a new way to live, a course about which the reader is told in exhaustive 
detail, has nothing to do with the self—he researches exotic perfumes, South American 
music, and literary jewels—and, unsurprisingly, no new personal philosophy results. 
Only his portrait, shut away in the upstairs nursery, marks any change, any development 
in the man, and the mildew, dust, and mice suggest that Dorian does not get up to the 
nursery to make note of those changes very often. He sails the course of his life without 
looking. Dorian is disintegrated; he has two selves, one acknowledged, one not. The artist 
discovers that second self, distilling it into the portrait, but even then the man does not 
recognize himself in, or understand, the representation—he sees only his secrets, not 




acknowledge or comprehend them; he thinks he understands himself because his image 
hangs on the wall, but he does not. He cannot. He lacks the fundamental intellectual 
equipment. More to the point, he thinks the other half of nature can be hidden away, but 
as the story proves, it cannot.  
Likewise, in Stevenson, the good Doctor Jekyll has disintegrated—one body has 
split itself into two. The actions of that second, “evil” Hyde persona are, in the text, 
largely unexpressed. (There is even room for doubt about those crimes which are 
mentioned—the reader is given only third-hand accounts of Hyde running down a child 
and clubbing a Member of Parliament.) In his confession, Jekyll admits to, but still 
defends, a youthful “duplicity”: “I concealed my pleasures…It was thus rather the 
exacting nature of my aspirations than any particular degradation in my faults, that made 
me what I am and, with even a deeper trench than in the majority of men, severed in me 
those provinces of good and ill which divide and compound man’s dual nature” (115-6). 
It is science, rather than art, which distills these unspoken secrets into the putative 
deformity of Hyde, and for a time, Jekyll revels in both the anonymity of his sins and the 
amnesia—in the fact that he has secrets he does not even tell himself. But, as with Dorian 
Gray, man cannot thrive in disintegrated form, and eventually the Hyde identity overtakes 
the Jekyll identity and dies. As with Dorian Gray, the diffidence of the man about facing 
his own sins is echoed in the bashfulness of the text about recounting them; the text 
expects the reader to do the work of their creation and comprehension. In this way, the 
text sets the reader a test, a natural opportunity to demonstrate that they are more 
intelligent, more aware, less flawed, less blind than the protagonists with whom the 




mechanism suggests that these texts, overtly less provocative than an obvious adaptation 
of a libertine work like Don Juan, are nonetheless trolling for the kind of readership for 
whom open secrets are not secrets at all. (One wonders if Jane Austen’s demureness on 
the subject of Wickham’s true character—a subject Elizabeth, and thus the reader, can 
only partly divine—was meant to imply something much more sordid than a picker-up of 
money, where available, and unguarded feckless girls.) Postmodernity likes to think of 
the nineteenth century as a departure from its Augustan forebears, a layered cultural 
construct consisting of a consciousness of gentle domesticity glossing over a political 
subconscious of prostitutes, syphilis, green carnations, and flagellation parlors. Perhaps, 
outside the schoolroom, at least, the domestic consciousness was less blind than we think, 
and readers, even of mainstream, unprovocative fiction, were accustomed not just to fill 
the gaps in the text with a negotiated reality, as Iser suggest, but to make note of them as 
signifiers of a flaw in the viewpoint character as well as the focal one. 
Or perhaps we read more literally than we like to think. When filling in the 
biographical gaps for those authors who were not untiring diarists (in the manner of 
Casanova or Pepys), it is common to turn to their fiction for clues, under the assumption 
that writers write what they know. To judge from their collected works, Byron, 
Baudelaire, Swinburne, and Beardsley all seem to know quite a lot about sexual matters, 
vice, and deviancy. As Aesthetes and Decadents—or just the “mad, bad, and dangerous 
to know” brand of Romantic—their reputations are built upon it. But the power relied 
upon by libertine literature and pornography to simulate the effects of sexual experience 
in the absence of sex suggests that their knowledge need not have been derived from 




Even when they speak of their sins, their accounts may be unreliable. Some critics are 
careful to distinguish between intellectual interest and sexual practice: Richard 
Dellamora, for instance, classifies Swinburne as a “not-homosexual” in modern terms, on 
the grounds that “male-male sexuality was a central imaginative fact” (218), rather than 
what we might now term a lifestyle choice. The distinction neatly avoids involving 
Swinburne, a highly individual thinker with idiosyncratic interests, in modern and 
potentially anachronistic debates on matters of essentialism in gender and sexual practice.  
Even Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick notes, in her prefatory axioms to Epistemology of the 
Closet, that the extraordinary variation in individual sexual realities complicates, though 
does not undermine, the modern impulse to identify and delineate sexual identities.81 
Unfortunately, not all critics are so careful. John Selwyn Gilbert’s 1982 documentary for 
the BBC, “Aubrey Beardsley and His Work,” for example, remarks upon Beardsley’s 
stated intention, in a letter, to show up to a popular restaurant “dressed up as a tart,” 
coupled with his obvious interest in women dressing as a subject of illustration, as 
evidence of a transvestitist tendency. The narrator questions whether the letter is 
serious—the recipient was John Lane, with whom Beardsley was often facetious—but in 
spite of the tone and the potential for a metaphoric, rather than literal, reading of the 
claim, Brian Reade, as commentator, asserts that Beardsley’s interest in, and practice of, 
transvestitism is an “inescapable” conclusion. He points to the itemization of women’s 
clothing in The Story of Venus and Tannhäuser as proof. (There is no indication, 
incidentally, in Beardsley’s letters that he went to dinner at all on that occasion, nor is 
there any other reference to cross-dressing.) Given the circumstances of Beardsley’s 




his own impish verbal perversity—the conclusion seems anything but inescapable. 
Indeed, since Beardsley, like Swinburne, Baudelaire, and Byron before him, writes 
specifically about characters involved in projects of seductive experience that, thanks 
sometimes to happy accident and sometimes to careful curation, are meant to test, 
trouble, and break down definitions of identity, any claims to essential anything—be it 
gender, class, sexuality, or religious belief—based on his work seem rash.82 These stories 
seem to be cautionary tales, warning us against a rush to identify and demarcate, against 
the inclination to push the boat out too far in supposing either essentialism or pose. 
Baudelaire writes a Valmont who is an irreligious sexual manipulator, yet is capable of 
extraordinary self-sacrifice—is he villain or hero; Byron gives us a Don Juan who dresses 
as a woman, lives in a harem, and sleeps with women—are we to label him a transvestite, 
a lesbian, or just a guy with extraordinary luck? If, as Wilde contends in De Profundis, 
“the supreme vice is shallowness,” such labels, when allocated categorically and without 
reservation, may be more perverse than the experiences they attempt to label.   
The final implication of this study is by way of being a minor endorsement of 
interdisciplinary media criticism. We have seen how, in all four cases, these writers have 
unearthed old stories and renewed them for rhetorical purpose, in effect making old 
stories about seduction themselves seductive in new times and to new audiences. In most 
cases, this necessitated a change in genre—Don Juan jumped from play to pantomime to 
poem, Valmont from novel to criticism, Tannhäuser from song to opera to poem to 
illustrated novel. In each case, narratives were significantly reconfigured—redesigned 
rather than adapted. In modern parlance, their stories were “rebooted.” In the twenty-first 




progressed from mere literary adaptation to full-scale literary reinvention across genres, 
so much so that the distinctions between disciplines that study those genres—literature 
studies, genre studies, film studies, television studies—appear to be at best arbitrary and 
at worst detrimental to more complete understanding of the development of the narrative 
over time. It is no longer the case that, if a book sells, they make a movie of it and no 
more is heard. Books spawn movies that spawn television spin-offs and tie-in novels that 
spawn comic books and fan-fiction that become extended universes for new movies and 
television shows. Books spawn movies that spawn theme parks. Theme parks spawn 
movies that spawn books.83  
Story now spends so much time in dialogue with itself we have an elaborate 
lexicon of common-use terms to delineate the kind of challenge presented: the 
“crossover”, a mixing of two or more story worlds; “retroactive continuity” or “retcon,” 
the alteration of the facts of a preexisting storyline in order to make new contradictory 
characters or events possible, to correct factual errors, or to smooth over preexisting 
discontinuity; and the “reboot,” the reimagining of all but the essential elements of a 
preexisting story, as a way of freeing it entirely from the demands of continuity without 
completely severing the connection with the parent narrative. As we have seen over the 
course of this argument, story renovations (as opposed to new literary constructions) 
allow long-running stories to enjoy the simultaneous benefits of familiarity and novelty; 
they can cross generations, attracting new audiences or readers with at least a degree of 
contemporary relevance, while retaining former audiences through nostalgia.84 They can 
be forward-looking and reactionary at the same time. All three methods of reinvention 




bodies, composed of bone, flesh, and space. Bone is those components of the story that 
are brought forward, either because they are necessary for the recognition of the old story 
as part of the genealogy of the new (to excite that nostalgic response) or because they 
contain some critical dynamic that is part of the continuing message of the evolved 
storyline. Flesh is composed of those aspects of the preceding stories that are deemed 
irrelevant or outmoded and which may be safely stripped away. The space—Iser’s 
gaps—is made up of those inconsistencies or omissions in the parent narrative that give 
the reinventor the room to speculate, that first toehold from which to begin to conceive 
the narrative successor. The relevant critical questions regarding such reboots and retcons 
are the same questions I have been asking about the more canonical literary reinventions 
discussed in this argument: what is it about the bones of a story that makes them relevant 
to both the parent and progeny narratives, and what rhetorical function is served by the 
changes made and the material added to the parent narrative? The fact that such 
reinventions may have jumped the barrier between genres, or even between media, 
should be irrelevant; the relevant issue is that the variations on a story—Don Juan, 
Tannhäuser, Star Trek—come together to create a canon of their own, each element of 
which is in dialogue with both on the canon as a whole and its own context, the sum of 
the whole providing practically endless—if hairsplitting on matters of generic or media 
legitimacy can be avoided—material for examination. Because the way Byron, 
Baudelaire, Swinburne, and Beardsley read, reacted, and rewrote is the way we write 











1 Oscar Mandel puts the date of composition of El Burlador de Sevilla y convidado de piedra between 1612 
and 1616, even though it did not turn up in print until 1630.  See also Wade. 
 
2 Postmodernity has too.  In a December 18, 1988 New York Times theater review entitled “Don Juan in His 
Own Language,” theater critic Richard Shepard reckoned that more than 40 authors had taken a stab at the 
“profligate and profaner” since his invention. The occasion for such notice in the popular press?  A 27th 
Street Spanish-language revival of the 1844 Zorilla drama Don Juan Tenorio. Laclos’ antihero Valmont 
transitions from the page to the big screen in at least two English-language films (the 1988 Dangerous 
Liaisons, played by John Malkovich, and the 1989 Valmont, played by Colin Firth) and one Korean, the 
2003 Seukaendeul. Casanova is an old standby, revived eponymously at least 16 times on the big and small 
screen, beginning with the 1918 Hungarian silent film and ending—so far—in 2005 when he was the 
subject of two very different treatments in the motion picture starring Heath Ledger and the BBC 
miniseries where David Tennant and Peter O’Toole share the title role. Some ideas, it seems, will not die. 
 
3 For a detailed explanation of the convergence between the libertine text and the libelous tract, see Section 
III, “Do Books Cause Revolutions?” in Darnton.   
 
4 The editor’s preface to Dangerous Liaisons appears to expect a female audience, specifically imagining a 
mother passing the text along to her daughter on her wedding day. (Janie Vanpée notes the potential for 
irony here, that the text may be intended as either a what-to-avoid or a how-to.) Yet correspondence 
between Laclos and the novelist Marie-Jeanne Riccoboni suggests that an actual female audience is a good 
deal less comfortable with the characterization of women in the novel and its didactic capability. For 
further discussion of the correspondence and Laclos’ handling of the objections, see both Vanpée and 
Antoinette Sol.  
 
5 Sigmund Freud’s ambivalence toward his subject colored the perceptions of a century of critics when, in 
1914, he termed seduction, the central precept of his now-abandoned seduction theory, “passive sexual 
experiences in the first years of childhood”—in effect, rape plus pedophilia, no discourse required (17). 
Later critics studying seduction narratives opened up the definition only slightly. Donna Bontatibus, for 
instance, studying early American examples, defines seduction as “a euphemism for the most abusive 
means of maintaining women’s allegiance to the new nation,” or rape in the service of political 
determinism (she even terms the infant nation a “rape culture”) (5). For Elizabeth Barnes, these same 
seduction narratives leverage the confusion between seductive manipulation and patriarchal caretaking, 
thus both a subversion of the interpretive faculties and an overt projection of physical power and familial 
authority. 
 
6 In de Sade’s works, servants are seen, not heard—called upon to perform a great many sexual acrobatics, 
but they do not say much. Their acts are narrated or explicated instead by their social superiors, as in 
Philosophy in the Bedroom’s seventh dialogue.  
 
7 Ros Ballaster proposes a similar idea, much more succinctly, in the course of her study of very early 
eighteenth-century seduction narratives by women’s writers and the gender-based struggle for 
epistemological control: “The telling of a story of seduction is also a mode of seduction” (24).  
 
8 Like Barthes, Roy Roussel, Thomas Di Piero, and Katherine Binhammer also emphasize discourse as 
seduction’s primary tool in their analyses of eighteenth-century narratives, but locate interpretation (and 
misinterpretation) as the primary event. Roussel classifies seduction according to outcome: in one type, the 





lover] to do the same. Then he tells his friends”; in the other, the susceptibility that is initially feigned 
becomes real, and the man begins to seek “a truly personal desire” and ultimately surrenders himself (21). 
Di Piero widens the scope of the seducer’s mimicry; seducers use “unstable and duplicitous language and 
behavior” to feign stability and social legitimacy and manipulate expectation (237). Binhammer, 
uncharacteristically positive in her view of the subject, glosses over any duplicitous intent in the seducer in 
favor of interest in the reception of the seducer’s language and behavior by the victim; seduction presents a 
problem of interpretation to which the seduction narrative, which acts as a kind of field guide to what she 
calls “the semiotics of love,” is a solution (6). 
 
9 For an examination of Seduction as an antifeminist polemic that ironically violates Baudrillard’s own 
pretensions to seductive discourse—which the author terms “hype”—see Andres Ross.  
 
10 It may be useful to recall that Letter 34 is addressed to the Marquise de Merteuil, and thus is an exhibit 
from the primary seduction (which Baudrillard considers the only seduction) that occurs in the novel—
Valmont’s failed coercion of Merteuil, the scheme that is meant to be furthered by the successful 
seductions of Tourvel and Cécile. As such, the contention, in writing, that seduction is best conducted in 
speech may be an ironic statement designed to disarm the prey and conceal the intent of the letter (989). 
Alternatively, it may be that Valmont’s seduction of Merteuil fails because, exiled to the country, he is 
unable to maintain the enclosed world that seduction seems to require; only Cécile remains within his reach 
throughout the novel.   
 
11 Such ignorance may be more than just a rhetorical pretense; strategic obtuseness may be necessary to 
milking the libertine experience of its pleasure. In “Casanova, Inscriptions of Forgetting,” Chantal Thomas 
contends that it “guarantees two elements of the pleasure principle: not seeking to know whenever 
knowledge might lead to a reduction in pleasure, and rejecting out of hand, at every point, any insinuation 
of guilt” (37). 
 
12 The reader is, after all, the insider, part of the “we” rather than the “they.” Case in point—half a dozen 
pages before this moment of flattering address, Casanova brings up his penchant for deception: “You will 
laugh when you discover I often had no scruples about deceiving nitwits and scoundrels and fools… I 
always congratulate myself when I remember catching them in my snares, for they are insolent and 
presumptuous to the point of challenging intelligence. We avenge intelligence when we deceive a fool… 
for a fool is encased in armor and we do not know where to attack him” (16). If the reader is laughing at the 
deception, then the reader cannot possibly be the nitwit it targets, so the structural similarity in the twin 
images of the fool in armor and the salamander toughened by flame must be accidental. 
 
13 The BBC mini-series Casanova actualizes this framing by splitting Casanova into two characters and two 
separate processes of seduction, a split identity that disarms by the appearance of adolescence and 
impotence simultaneously—the old Casanova recalls the adventures of his younger self for the benefit of a 
kitchen maid, leaning heavily on the appearance of infirmity to get and keep her attentions, while the young 
Casanova’s seductions are, by contrast, initiated recklessly, fecklessly, and with a hyperactive abandon; too 
little capability as a foil for too little thought, each concealing the effectiveness of its component seduction. 
To be clear, in the mini-series the aged Casanova does not debauch the kitchen maid—he dies too soon, 
and it is never clear if sex is his aim—but as a result of his seduction he does receive from her care, 
attention, and respect not otherwise accorded to him by other servants of the Castle Dux. 
 
14 Gulemot’s definition of pornography is coy, but clear, and relies solely on reader response: “A piece of 
writing is pornographic if it triggers in the reader certain physiological reactions, which I trust I shall not 
have to elaborate upon” (134). The argument then moves almost immediately into considerations of 
pornography’s philosophical addenda. Hunt’s list of such characteristics is also weighted in favor of the 
philosophical, but seems to adequately reflect the common theoretical foci of scholars of pornography: 
“free-thinking and heresy, to science and natural philosophy, and to attacks on absolutist political 
authority… [as well as] gender differentiations…”(11). For accounts of the application of pornography to 
sugar-coat various ideological pills, see Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Connell, Richard Darnton, Paula Findlen, 





the history of pornography. Perhaps in its pure, philosophically uninflected state, pornography is too self-
evident to merit analysis. 
 
15 Even Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, in spite of being an almost continuous series of sex 
acts which include repeated orgies, has to create a highly artificial postorgy storytelling scene, a narrative 
interruption that introduces extremely brief subplots, in order to get out of Fanny’s head.  
 
16 J. Rives Childs contests it briefly; Norwich considers and discounts it in the preface to the William R. 
Trask translation of History of my Life; Kelly and Lydia Flem fail to consider it at all, preferring instead to 
emphasize Casanova as the illegitimate issue of an actress of unknown antecedents.  
 
17 Unless the reader is a twentieth-century critic, who instead populates Casanova’s prepubescent backstory 
with psycho-sexual concerns. Chantal Thomas follows Fliess in a reading that attributes the incessant 
bleeding to “une activité masturbatoire incessante” (Casanova 354); Kelly posits that “he almost certainly 
caused the nosebleed, himself, exploring and over-exploring his physical self” (27); Flem considers the 
hemorrhage the first futile attempt to reclaim the attentions of a mother in the midst of a narcissistic retreat 
(43), and possibly the source of his affinity with women (195).  
 
18 Emery may insist on assuming Casanova’s intended audience was male; given his flirtatious nature and 
extensive correspondence with women throughout his life, it seems unlikely that Casanova would have 
been so narrow in his preconceptions. 
 
19 Emery notes the similarities in these two episodes, but underplays the contribution of both the power 
dynamic here and the passage of time to Casanova’s self-distancing. It is useful to note that Casanova was 
19 when he met Bellino and 40 when he met Lunin; it is possible that time gave Casanova a degree of 
resistance to the attractions of a pretty face, whatever the gender. It is also possible that, having spent a 
dozen volumes seducing the reader into complacency, Casanova need no longer hide bisexuality under the 
cover of an inexplicable and unavoidable attraction.  
 
20 Usually, but not always, it is the mother. Zaïre, for instance, Casanova’s companion on the Russian leg of 
his travels, is bargained for by the father: “the father had replied that he would be willing [to give Zaïre into 
service], that he must get a hundred rubles because she still had her maidenhead” (986). Casanova is urged 
to check the veracity of this claim, though he contends, generously enough, that he would have completed 
the transaction regardless.  For more on the ramifications of Casanova’s preference for young girls in the 
larger context of Venetian law, see Larry Wolff.  
 
21 Jay Caplan contends that the painter is Boucher; Trask’s notes credit either Gustaf Lundberg, a Swede, or 
Johann Anton Peters, a Boucher copyist. 
 
22Haslett verifies the genealogy in detail in the first third of Byron’s Don Juan and the Don Juan Legend. 
(Her argument, however, relies on emphasizing the similarities between the adolescent Don Juan and his 
roguish forebears.) For a detailed examination of the connections between Don Juan and the conventions, 
staging, and tropes of Regency pantomime, see Graham. 
 
23 Byron undergoes his own dramatic and formative exile; after leaving his wife, escaping to Italy, and 
taking up Don Juan as a project, Byron ends multiple affairs, suffers the death of his daughter Allegra and 
his friend and fellow poet Shelley, takes up revolution, and dies of a cold. See Marchand, volumes II and 
III. 
 
24 A geographical distinction demonstrated in the oft-quoted couplet “what men call gallantry, and gods 
adultery/Is much more common where the climate’s sultry” (I, lxiii) and the less-familiar quatrain “Happy 
all the nations of the moral North!/ Where all is virtue, and the winter season/Sends sin, without a rag on, 
shivering forth/(‘T was snow that brought St. Anthony to reason)…”(I, lxiv).  One wonders if the 






25Andrew Franta argues cogently that all the Romantic poets, including Byron, were concerned about 
reader response and its implications for poetic authority, particularly in the matter of unintended effects, so 
claims about authorial intention and reader manipulation are not out of place. For an examination of 
Byron’s often contentious relationship with his reading (and reviewing) public, see Franklin. 
 
26 Byron was, however, a fan of the picaresque, and counted a deluxe edition of Don Quixote among his 
library possessions. See Boyd’s chapter “Byron’s Library and His Readings” for a more complete list of his 
collection. 
 
27 This is a marked departure from the libertine tradition and would come as a surprise to the protagonists 
of Venus in the Cloister, Roxana, or Fanny Hill, for whom femininity is no bar to a successful libertine 
project. 
 
28 Byron communicates the violence of war through description as well as metaphor; for an assessment of 
the descriptive power of his war scenes, see Rutherford, “Don Juan: War and Realism,” in which he 
considers them “the most impressive of all [Byron’s] attempts to reconcile poetry with truth and wisdom” 
(51). 
 
29 Byron’s revolutionary ideals, manifested in his personal and pecuniary support of the Greek revolt 
against the Turks, are much mentioned in the criticism, but the ambivalence regarding the Turks that may 
underpin this scene is less well known. See Marchand, volume III for a detailed account of Byron’s 
involvement in the Greek uprising. For a briefer account of the Greek/Turk conflict and more on Byron’s 
feelings about Turkey, see Douglas Dakin or Andre Maurois. 
 
30 Byron is circumspect about his motives even in his private communications. Both facetious and 
inscrutable regarding the possibilities, in a letter dated February, 1821, he writes of his intentions for the 
plot thus: 
I mean to take him the tour of Europe, with a proper mix of siege, battle, and adventure, and to 
make him finish as Anarcharsis Cloots in the French Revolution… But I had not quite fixed 
whether to make him end in Hell, or in an unhappy marriage, not knowing which would be the 
severest. The Spanish tradition says Hell: but it is probably only an Allegory of the other State. 
(242-3) 
 
31 He reached it in the end. Just before his death, he undertook the financing of a military unit in the Greek 
resistance; the cold he caught on that battlefield killed him. 
 
32 The notes are seldom considered in their entirety in recent Baudelaire criticism. On the rare occasion 
modern critics examine Baudelaire’s “Notes sur Les Liaisons dangereuses” at all, it is usually for the 
purpose of appropriating a line or two from the notes to frame an argument about Laclos, rather than 
Baudelaire—see Philip Thody and William Mead. Stevens is a notable exception. 
 
33 It is possible Baudelaire’s labelling of Valmont as dandy may be as much an indicator of a self-
recognition as the result of studied rational assessment; Ellen Moers suggests that “Baudelaire used the 
word dandy as a value term, a kind of personal, suggestive, imprecise shorthand. Artists and writers in 
whom he found fellow feelings, and in whom he therefore admired, he would call dandies for reasons 
difficult to decipher; the rest he could then dismiss as non-dandies” (275)—in essence, applying the 
syllogism “I am a dandy, I like you, therefore you must be a dandy too.” 
 
34 Baudelaire catalogues the propensity to be duped extensively in Les Fleurs du mal. Examples includes, 
but are not limited to, “Le Vampire,” “Les Métamorphoses du Vampire,” “Femmes damnés: Delphine et 
Hippolyte,” “Le Possédé,” “L’Amour du mensonge,” “Un Fantôme,” “Le Poison,” “Le Destruction,” and 






35 Thody’s reading of Dangerous Liaisons acknowledges the possibility of a similar conclusion: “[it is 
possible to] see both Valmont and Madame de Merteuil as destroyed not by chance and as a concession to 
official morality, but by the inherently moral consequences of their own acts and attitudes” (834). 
 
36 Baudelaire is not alone on this. For a Freudian reading of the Frears/Hampton 1988 film version of 
Dangerous Liaisons that considers Madame de Merteuil, lesbianism, and the “masculinity complex,” see 
Alan Singerman. 
 
37 Milton may have excoriated pride, but Baudelaire does not. Pride’s value as a positive character trait, 
rather than a deadly sin, part and parcel of the revolutionary spirit, is demonstrated in “Le Peintre de la vie 
moderne,” where the claim is made that dandies “sont des représentants de ce qu’il y a de meilleur dans 
l’orgueil humain, de ce besoin, trop rare chez ceux d’aujourd’hui, de combattre et de détruire la trivialité” 
(1179). The other option, of course, is to deal with the trivial in a manner that is itself significant, a 
common libertine practice.   
 
38
 This fragmented duality fragments further when one considers the labile nature of the language of evil. 
As Edward Kaplan points out in “Baudelairean Ethics,” a study of what he calls “ethical irony,” the word 
“mal” can signify evil, illness, or pain (93). So the “mal se connaissant,” Valmont’s label, can equally be 
read as a student of evil, the libertine perpetrating sin; a student of illness, like the medical men that 
populate Baudelaire’s metaphors; or a student of pain, which, while it can suggest an intentional 
viciousness of the sort seen in the work of de Sade, can also bring to bear an element of empathy. The 
“mal” itself thus has the potential to be understood, healed, or pitied.  
 
39 Thody characterizes Baudelaire’s reading of Tourvel as “extreme approval” and the source of “an 
essentially progressive and humanistic interpretation” of Laclos’ novel (832).   
 
40 “Baudelaire, lecteur de Laclos” (29). I would question whether, given the references to ashes, paint, and 
dirt, all accretions of inert particles, Baudelaire was willing to credit them even with the sentience of 
animality. 
 
41 Valmont’s destructiveness may have only added to the appeal; Pichois describes the source of 
Baudelaire’s zeal as “anger [that] transcended politics,” noting that the poet “was fighting neither for the 
Republic, nor for the revolution, but satisfying a deeper instinct for revolt” (160). 
 
42 Most versions lean heavily on the good adventurer and the evil fairy. The seducing fairy is a common 
trope in folklore, crossing into literature early in the Odyssey, in the account of Odysseus’s sojourn with 
Calypso, and much later in such nineteenth-century classics as Anderson’s “The Little Mermaid”, Keats’ 
Lamia and La Belle Dame sans Merci, and even Tennyson’s Lady of Shalott. For the historical and cultural 
scope of the trope, see Barbara Fass (15-26). For a précis of the debate staged in Grimm and Krappe about 
the possible Celtic origins of Tannhäuser, see Simpson, who also dismantles the Wagnerian version into its 
component myths and inspirations.     
 
43 For a brief précis of the numerous mythological sources for the story, see Simpson. For a collection of 
the various versions of the folksong, as well as an in-depth discussion tracing the twin motifs of the 
Tannhäuser seduction and the Venusberg through fifteenth-, sixteenth-, and seventeenth-century German 
mythology, as well as the Tannhäuser tale’s intersection with Grail myth, Parsifal, and the Schwanritter, 
see Barto.  
 
44 Why this would be the case is not clear, as the poem does not appear to make any changes to the 
condition of immortality that is normally associated with Tannhäuser’s sojourn in the Venus-Hill; it may be 
that Venus’ demotion from goddess to middle-class housewife makes her equally susceptible to the human 
emotion of ennui. 
 





46 In any sense of the word; in a later letter to William Rossetti, dated 25 November, 1862, Swinburne takes 
exceptional delight that the divine Marquis cannot spell.  See Letters, vol. 1, page 63.  
 
47 Jeremy Mitchell contends that pain “is absolutely central to [Swinburne’s] genius” in an argument that 
traces the influences of the divine Marquis and masochism upon all the works in Poems and Ballads. 
 
48 In an examination of Swinburne’s Atalanta in Calydon, T. D. Olverson links this impulse to Swinburne’s 
Hellenism, a philosophy predicated on spiritual eroticism which underpins the notion that “the pursuit of 
pleasure can be seen as virtuous and spiritually and philosophically enhancing” and thus a valid topic for 
public consideration (773). 
 
49 Some readers did exactly this, and complained—in 1901 Swinburne writes at least two apologies 
regarding that epigraph. To H.G. Fiedler he writes “I am quite sorry that you had so much trouble about 
Maistre Gaget. I must confess that he and his book…were pure inventions of my own at a rather early age, 
when I was fond of trying my hand at imitations of medieval French prose and Latin verse” (Letters VI 
150). Charles Carrington’s letter must have been more flattering, as Swinburne “confess[es] the youthful 
sin of forgery” while being “highly honoured and gratified by your estimate of my early improvisations in 
old French” (Letters VI 156).  For Swinburne’s forgotten female readership, see Heather Seagroatt. 
 
50 This is not to argue that all poetry must be syntactically accurate. However, the Tannhäuser tradition is 
quite normative in its deployment of antecedents, even when the version is not a translation. Consider the 
definitiveness of the following example from the Lytton-Fane “idyll,” written first and only in English: 
“Large fame and lavish service had she then,/ Venus yclep’d, of all the Olympian crew/ Least continent of 
Spirits and most fair” (16). The inverted syntax and the forced archaism may not be every critic’s cup of 
tea, but the subject of the sentence is nonetheless painfully clear.   
 
51 When she is named, eight stanzas in, it is only after the speaker’s thoughts have turned to the incorporeal, 
comparing the beloved to the Virgin Mary. Even then, it is not clear if Venus is a name or just another 
metaphor.   
 
52 Allison Pease’s discussion of Swinburne’s critical reception suggests that this challenging of boundaries 
permeates the poet’s work: “Within the debate over Poems and Ballads the margins constructed between 
civilization and nature, order and chaos, procreation and perversion, and male and female are all raised, 
deconstructed, and…reconstructed by Swinburne in his heated public response…” (43)  
 
53 Her concerns are so human she even submits herself to the processes of law; see Sarah Westphal on Die 
Mörin, the fifteenth-century tale in which Venus is the lead plaintiff in a class action against a seducer.    
 
54 See Malcolm Davies for the Biblical implications and connection to Heracles at the Crossroads. 
 
55 As fairy seductions go, though, this encounter is quite bland. It is not clear whether the goddess ever even 
notices Tannhäuser, much less encourages him; it is as though he is being led around by his own eyes.  Fass 
finds that, in this poem, “imagination seems threatened by reduction to the merely erotic, almost justifying 
the medieval belief that imagination is a product of the senses and like them to be condemned as unhealthy 
and evil” (189). If this is the case, Tannhäuser has a great deal of imagination to be condemned for. 
 
56 See Morgan, “Reimagining Masculinity in Victorian Criticism.” 
 
57 Robert Peters’ reading of the sea’s “panting mouth of dry desire” in stanza 10 as a “magnificent symbol 
of lust…which suggests and intensifies Tannhäuser’s tortured erotic state” points out its simultaneously 
impossible, yet perpetual conditions—wet/dry; sated/insatiable—demonstrating that, even when not 
juxtaposed with the shore, the ocean has its own symbolic paradoxicality (79). 
 
58 Suicidal depression here may not be as likely a reading at it seems, as Swinburne himself did not seem to 





rejects the possibility of ennui, remarking salaciously on the knight’s hypothetical response to the Titian 
Venus: “…four lazy fingers buried dans les fleurs de son jardin—how any creature can be decently 
virtuous within thirty square miles of it passes my comprehension. I think with her Tannhäuser need not 
have been bored—even till the end of the world” (Letters I 99). Swinburne’s reaction also points up the 
power of an abstraction to excite desire, validating the knight’s fervid devotion to an essentially passive 
object. Harrison and Julian Baird tend to privilege suffering over erotic potential in Tannhäuser’s 
formation; see “Swinburne’s Losses” and “Swinburne, Sade and Blake,” respectively. 
 
59 Curiously, the expression “broken on the wheel” has itself become an idiom for weariness in German, 
Dutch, and Swedish. 
 
60 Waite also notes that the Venusberg was popularly believed to be a source for magical learning, a 
historical presupposition that underscores its pedagogical fitness as a locale for such an intense course of 
self-scrutiny.  
 
61 McGann notes in his discussion of “Ave Atque Vale” that, in pairing analogous terms, Swinburne is 
defining limits of a spectrum which he then subdivides into further limits, as if chasing the boundaries 
between them (Swinburne 171). 
 
62 Nor is it new to contemporary audiences; Baudelaire omits consideration of the redemption scene from 
his analysis of Wagner’s opera, and the Paris audience booed all the way through the third act. 
 
63 For more on the difficulties the terseness of Beardsley’s letters have created for his biographers, see 
Linda Zatlin’s “Drawing Conclusions: Beardsley and Biography.” 
 
64 In an April 8, 1896 letter to Smithers, Beardsley describes it as “the last century once more” (Letters 
123), but by May 2 it has “been spoilt, begun again and carried up to the point where the will alone is 
wanting” (129). Apparently the will remained wanting. The submission of illustrations to The Savoy for 
“Under the Hill” also included St. Rose of Lima and For the Third Tableau of ‘Das Rheingold’; it is not 
clear in the letters whether Beardsley considers the former part of the body of work for the Tannhäuser—
the editors identify it with the “drawing No. 2” submitted to Smithers and mentioned in the letter of April 1, 
1896 (121), but Beardsley has also spoken of Toilet of Helen as the second illustration to Smithers on 
November 7 of the previous year (103). The disposition of the Rheingold piece as other than part of “Under 
the Hill” is clarified on April 10, when Beardsley admits to mis-ascribing it (124). In spite of the title and 
contrary to Zatlin (Sexual Politics 197), Sutton (31), or Reade (350), The Return of Tannhäuser to the 
Venusberg was apparently not designed for The Story of Venus and Tannhäuser, but instead to 
simultaneously pay a debt and round out Smithers’ collection of Beardsley’s work, A Book of Fifty 
Drawings (see October 4 letter, 177). 
 
65 An abbé or chevalier, depending on Beardsley’s iteration. It is interesting to recall that Casanova styled 
himself the Chevalier de Seingalt while in the French court, though he held claim to no French titles; 
Tannhäuser, too, may be guilty of similar self-aggrandizement. 
 
66 Addison Bross emphasizes the synesthetic effect on the reader: the puffery and texture impart “a highly 
empathetic, sensual delight in the body’s being softly rubbed and supported by mounds of cloth…able to 
give one a sense of womb-like pleasure and security” (15). So not only is Tannhäuser infantilized by being 
swaddled in such sumptuous clothes, but so, by extension, is the reader. The act of viewing the illustration 
creates a condition whereby the Chevalier and the audience share the same feeling of immaturity—an 
immaturity to be rectified, one assumes, by further experience of the text.  
 
67 Matthew Sturgis credits this transformation to “long study of Watteau, Lancret, St. Aubyn, Cochin, Dorat 
and the rococo masters of French illustration” and the French drawings Beardsley collected (261). 
 
68The narrator remarks facetiously at one point that, though it is common to “paint heroes who can give a 





suggesting that the knight is not, in fact, entirely up to the task of satisfying Venus—other residents of the 
Venusberg break in afterwards and claim Venus for an orgy (55). But then, Byron’s hero was not up to 
satisfying Gulbeyaz’s rapacity either. 
 
69 A more complete explanation can be found in Marcus (272-3), but the gist of the requirement is two-fold: 
in pornography, nature is envisioned as an “immense, supine female form,” and there is no “out there.” For 
Marcus, this speaks of pornography’s basis in infantile perspectives. It also happens to be the lover’s 
perspective, a relocation of the deeply intimate gaze Swinburne’s Tannhäuser confines to his beloved’s 
head and neck, as well as the perspective of a personified phallus; as Potolsky notes, the faux dedication of 
the book to Cardinal Pezzoli is a pun on “pizzle” (“Decadent Counterpublic” 20), making The Story of 
Venus and Tannhäuser in effect the penis’ book. If, however, some larger analogy between Tannhäuser’s 
journey through the Venusberg and sexual intercourse is intended, the story is too unfinished to see the 
metaphor through.  
 
70 Sometimes they are merely imaginary, as in the lambs’ tails in moonlight, ice cream with gold beams, or 
the bream in a beef-based sauce (24-5). Depending on whose account you prefer, royalist or Roundhead, 
Lucy Waters was either wife or mistress to Charles II. In either incarnation, she had a reputation for 
lascivious behavior, so a tart filled with the fruit of Adam’s fall, in the manner of a courtesan/fallen queen, 
is bound to be a sinful dish, or an interesting sexual encounter, if “tart” is given its slang meaning of 
“prostitute.” 
 
71 Linda Dowling contends that this is merely covert mockery of the sexual peccadillos of other Aesthetes, 
but does not account for the tidy organization of deviancy by type (“Satire of Decadence” 35); as Beardsley 
had a copy of the 1895 edition of Psychopathia Sexualis on his bookshelf, it may be reasonable to suppose 
he was pursuing a larger critique of deviancy and its mystification in medical texts; see note 25 in Zatlin 
(“Aubrey Beardsley’s ‘Japanese’ Grotesques” 106). 
 
72 This disinclination to name names is typical of the chronique scandaleuse, and can be seen in Manley’s 
New Atalantis and Oldham’s “Sardanapalus,” among others, where it functions to both protect the writer 
from charges of libel or worse in a politically-motivated attack and titillate the reader with the possibility of 
knowing the participants in the scandal,.. “Sardanapalus” and the “language of blame” found in politically-
motivated English pornography is discussed in Weil; the impact of the chronique scandaleuse and 
pamphleteering’s role in bringing down the French monarchy is discussed in Darnton. Titillation is not the 
sole advantage to this pretense of intimacy; as we saw in Chapter 2, it also fosters the connection between 
seducer and victim that makes submission to the seducer appear desirable. Here, that pretense of inclusion 
turns the reader who reads on into a de facto conspirator in the adventures of Tannhäuser and his works in 
the Venusberg. 
 
73 These names do not appear to have any particular literary or historical significance, although many in the 
Venusberg do, being named for lovers—Sarrasine, the sculptor from La Comedie Humaine; Millamant 
from The Way of the World; Florizel from A Winter’s Tale; Vadius, the scholar who benefits from l’amour 
du grec in Les Femmes Savantes; La Popelinière, mistress to the Duc de Richelieu; Amadour, husband to 
St. Veronica and himself a saint—a selection both decadent and cosmopolitan in that it spans multiple eras, 
none of them quite contemporary,  and several nations. There is no indication that these characters know 
themselves to be allusively named. Except for Sarrasine, all the lovers are presented uncoupled from their 
beloveds, consistent with the idea of exile and also implying a certain cynical twist on literary happy 
endings.  
 
74 The style is Rococo, with particular emphasis placed on the looping garlands, like ropes, on every 
garment. There are an extraordinary variety of coiffeur decorations, worn in the mid-eighteenth-century 
manner. The dwarves wear pantaloons and wigs held perilously close to open flame. For the most part, 
female attendants are attired in gowns with tight, sometimes low-cut bodices and vast skirts, and have the 
rounded faces and small chins of a Fragonard or a Boucher subject. The males sport cavalier curls with lace 






75 See Le grand dictionnaire des précieuses: ou La clef de la langue des ruelles and Les précieuses 
ridicules, respectively, collected in Livet’s two-volume Le dictionnaire des précieuses. Sutton poses a 
contrary argument that the language in Beardsley is meant to mock; though “ostensibly so unrelated to 
Wagner’s works” it is intended as “parody of Wagner’s operas”—in particular his formality and 
nationalistic fervor (144).  
 
76 For more on les précieuses as a proto-feminist construct, see Myriam Maître or Roger Duchêne. The 
connection between the Venusberg and these salons is further underscored by the borrowing of the name 
Rambouillet for Venus’ cook in Chapter 3. 
 
77 Haldane Macfall, for instance, criticizes the language of the prose as “pedantic,” “uneducated,” and 
“dead,” a “crude vulgarity” (80), while Trail damns the text with ironic praise, labeling the story a 
“perfectly wrought tour de force” whose expurgated version nonetheless “achieves a higher art” because of 
what it leaves out, suggesting that, contrary to its denotation, perfection is a journey rather than a 
destination (22). 
 
78 It is impossible not to comment on the demure restraint of this scene; outside of one man partially naked 
in the corner and Venus’ bare breasts, all the usual perversely sexual tropes of Beardsley’s work—embryos, 
phalluses, femmes fatale—are missing. The illustrations completed for this text are so tame that they never 
seem to be chosen for the covers of collections or criticism; at least one modern publisher pulls an 
illustration from Salome for the cover of The Story of Venus and Tannhäuser, even though Salome is not 
included in the volume. Possibly it is more “Beardley-esque.” 
 
79 For more on eighteenth-century dress as a possible signifier of female sexual deviancy in Beardsley’s 
theatrical illustrations, see Bridget Elliott. 
 
80 Zatlin, for instance, sees this illustration as a necessarily restrained allusion to eighteenth-century 
pornography’s taste for depictions of priapic worship as part of a larger consideration of the influence of 
French pornography on Beardsley’s illustration; see the version of “Beardsley Redresses Venus” as 
published in Victorian Poetry. 
 
81 This is not to say she does not advocate such inquiry; in fact, she goes on to bemoan the tendency among 
academics to dismiss the relevance of modern sexual identities to historical contexts (52-3). 
 
82 Not that these are the only authors—nor the only sexual philosophy—to undertake such hands-on 
projects of development. For a detailed account of the complicated relationship between Oxford Hellenism, 
homosexual practice, masculinity, and effeminacy, see Dowling, Hellenism and Homosexuality in 
Victorian Oxford.  
  
83 For an example of the first point, consider the Star Wars universe. George Lucas uses the Star Wars 
original trilogy to exemplify, among other things, the mythic structures of the hero’s journey proposed by 
Joseph Campbell in The Hero with a Thousand Faces; Star Wars eventually comes to television as the 
animated Clone Wars series, while also generating a vast quantity of tie-in and expanded-universe fiction. 
Both iterations feed later big- and small-screen projects that continue to flesh out the narrative, creating 
their own tie-in and extended universe novels, etc. For an example of the latter point, look to the Harry 
Potter franchise, which gave rise to, among other things, a theme attraction called The World of Harry 
Potter, and the Pirates of the Caribbean theme park ride, which gave rise to a four-film franchise of the 
same name. I cannot help but think that Swinburne, Byron, et al., would have approved of such a blurring 
of the lines between narrative and experience.   
 
84 For a discussion of the possibilities of fanfiction, an independent and mostly online community-
dependent genre of writing that is, by definition, “in a constant state of conversation and exchange,” with 
varying degrees of fealty to context and canon, while generating a simply staggering amount of content, see 
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